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Abstract 
This thesis is comprised of a translation of and commentary on Ennead III.7, 
‘On Eternity and Time’ as well as an interpretative essay. The aim of this 
thesis is to demonstrate that eternity and time are, for Plotinus, modes which 
make the experience of the contents of Intellect and Soul possible, rather 
than features of reality existing independently of human subjectivity. As 
modes of subjectivity, eternity and time can be conceived as emanations 
from the One in a different way to the hypostases, since the hypostases are 
causes and containers of the realities human beings experience, whereas 
eternity and time are the keys which unlock these realms of experience. I 
therefore argue that Plotinus distinguishes eternity from Intellect and time 
from Soul by presenting eternity and time as internal conditions of 
possibility for experience in contrast to Intellect and Soul, which are 
external conditions of possibility for experience. I also show that Plotinus 
distinguishes eternity and time, and calls time an image of eternity, because 
eternity is the natural desireless mode of subjectivity which allows man to 
experience all things, whereas time is man’s desiring mode of subjectivity 
which blinds him to Intellect and entraps him in the sensory world. I argue 
that this desiring mode of subjectivity is, according to Plotinus, the essence 
of time, and I refer to this as ‘psychological time’. I then distinguish 
Plotinus’ conception of the essence of time from his claims about its 
manifestation, which is made up of the ‘before’ and ‘after’ and is produced 
by the hypostasis of Soul. This manifest nature of time I refer to as 
‘mechanical time’. This interpretation enables us to see why time is both a 
product of the human soul and the hypostasis of Soul.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis wishes to justify three main claims pertaining to Ennead III.7.  
Firstly, that eternity and time are not features of human experience but 
rather modes which make human experience possible. Therefore, we claim 
that the notions of eternity and time are in themselves how we experience 
rather than what we experience. This first claim has a number of 
implications. For example, although eternity and time are the how rather 
than the what of experience, the eternal and temporal modes unlock access 
to different strata of reality. And thus, entering into the eternal mode allows 
man to experience the intelligible realities and Intellect itself, whereas 
entering into time conceals these realities from man and allows him to 
perceive only the sensible objects of Soul in the context of present, past and 
future. Furthermore, since eternity and time are the how of experience, there 
is the possibility that one might perceive the what of experience in different 
modes. For example, when man exists within the intelligible realm, if he 
begins to desire more than the timeless presence of Intellect, he will find 
himself entering into an artificial mode of perception within the totally non-
artificial and real realm of Intellect. The inverse is also true: while in the 
realm of Soul, man may recognise and rest in his original state of presence 
and thus discover eternity within the world of generation and destruction. 
This means that man is first temporal and intelligible before he enters into a 
physical body, and first eternal and embodied before escaping further 
incarnations and returning to Intellect. Therefore, while eternity corresponds 
more closely to Intellect, and time more closely to Soul, Soul can be 
perceived eternally and temporal consciousness can be traced back to 
Intellect. And thus, Plotinus neither conceives of time as a purely sensible 
realm, nor of eternity as a purely abstract realm distinct from physical 
existence. Rather he conceives of time as the mode which ushers us into 
physical existence and of eternity as that mode which must be discovered 
while we exist in physical form, so that we may finally be liberated from our 
physical form and return to original formless existence.  
The second claim is that the modes of eternity and time are emanations of 
the One which pertain to man’s subjective states. We therefore say that 
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eternity and time have a different emanatory character to Intellect and Soul 
since Intellect and Soul pertain to objective features of reality such as the 
intelligible and sensible realities which are experienced within man’s 
perception rather than as a state of his perception. Therefore the One can be 
thought of as the peak of a mountain with two sides descending from it. One 
of these sides represents the objective emanation of the One and features 
Intellect and Soul. The other of these sides represents the subjective 
emanation of the One and features eternity and time. The objective side 
descends from the One as hypostases containing elements like mathematical 
sets. The subjective side descends from the One as modes pertaining to 
these hypostases. And indeed, we trace the hypostases and modes as 
descending from the One in this way, since the One can be thought of both 
as a mode and as a hypostasis. For on the one hand, the modal nature of the 
One captures its ineffable and transcendent nature which cannot be grasped 
conceptually. This esoteric1 aspect of the One then transfers its ineffable, 
hidden and mysterious nature to the modes of eternity and time, since 
neither eternity nor time can be grasped in experience, arising as they do as 
modes of experience which can never be known objectively. Thus we claim 
that there are three modes of the esoteric: the One, eternity and time. On the 
other hand, the exoteric2 nature of the One as a cause and container of 
things, is transferred to the hypostases of Intellect and Soul which cause and 
contain the intelligible and sensible realities respectively. We therefore 
claim that there are also three exoteric levels: the One, Intellect and Soul. 
The first mode of the esoteric leads to union with all things; the second 
mode of the esoteric, eternity, unlocks access to the second exoteric level of 
Intellect; and the third mode of the esoteric, time, unlocks access to the third 
exoteric level of Soul. Once this third mode of the esoteric has unlocked 
access to Soul, Soul produces the ‘before’ and ‘after’ which we call 
mechanical time, and which exists distinct from the essence of time as a 
                                                           
1
 We will use the term ‘esoteric’ to refer to the internal conditions of possibility for human 
experience; these modes of human subjectivity are hidden from objective human experience 
and are private and personal, pertaining to the states of each individual human soul. 
2
 We will use the term ‘exoteric’ to refer to those hypostases which represent the totality of 
the objects which they cause and contain. The term ‘exoteric’, as the antonym of ‘esoteric’, 
has the advantage of conveying that these hypostases are both accessible to objective 
human experience and impersonal, since they exist as external conditions of possibility for 
human experience rather than as subjective modes of the human soul. 
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mode which we call psychological time. We therefore not only present the 
claim that eternity and time are modes but justify this reading by placing 
these principles within the context of the One and showing how the 
paradoxically esoteric-exoteric nature of the One lends certain qualities to 
eternity and time, and others to Intellect and Soul.  
The third claim that we wish to justify is that we as human beings are 
responsible for the modes which we inhabit. We point to certain passages 
such as 6.1-9, 7.1-5, 11.1-4, 11.20-27 and 12.4-253 to support the claim that 
the human soul first falls into time through its desire for physical existence 
and that it is able to recognise its identity with eternity by stopping this 
desire itself. This is why we call time a desiring mode: for it is only because 
human beings desire something more than timeless presence that they enter 
into a physical body in the realm of Soul. Similarly, eternity is the mode of 
desirelessness, for as soon as man stops the desire for physical existence and 
temporal succession, he enters into the eternal mode and recognises his 
nature as eternity itself. We argue therefore that man is in control of his own 
destiny according to the choice he makes between seeking the ‘next’ and 
‘after’ and remaining content with a life of timeless presence. He is even 
able to attain to the One, or the first mode of the esoteric, by ridding himself 
of identification with the intelligible realities and eternity after he has 
transcended the sensible realities and temporal consciousness. We therefore 
claim that while man is not able to change the objective features of 
existence, such as the sensible realities and intelligible realities, he does 
have control over whether he experiences one set of realities or the other (or 
neither and both simultaneously in the case of the One). For the what of 
experience is already set out for man by the exoteric emanation of the One, 
whereas the how of experience, pertaining to the modes produced by the 
esoteric emanation of the One, relates to man’s inner nature and his ability 
to recognise and honour this inner nature. And thus, we may say that by 
failing to honour his innermost nature, man co-creates the essence of time 
with the One, for which it is the final stage of esoteric emanation.  
                                                           
3
 In this thesis, all such incomplete references, without an Ennead number, will always be 
to III.7.   
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The first claim, namely that eternity and time are modes of experience, is an 
original way of placing these principles in relation to the hypostases of 
Intellect and Soul. For as Kalligas 2014, 586 observes in his comments on 
2.10-19, ‘inasmuch as eternity constitutes a property of intelligible beings, it 
cannot be identical either to any one of these or to their totality’. Kalligas is 
right to concede that Plotinus identifies eternity neither as an intelligible 
reality nor as Intellect itself (cf. Smith 1996, 201). However, to present 
eternity as a property of the intelligibles is also difficult to grasp. For in 
what way can the forms of Love, Truth and Beauty be said to possess the 
qualities of presence if such a claim does not appeal to subjectivity in any 
way? For what distinguishes the concept of presence from that of abstract 
Being would seem to be the sense of a here-now which can only be 
understood in relation to subjectivity. One could ascribe to the intelligible 
realities a kind of consciousness which would enable us to say that they are 
present to themselves (this kind of personification occurs in 4.33-42 for 
example). However, Kalligas does not do this. We are therefore left 
uncertain of what the difference is between Being, or ‘what is’, and the 
sense of presence which accompanies that stable identity. For if eternity is 
simply ‘what is’ considered in an objective sense, then this makes it difficult 
to distinguish it from Intellect. Indeed, if we reduce terms used to describe 
eternity such as ‘activity’ (ἐνέργεια), life (ζωή) or mode of life (βιός) (see 
for example 3.11-27 and 3.36-38) to objective features of Intellect then the 
concept of eternity appears to be no more than the empty self-assertion on 
the part of Intellect that it is what it is. And although the proclamation of 
Being is a function of eternity (as described in 5.19-22), its identity exceeds 
the bounds of Intellect, for as Plotinus at one point even claims, eternity is 
logically prior to Intellect as the partless whole in which the intelligibles 
exist (2.9-20). Therefore, it would seem that we are left with three options. 
The first is to accept that eternity is an objective aspect of the intelligible 
world which cannot be easily defined or posited in relation to human 
experience. The second is to take on the challenge of defining eternity more 
precisely as an objective feature of Intellect, which seems to be a very 
difficult task. The third option (which we take) is to posit eternity as a 
subjective mode, which solves the problem of positing it in relation to 
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experience (since it is the source of experience) and saves it from being the 
empty function of self-assertion on the part of Intellect. The closest that a 
scholar has come to this subjectivist turn is José Baracat Jr, 2013, 32 who in 
his article ‘Soul’s Desire and the Origin of Time in the Philosophy of 
Plotinus’ posits that Plotinus’ conception of eternity is identical with that of 
νόησις, and that his conception of time is nothing more than διάνοια. While 
it is reasonable to associate intelligible reason with eternity and discursive 
reason with time, we attempt to show that eternity and time are more 
primordial than these forms of thought, since they represent not only a 
thinking relationship between subject and intelligible and sensible objects, 
but the desireless and desiring dispositions of the soul which make such 
interaction possible in the first place.  
The second claim, namely that eternity and time are emanations 
representing the esoteric aspect of the One is also an original contribution to 
the literature on III.7. For although Beierwaltes 2010, 11-21 in his 
‘Herkunft’ seeks to investigate the natures of eternity and time by going 
back to first principles and examining how the One came to differentiate 
itself rather than remaining alone in its own nature, he does not distinguish 
the emanatory path proceeding from the One to Intellect and Soul from that 
which progresses from the One to eternity and time. Furthermore, Kalligas 
2014, 597 fails to map out a conception of the precise relationship between 
eternity and the One in his comments on 6.9-21 and Smith 2005, 203, claims 
that eternity is directed to the One by virtue of being the life of real Being 
but does not attempt to show how eternity is directed towards the One in a 
different way to Intellect.  
The third and final claim that we are responsible for the modes we inhabit is 
only original insofar as we define eternity and time as modes. For we agree 
with Armstrong 1966-1988, vol. III, 338, n. 1; McGuire and Strange 1988, 
209, n. 102; Smith 1996, 209 and Baracat Jr, 2013, 32-33 and pace 
Beierwaltes 1995, 238-239, Rist 1983, 137-138 and Kalligas 2014, 612 that 
in 11.15-20 Plotinus holds the human soul (the ‘we’ of 11.20) responsible 
for the original creation of time through the desire for an exciting narrative 
in the future. For we believe that in order to make sense of Plotinus’ 
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statements in 11.1-4, namely that ‘it is necessary to take ourselves back into 
that disposition which we were saying existed in eternity’, in 6.1-9 that ‘this 
nature is therefore what we are seeking and dwelling in this way is being 
eternity’ and in 7.1-5 that ‘it is necessary that we ourselves also have a share 
in eternity’, we must believe that Plotinus presents us with a way in which 
we can recognise our eternal nature and take responsibility both for the 
original creation and the eventual dissolution of time. For if Plotinus did not 
believe that we had created time through our own desire, then it would not 
be at all clear how human beings came to find themselves in time, let alone 
how they could go about transcending it. But it is clear from passages both 
within III.7 (for example 5.7-12) and beyond that Plotinus believes that we 
can return to our eternal nature through the necessary purifications. Take, 
for example, IV.7.10.30-40 where Plotinus claims that man may ‘apprehend 
the eternal by its eternity, and all the things in the intelligible world, having 
become himself an intelligible universe full of light’. For this reason, we 
take Plotinus to be referring to the human soul rather than the hypostasis of 
Soul in 11.15-27 and 12.4-25 and therefore use a small rather than a capital 
‘s’ in our translation and commentary4. Therefore, not only do we assume 
that Plotinus attributes the creation and dissolution of time to the human 
soul but we attempt to show why this can be the case, and to remain 
consistent in our interpretation of the overall text with our theory of modes.  
Since the interpretation of III.7 as an investigation of esoteric modes may be 
seen to be a somewhat bold claim, we attempt to justify this reading through 
the close textual analysis presented in the commentary and in the translation. 
We then attempt to fully extrapolate this thesis and connect it to the 
Enneads as a whole in the interpretative essay. Indeed, my approach to the 
text does not presuppose that there are large doctrinal differences between 
the earlier and later treatises in the Enneads but rather attempts to conceive 
of Plotinus’ thought as a whole whose parts can be reconciled with one 
another. My approach therefore reflects the sentiment of Gerson 1994, xvii. 
He writes, ‘I am very sceptical about claims regarding a development of 
                                                           
4
 In this thesis, all translations of Ennead III.7 are my own and follow the text of the editio 
minor of Henry and Schwyzer (1964-1982). Translations of passages from the other 
treatises in the Enneads are those of Armstrong 1966-88.  
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Plotinus’ thought in the Enneads following the chronological ordering. I 
think the fact that we have a relative chronology has just been a temptation 
to search for such schemes. There are certainly variations in nuance and 
emphasis, but I have not detected any substantial alterations in doctrinal 
content throughout the corpus. Accordingly, in this book I have felt free to 
draw on texts everywhere in the Enneads as evidence for an interpretation.’ 
Whilst I include material from many treatises in the Enneads, there are 
passages which appear in square brackets within III.7 itself which I do not 
necessarily comment on in my commentary if (as is the case in 5.28-30) 
they are reiterations of analyses Plotinus has already presented earlier on in 
the treatise. 
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TRANSLATION 
 
Chapter I 
(1-3) When we say that eternity and time are different from one another and 
that one belongs to the everlasting nature, whereas the other- time- belongs 
to that which is in becoming and our universe, 
(3-8) immediately and as if by a sudden apprehension of our concept of 
them, we think that we have a clear impression about them in our souls, 
since we are always mentioning them and naming them on every occasion. 
However, when we try to examine them more deeply and in a sense bring 
ourselves closer to them, our thought runs again into confusion. 
(8-16) Each of us considers one or the other of the different assertions of the 
ancients about time and eternity and perhaps interprets them in a different 
way; we halt our investigation there, and when we are asked, we think that it 
suffices to name the opinions of the great philosophers. We are then happy 
to depart from our investigation into these concepts. Certainly, we must hold 
that some of these ancient and blessed philosophers have discovered the 
truth, but it is fitting for us to examine which of them best attained it, and 
how we ourselves can come to have such an understanding.  
(16-20) We must begin with eternity by asking ourselves what it is for those 
who say that it is something different from time. For once we know what 
stands as the archetype, it might be possible also to clearly reveal its image- 
that image which they say is time.  
(20-24) Nevertheless, if one came to form an image of the nature of time 
before having contemplated eternity, it would still be possible for him, 
through recollection, to ascend from here to the intelligible realm, and so to 
contemplate that which time resembles, if it is true that time really does 
resemble eternity.  
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Chapter II 
(1-4) What therefore should we say that eternity is? Must we say that it is 
intelligible reality itself, just as we could say that time is the whole of the 
heavens and the universe at large? For as they say, this was the opinion of 
certain philosophers about time. 
(5-9) For since we imagine and conceive eternity as something supremely 
majestic, and since in another sense we also conceive intelligible nature as 
supremely majestic, and as we do not say that one of the two is more 
majestic than the other- as for that which is beyond, even this predicate 
cannot be attributed to it- it is thus tempting to identify them with one 
another.  
(9-20) And all the more so since the intelligible world and eternity both 
have a containing character and contain the same things. However, when we 
say that things of one kind- the intelligibles- are held in the other- in 
eternity- and we attribute to them the predicate ‘eternal’ because, as Plato 
maintains, the nature of the archetype is eternal, we are again saying that 
eternity is something other than this nature, while claiming that it is 
concerned with it, is in it, or belongs to it. The fact that they are both 
majestic does not prove that they are identical because it may well be that 
one of the two receives its majestic character from the other. As for their 
containing character, they are not of the same order: one contains that which 
it contains because it stands in relation to its parts, whereas the other, 
eternity, contains the totality of the intelligible realities simultaneously, not 
as parts, but because all the realities, insofar as they are eternal, are so by 
virtue of eternity itself.  
(20-36) Must we therefore say that eternity is related to intelligible rest, just 
as we say that time is related to sensible movement? But now someone 
could ask, understandably, if those who say this want to say that eternity is 
identical to rest, or not to rest without qualification but to the rest which 
belongs to Being. For if it is identical to rest, then first of all, we must not 
say that rest is eternal, just as we do not say that eternity itself is eternal, for 
that which is eternal is that which participates in eternity. Secondly, how 
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could movement be eternal when at the same time it would also be at rest? 
And how can the notion of rest contain the ‘always’- not the ‘always’ which 
is in time, but that which we think of when we speak of that which is 
everlasting? If, on the other hand, eternity were identical to the rest which 
belongs to Being, then once more we would place the other kinds of 
intelligible being outside eternity. Then it is not necessary to think of 
eternity as existing only in rest because it is also in unity; it is also necessary 
to think of it without extension in order for it not to be identical to time: but 
rest insofar as it is rest does not entail either the notion of unity or of the 
absence of extension. Finally, since we predicate of eternity its dwelling in 
unity, it could participate in rest while not being rest itself.  
 
Chapter III 
(1-3) What therefore could this nature be which makes us say of the 
intelligible realm that it is wholly eternal and everlasting? And what is 
everlastingness? Are everlastingness and eternity one and the same thing or 
does eternity conform to everlastingness? 
(4-7) Should we say that it is an idea which corresponds to a certain unity, 
but a unity which results from a gathering of multiplicity? Or rather, is it 
instead a nature which follows on from things in the intelligible realm, or 
which is present to them, or manifest in them? Are all these things that 
nature which, although one, possesses many powers and exists as many 
things? 
(7-11) And if we examine this abundant power, we call it ‘being’ with 
reference to the character which it has as a substrate, ‘motion’ to the extent 
to which we consider its life, then ‘rest’ because it dwells in every way in 
the same state, and ‘different and same’ to the extent that the things of the 
intelligible realm are together and one. 
(11-27) So too, if we again gather these things into unity so as to be only 
life, and if we compress the otherness, and consider the inexhaustible nature 
of their action, and the fact that it never becomes other than itself and is not 
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the thought or life which goes from one state to another, but rather that 
which dwells in the same state and continually does not have extension, that 
thing that we see in seeing all these things is eternity, a life which dwells in 
the same because the whole is always present to it. This life is not one thing 
now and then something different afterwards, but it is all things at the same 
time and not composed of different things now and then others afterwards. 
Rather, it is perfectly complete and without parts: as in a point, all things are 
in it together without ever separating or flowing out. Dwelling instead in 
itself and identical to itself, eternity does not change; it is always in the 
present because there is nothing of it which has come or will go but it is just 
what is. So that it is not the substrate which is eternity but that which shines 
out, so to speak, from the substrate itself in accordance with the identity 
which proclaims about not what is going to be but what is already present 
and which is as it is and not otherwise.   
(27-36) And in fact, what could happen to it later which it is not now?  It 
will not be anything later which it is not already because there is nothing 
which it could leave in order to arrive at the now, because this could not be 
different from the now. And it is not going to be in the future what it does 
not possess now. Necessarily, ‘was’ will not belong to it because what is 
there which belonged to it that has passed? Neither ‘will be’, because what 
will happen to it? It remains for it that it is precisely that which is. That 
which neither was nor will be but which only is, and which possesses being 
by dwelling in rest, because it does not change to the ‘will be’ nor has 
changed - this very thing is eternity.  
(36-38) Therefore, the life which belongs to being and which is in being, the 
life that is wholly together, full and totally lacking extension, is what we are 
searching for, namely, eternity.  
 
Chapter IV 
(1-5) One must not think that that which exists for the intelligible nature has 
come to it accidentally from the outside: it is this nature, it comes from it 
and is with it. For eternity manifests itself in this reality by virtue of the 
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reality itself, since for all the other things too which we claim are there, 
because we see that they have their existence there, we say that in each case 
they come from the intelligible nature and exist with it. 
(5-11) For it is necessary that the primary realities exist with the primaries 
and among them. Indeed, beauty too is among them and comes from them, 
and truth is among them as well. And some things are as if in a part of total 
being, whereas the others are in the totality in the same way that this which 
is really a whole does not arise from the gathering of its parts, but has 
produced its parts itself, so that in this way it would be truly whole.  
(11-12) And there, truth does not correspond with anything else but it 
belongs to each thing of which it is the truth. 
(12-20) It is necessary, in fact, that this thing which is a true whole, if it is to 
be truly whole, must not only be whole in the sense that it is all things but it 
must also have the character of a whole by not lacking anything. If this is 
the case, then nothing will be for it. This is because, if something will be, it 
means that the whole lacks this thing and that it was not after all whole in 
the first place. And what could happen to it which would be alien to its 
nature? For it does not suffer in any way. If therefore nothing could happen 
to it, it will not be destined to come into being, nor did it come into being. 
Concerning things which have been created, if you take away the ‘will be’, 
then they immediately cease to exist because they are continually acquiring 
their being.  
(20-28) But for things which are not of this kind, if you add the ‘will be’, 
then they leave the seat of being. Therefore, it is clear that being was not 
something natural for them if they came to be by delaying being, by having 
been, and by going to be in the future. For things which have been 
produced, it could well be that their reality consists in existing from the very 
moment of their birth until they have reached their last moment, at which 
point they no longer exist. Their ‘being’ is just that, and if we were to take 
this away from them, their life would be shortened and as a result their 
being would also be diminished.  
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(28-33) And the universe must also have a future by moving towards that 
which ‘will be’ in this way. This is why it actually speeds towards the future 
without wanting to stay still and draws being to itself by producing a 
succession of different states and by moving in a circle through a kind of 
desire for Being. And for that reason, we have also found the cause of the 
movement which tends to everlasting being by projecting itself into the 
future.  
(33-42) But the primary and blessed beings do not desire for the future 
because they are already the whole, and they have all the life which so to 
speak is due to them. For this reason they do not seek anything because they 
have nothing which will be, nor, after all, that in which the future can be 
found. The complete and whole reality of Being is not solely that which 
consists in the sum of its parts but also that which consists in the fact that it 
will never lack anything and that there is no non-being which will associate 
with it, because it is not enough for the whole to have all beings present to 
it, but it is also necessary that it does not have anything which could ever 
not be; this disposition and nature would be eternity.  
(43) Thus, ‘eternity’ (aiōn) comes from ‘that which always is’ (aei on). 
 
Chapter V 
(1-7) When I apply thought to something and can say of that thing, or rather 
see, that it is of such a kind that it is impossible that anything about it could 
have come into being (for then it would be something that does not always 
exist, or that does not always exist as a whole), is that thing eternal, if it 
does not have the kind of nature which affirms that it exists and will never 
exist in a different way, so that if you were to look at it again, you would 
find it as it was?  
(7-12) What, then, if one does not stop contemplating it, but dwells with it, 
fascinated by its nature and able to do so by a natural power that never tires? 
Would one not rush towards eternity, without veering from it in any way, 
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and thus become similar to it and eternal, contemplating the eternal and 
eternity by that which is eternal in oneself?  
(12-18) If that which has these attributes is eternal and always exists and 
does not veer away towards a different nature in any way, and has the life 
which already it possesses as a whole, not requiring any addition, past, 
present, or future, that which has these attributes would be everlasting, and 
everlastingness would be this kind of condition of the substrate, as that 
which comes from the substrate itself and that which is in it, and eternity 
would be the substrate, with that kind of condition manifesting itself in it.  
(18-22) For which reason, eternity is something majestic, and thought 
proclaims it identical to the god, and proclaims it identical with this god. 
And it would be right to say that eternity is a god which shows itself and 
manifests itself as what is, that is, Being, immoveable and identical to itself, 
and like this and solidly established in life. 
(22-30) However, there is no need to be surprised if we say that it is 
comprised of a multiplicity because each of the intelligible beings is many 
things due to the limitless power of these beings. To be limitless is to never 
lack anything, and this being is limitless in a strict sense, since it expends 
nothing of itself. And if we were to say, in the light of this, that eternity is 
immediately limitless life, because it is whole and does not expend anything 
of itself, neither existing in the past nor in the future- without which it 
would not exist as an immediate whole- we would indeed be close to a 
definition of eternity. [The latter part of this definition, ‘because it is whole 
and does not expend anything of itself’, would be an explanation of the 
expression ‘immediately endless’]. 
Chapter VI 
 
(1-9) Since the nature which is of this kind, absolutely beautiful and 
everlasting in this way, is around the One and comes from it and is 
orientated towards it, without ever going away from it, but always dwells 
around it and in it, and lives in accordance with it; and since Plato said in a 
beautiful way and with deep intelligence (in my opinion), and not at 
19 
 
random, ‘eternity dwells in the One’, not only in the sense that it leads itself 
back to unity in relation to itself, but also by being the life of Being around 
the One, this nature is therefore what we are seeking and dwelling in this 
way is being eternity.  
 
(9-21) For that which is this and which dwells in this way as what it is, an 
activity of life dwelling in and directed towards the One and in it, with no 
falsehood in its being or its life - this would have the being of eternity. For 
true Being is never not being or being otherwise, and this Being is always 
identical, and this is Being without differences. True Being therefore never 
has ‘this then that’ nor will you be able to separate it out or unroll it, or 
prolong it or stretch it, and therefore you cannot grasp anything of which 
comes beforehand or afterwards. If therefore, there is no before or after 
concerning it, if its ‘is’ is the truest thing concerning it, and itself, and this in 
the sense that it is by its being or its life, there again appears to us that which 
we are speaking about, namely, eternity. 
 
(21-26) But whenever we speak of the ‘always’ and say that at one moment 
it exists and at another it does not, it is necessary to believe that we express 
ourselves in this way in order to make things clearer for ourselves. For the 
‘always’ was perhaps not being used in the strict sense, but taken as 
explaining the imperishable, might deceive the soul into thinking of 
something which extends more and more and which will never fail. 
 
(26-36) It would perhaps have been better simply to say ‘that which is’. But 
even though the expression ‘that which is’ is suitable for describing being, 
since people thought that being was becoming they needed the qualification 
of ‘always’ in order to understand the meaning of ‘that which is’.  
For it is not that 'existing' is one thing and 'existing always' is another, just 
as it is not that a 'philosopher' is one thing and a 'true philosopher' is another, 
but it was because a pretence of philosophy existed that the addition of the 
adjective 'true' to 'philosopher' took place. Similarly, we added ‘always’ to 
being, that is, ‘aei’ to ‘on’ so that we say ‘always being’ (aei on) meaning 
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that which truly is, designating an unextended power which in no way needs 
anything more than what it already possesses, as it possesses the whole.  
 
(37-42) The nature of this kind is therefore all, it is that which is, and not 
lacking in wholeness, and not complete in one respect and lacking in 
another. For that which is in time, even if it seems perfect in the way that a 
body which is appropriate for a soul is perfect, also needs that which is to 
come and lacking in time, which it needs because it is with it; if time is 
present to it and runs alongside it, it is incomplete. Having this kind of 
existence, it would be called perfect homonymously.  
 
(43-50) But that which does not need that which is to come, which is 
measured neither by another time or an indefinite time which will 
be endless, but which possesses that which it must be, this is what our mind 
reaches for, that whose being does not arise from a certain amount of time 
but exists before any amount of time. For since it is not of any quantity, it 
was fitting that it should not have any contact with quantity to avoid its life 
being divided into parts and the destruction of its pure partlessness, in order 
for it to be partless both in life and in being.  
 
(50-57) And with the proclamation, ‘he was good’, Plato takes us back to 
the notion of the all, signifying by the ‘all beyond’ that the intelligible realm 
did not come into being from any particular time, so that even the universe 
did not have any temporal beginning, since the cause of its being supplies 
what is before it. Nevertheless, having said this for the sake of 
explanation, he then finds fault with this word as well afterwards, as not 
being used entirely in the correct way for things which have a share in that 
which we call and think of as eternity.   
 
Chapter VII 
 
(1-5) Do we then say these things as though we were testifying for others 
and speaking about what is foreign to us? How would this be possible? And 
how could we attain understanding of something with which we have no 
21 
 
contact? For how could we have contact with something which is foreign to 
us? It is necessary that we ourselves also have a share in eternity.  
 
(5-10) But how can we, when we are in time? What it is to be in time and 
what it is to be in eternity may be understood when we have first found out 
what time is. So we must descend from eternity for the purpose of the 
investigation into time, and to time. For there the way was upwards, but now 
let us speak as descending, not totally but in the way that time descended.  
 
(10-17) Now if the ancient and blessed men had said nothing about time, it 
would have been necessary to start with eternity and join the subsequent 
account together with it, saying what seems true to us and attempting to 
match the notion of time we have gained with the opinion about it which we 
express. But as things are, it is necessary first to take into account the most 
worthy statements and examine whether the theses which we hold will agree 
with any of them.  
 
(17-27) Perhaps we should, in the first instance, divide the statements made 
about time into three groups. For either time is what is called movement, or 
it could be said to be that which is moved, or something which is associated 
with movement. For to say that it is rest, or at rest, or something associated 
with rest, would be far from our notion of time, which is never the same in 
any way. Among those who say that time is movement, some would seem to 
mean that it is movement in general, others that it is the movement of the 
whole. Those who say that time is what is moved seem to mean that it is the 
sphere of the whole; among those who say that time is something which is 
associated with movement or that it is the interval of movement, some say 
that it is the measure of movement, others that it is in a general way that 
which follows movement, and either all movement or regulated movement. 
 
Chapter VIII 
(1-8) It is impossible for time to be movement, whether one takes all the 
movements and makes them as it were into one or whether one takes it as 
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ordered movement, for what we call movement of each kind exists in time; 
if some movement were not in time, it would be even less feasible for it to 
be time because that in which movement exists and movement itself are 
different things. And although objections can be advanced or have been 
advanced, it suffices to say that movement can stop or be interrupted 
whereas time cannot.  
(8-14) If one were to argue that the movement of the universe is not 
interrupted, nevertheless this as well, if indeed he were talking about the 
movement of the heavens, exists in a period of time. This circuit would not 
complete itself in the time which it would need to achieve half its journey: 
one would be half and the other double the time; each movement would be 
movement of the whole, with the first going to and from the same place and 
the latter reaching only half the distance. 
(14-19) And to say that the movement of the outermost sphere is the keenest 
and quickest is to bear witness to our view that movement is different to 
time. For it is quite clearly the quickest of all because it traverses the 
greatest distance in less time; the other movements are slower since they 
take a longer time to cover only a part of the distance traversed by the 
outermost sphere. 
(20-22) If therefore, time is not the movement of the sphere, it could hardly 
be the sphere itself, which was supposed to be time on the basis that it is in 
motion.  
(23-30) Is it therefore something which belongs to movement? If it is the 
interval of movement, firstly, this interval is not identical for all movement, 
not even for movement of the same kind: for movement is quicker and 
slower, even in space. And both these intervals would be measured by one 
other thing, which would indeed more correctly be called time. Then of 
which of the two movements is the interval time? Or rather, of which of the 
infinite number of movements which exist? If it is the interval of ordered 
movement, it is not the interval of all ordered movement, or of ordered 
movement of a particular kind, for there are many of these, so there would 
also be many times at once. 
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(30-32) But if it is the interval of the movement of the universe, and if we 
take it to be the interval which is in the movement itself, what would this be 
other than the movement?  
(32-37) The movement certainly has a fixed quantity, but this quantity will 
be measured by space because the space which the movement has travelled 
across has a fixed quantity and this will be the interval. But this is not time 
but space. Or alternatively, the movement itself, by the continuity of its 
movement and because it does not stop immediately but always persists, 
will contain the interval.  
(37-53) But this would be the multiplicity of movement, and if, looking at it, 
one shows that it is a multiplicity, just as one might say that there is a lot of 
heat, time will not manifest at that point, nor enter into view, but only 
movement again and again just like water flowing again and again and the 
interval we perceive in it. And the again and again will be a number, just 
like two or three but interval pertains to size. In this way, therefore, the 
multitude of movement is like the number ten or the interval which appears 
in that which is, so to speak, the mass of movement, and this does not 
contain the concept of time but will be the extent of that which came to be in 
time, or else time will not be everywhere but in movement as its substrate, 
and we are back to saying that time is movement. For the interval itself is 
not outside movement but is movement which is not immediate. But the 
comparison between movement which is immediate and movement which is 
not immediate itself occurs in time. How will that which is not immediate 
differ from that which is immediate? By existing in time, insofar as the 
movement which extends over an interval and the interval of it are not time 
itself but are in time.  
(53-62) But if someone were to say that the interval of movement is time, 
not the interval of movement itself, but that from which the movement itself 
possesses extension, in the sense that it runs along together with it, what this 
is has not been stated. For it is clear that time is that in which the movement 
came into being. But this has been the object of our enquiry from the outset, 
to discover what time really is, which is more or less the same as responding 
to the question, ‘what is time?’ with the statement that it is the interval of 
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movement in time. What therefore is that interval which you call time and 
place outside the interval which belongs to movement?  
(63-69) Moreover, he who places the interval in the movement itself will 
find himself confused as to where to place the interval of rest. For another 
thing could rest for as long as something was moved, and you would say the 
time of each was the same, being quite clearly different from both. What 
therefore is this interval and what is its nature? Indeed, it cannot be spatial, 
for this is also outside movement.  
 
Chapter IX  
(1-2) We must consider in what sense time is number of movement or its 
measure- better to call it a measure since movement is continuous.  
(2-15) Firstly, we must also raise the question as to whether time is the 
measure of all movement equally, just as we raised the question of the 
interval of movement, if time was said to be the measure of all movement. 
For how could one count disordered and uneven movement? And what 
would its number or measure be and according to what would it be 
measured? But if there is the same measure for each kind of movement and 
for all movement as a whole, quick and slow, then the number and measure 
will be like the number ten measuring both horses and cows, or like the 
same measure for both liquids and solids. Indeed, if time is such a measure, 
it has been said what kind of things time is a measure of - that of movements 
- but what it is itself has not yet been said. But if one can take the number 
ten and think of this number independently of horses, and the measure is a 
measure possessing a definite nature, even if it is not yet measuring, in the 
same way, time must also have a definite nature by virtue of being a 
measure.  
(15-17) If it is by itself a thing of such a kind, like a number, what 
difference can there be between this and the number ten or any other 
number consisting of abstract units?  
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(17-31) If on the other hand time is a continuous measure, it will be a 
measure by virtue of being something of a certain quantity, like the length of 
a cubit. The size will therefore be like a line which clearly runs alongside 
movement. But how will this line running alongside movement measure that 
which it runs alongside? Why should one measure the other rather than the 
other way round? It would be better and more persuasive to say that time is 
not the measure of all movement but only of that which it runs alongside. 
But this movement must be continuous, otherwise the line which it runs 
alongside will stop. But one should take that which measures neither as 
something outside nor as something separate but should treat the measured 
movement as one and the same. And what will that which measures be? 
Movement will be measured and that which measures will be size. And 
which of them will be time? The movement which is measured or the size 
doing the measuring? Time will either be the movement measured by 
magnitude or the magnitude which measures, or even that which uses this 
magnitude, as one uses the cubit to measure the quantity of the movement.  
(31-35) But in all these cases, we must suppose the very thing which we 
said is more plausible, namely, uniform movement, for without uniformity 
and, over and above that, without movement being unitary and pertaining to 
the whole, the account of time as a measure, in one way or another, becomes 
even more obscure.  
(35-50) But if time is a measured movement measured by a certain quantity, 
just as the movement, if there was need for it to be measured, could not be 
measured by itself but would need to be measured by something else, so it is 
necessary, if the movement is going to have another measure besides itself 
(and it is for this reason that we needed a continuous measure in order to 
measure this movement) in the same way it is necessary for magnitude itself 
to have a measure in order for the movement to be measured by fixing at a 
certain quantity of that by which it is measured as a certain quantity. And 
the time which we seek will be the number of the magnitude which 
accompanies movement but not simply the magnitude which runs alongside 
the movement. But what could this be if not number consisting of abstract 
units? Necessarily one is at a loss as to how this number will measure. Then, 
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if someone were to discover how this could occur, one will discover not 
time measuring, but a particular quantity of time. But this is not the same as 
time. For it is one thing to speak of time, another to speak of the quantity of 
time, since before speaking about the quantity of time, it is necessary to say 
what that thing is which is of such a quantity.  
(51-55) But the number which measures the movement from outside the 
movement is time, like the number ten applied to horses but understood 
independently of horses. Therefore, what this number is, which, like the 
number ten, is what it is before measuring anything, has not been said.  
(55-68) Perhaps it is the number which runs beside and measures the 
movement according to before and after. But it is not yet clear what this 
number, which measures according to before and after, is. However, if it 
measures according to before and after with a point or by any other means, 
in any case it would be measuring according to time. This time therefore, 
which measures movement according to before and after, depends on time 
and is in contact with it in order to measure. For one must either grasp 
before and after in a spatial sense, like the beginning of the race-course, or 
in a temporal sense. For in general, before and after are, on the one hand, 
that time which stops at the now, and on the other hand that which begins 
from the now. Time therefore is something different from the number which 
measures according to before and after not only any kind of movement but 
also ordered movement.  
(68-75) Then why, when number is added, either measured or measuring (as 
the same number could be both that which measures and that which is 
measured) why will time come into being when this number has come into 
being, but when movement exists- which always has a before and after 
belonging to it- time will not exist? It would be like saying that magnitude 
was not a certain size on the basis that no one took it to be that size.  
(75-78) Since time is and is said to be infinite- how could number have 
anything to do with it? Unless one took a part of it and measured it, a part in 
which time would exist even before having been measured.  
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(78-84) And why would time not exist before even the soul which measures 
it? Unless one were to say that its origin comes from the soul. But the fact 
that the soul measures time in no way necessitates this, for time exists with 
its quantity, even if no one measures it. But if one were to say that it is the 
soul which makes use of magnitude in order to measure time, what would 
this contribute to the concept of time? 
 
Chapter X 
(1-8) Saying that time is an accompaniment of movement does not indicate 
what it is, nor are we saying anything meaningful before it is said what that 
accompanying thing is, for perhaps that would be time. And one must 
consider whether this accompaniment comes after, at the same time as, or 
before the movement- if such an accompaniment really exists - for 
whichever of these is said, it is said to be in time. If this is the case, time 
will be an accompaniment of movement in time.  
(9-17) But since we are not looking for what time is not but for what it is, 
and since many things have been said by many of our predecessors on each 
theory - if one went through everything, he would instead be doing a 
historical investigation - and since something has been said about them by 
way of a summary and it is possible from what has already been said to 
contradict one who says that time is the measure of movement of the all by 
taking into account what we have already said about the measure of 
movement (for apart from that of uneven movement all the other objections 
used against these arguments will fit this one), the next thing is to say what 
it is necessary to believe that time is.  
 
Chapter XI 
(1-4) Indeed, it is necessary to take ourselves back into that disposition 
which we were saying existed in eternity, that still and unified whole: the 
already boundless life, altogether unswerving, which dwells in and is 
orientated towards the One. 
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(4-6) Time did not yet exist, not at any rate for the intelligible realities and 
we will generate time according to the principle and nature of the ‘after’. 
(6-11) Indeed, since these realities rest in themselves, one could probably 
not invoke the Muses to say how time ‘first fell off’ since they did not yet 
exist. But perhaps, even if the Muses really did exist at that time, one could 
ask time itself, having come into being, how it appeared and came into 
being. It might say something like this about itself:  
(12-14) that before, indeed before it had generated this ‘before’ or wanted 
the ‘after’, it rested in Being with eternity, since it was not yet time but 
itself, too, remained quiet in that Being.  
(15-20) But there was a restless nature, which wanted to govern itself, be by 
itself and chose to seek more than the present; it set itself in motion and time 
itself also moved and by always moving to the next and to the ‘after’ and 
what is not the same, but one thing or another, we created a lengthy journey 
and produced time as an image of eternity.  
(20-27) For the soul had an unquiet power, which always willed to carry 
across what it saw there into something else and did not want the all to be 
continuously present to it. Just as from a quiet seed the principle unfolds 
itself and goes outwards into vastness, or so it thinks, and hides the vastness 
by division, and instead of remaining in unity itself, expends its unity 
outside itself and proceeds into a weaker extension, 
(27-33) in this way too Soul makes the physical universe which imitates that 
eternal world, and moves with a motion not belonging to that eternal world 
but which resembles that motion and wishes to be an image of it. It first 
temporalised itself by making time as opposed to eternity, and then gave 
over to time as its slave that which had come into being, making all of it 
exist in time, and encasing all its means of escape in time.  
(33-45) For since this world moves in Soul- there being no other place for 
the universe than Soul- it moves also in that very time of Soul. For it 
produces its activities one after the other, and then another which succeeds 
that which precedes it. It generates one after another with its activity and 
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goes forward with another thought after that which it had beforehand, 
because discursive thought had not yet been activated, and the life of Soul 
now does not resemble that which previously existed. Its life is at the same 
time therefore ‘other’ and this ‘other’ involves another time. The expansion 
of life involves time and the ceaseless progression of life involves time 
which is continuous and life which has passed involved time which has 
passed. If someone were therefore to say that time is the life of the soul in a 
movement that changes from one way of life to another, would he be 
speaking sense? 
(45-59) Indeed- for if eternity is life at rest, identical to itself and the same 
and already boundless, and time must be an image of eternity, just as this 
universe is an image of the intelligible realm, then we must say that instead 
of that life there, there is another life which has the same name as this power 
of the soul, and it is not intelligible movement but movement of a part of 
Soul; it is not identity and sameness and permanence but that which does 
not dwell in identity and which acts in one way and then another, not that 
which is extensionless and unified but an image of the One existing in 
sequence, not already boundless and whole but existing in endless 
succession always, not as a complete whole but as something which will 
exist part by part and whose wholeness will always be yet to come. For in 
this way it will imitate the already whole and complete and already 
boundless, if it will always wish to acquire being in addition to its being, 
and indeed this is the way in which it will imitate that Being.  
(59-62) But one must not take time to exist outside Soul, just as eternity 
there is not outside Being. It neither accompanies Soul nor comes after it, 
just as eternity neither accompanies nor comes after Being but is seen with 
Soul and exists in and with it, just like eternity there in the intelligible realm. 
 
Chapter XII 
(1-4) Hence too it is necessary to understand that this is the nature of time, 
the extent of life of this kind which progresses in uniform and homogeneous 
changes that are silently advancing and which has continuous activity.  
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(4-22) Now if in our thought we were to make this power turn back again 
and stop this life, which it now has, being endless and never going to cease 
because it is the activity of a soul which always exists, neither being 
orientated towards nor dwelling in itself, but involved in creation and 
generation, if we therefore assumed that this power was no longer active but 
ceased from this activity and that this part of the soul too turned back 
towards the intelligible realm and to eternity, abiding in a state of rest, what 
would then exist but eternity? And how would there be one thing after 
another when all things abided in unity? And how would ‘before’ still exist? 
And how too would ‘after’ or ‘about to be’? And where would the soul 
attend to anything other than that in which it exists? Rather, it could not 
even attend to this, for it would first have to be separate from it in order to 
attend to it. Since even the sphere itself, which does not exist primarily, 
would not be, for this also exists and moves in time, and if it stops while the 
soul is active, we shall measure how long is its stop so long as the soul is 
outside eternity. If therefore when the soul desists and is unified, time is 
destroyed, it is clear that the beginning of this movement towards these 
things and this life generate time. 
(22-25) For which reason it is said that time was generated at the same time 
as the universe because soul produced it along with this universe. For this 
universe too came into being in activity of this kind and on the one hand this 
activity is time and on the other hand the universe is in time.  
(25-36) But if someone were to say that Plato also calls the revolutions of 
the stars ‘times’, he would have to remember that Plato says that the stars 
are generated in order to make time manifest and ‘delimited’ and ‘in order 
for there to be a visible measure’. For since it was not possible either for the 
soul to trace out time as a boundary or for those who did not know how to 
count to measure each of its parts by themselves, since time is invisible and 
cannot be grasped, the demiurge made day and night by means of which it 
was possible to grasp the notion of two, through their difference, and this is 
where the concept of number came from, according to Plato. Then, by 
taking the length of the interval from one sunrise to the next, since the 
nature of the movement upon which we rely is uniform, we can have an 
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interval of time as a given length and we use this sort of interval as a kind of 
measure, but as a measure of time,  
(37-40) for time is not itself a measure. For how could it measure and what 
would it say while measuring? Would it say, ‘This is the same quantity as 
some amount of myself’? Who then is this ‘myself’?  It is presumably that 
according to which the measurement is taking place. Then would it exist in 
order to measure while also not being a measure?  
(40-49) Therefore, it will be the movement of the universe which will be 
measured by time, and time will not be the measure of movement by virtue 
of its nature but, by previously being something different, it will incidentally 
provide evidence of the length of movement. And one movement, taken in a 
certain length of time and counted many times, will produce a notion of how 
much time has passed so that, if one were to say that the movement and the 
heavenly circuit in a way measure time, as much as possible, in the sense 
that the circuit manifests, through its own extent, the extent of time, which 
one could neither grasp nor be acquainted with otherwise, his explanation 
would not be out of place.  
(49-55) Therefore, that which is measured by the heavenly circuit- that is, 
that which is made manifest- will be time, and time is not produced by the 
heavenly circuit but only made manifest by it. And in this way the measure 
of the movement is that which is measured by a defined movement, and 
since it is measured by this movement it is something different from it, since 
even if it were measuring, it would be something else, and insofar as it is 
measured it is different to that which measures and is only measured 
incidentally.  
(55-61) One could explain it like this: it would be like saying that that which 
is measured by a cubit is the magnitude, without saying what magnitude 
really is but only tracing out its size, and if one were not able to say what 
movement is in itself by virtue of its indeterminate nature and said that it is 
that which is measured by space; for having taken a certain space through 
which the movement had passed, one could say that this movement is the 
same length as the space.  
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Chapter XIII 
(1-13) The revolution of the heavens therefore makes time manifest, in 
which it exists. It is necessary that time itself no longer possesses that in 
which it exists, but must first be that which it is itself, that in which the other 
things move and stand still evenly and regularly; however, time must be 
indicated by something ordered, and manifested as a concept in the mind, 
but not brought into being by that which indicates it, whether that which 
indicates it is at rest or in motion- but it should rather be in motion, for it is 
that which is in motion rather than that which is at rest which leads to the 
knowledge of time and shifts our attention towards it, and it is easier to 
know how long something has been moving than how long it has been at 
rest. This is why people were brought to say that time is the measure of 
movement, as opposed to saying that time is measured by movement and 
then adding what it is that is measured by movement, not merely saying 
something about what happens to a part of it incidentally and getting things 
the wrong way round.  
(13-18) But perhaps those authors did not get things the wrong way round, 
but we do not understand them because they clearly said ‘measure’ meaning 
that which is measured, and we did not hit upon what they were thinking. 
But the reason that we do not understand is that they did not make it clear, 
in their writings, what that is which either measures or is measured because 
they were writing for those who knew and had listened to them. 
(18-28) However, Plato neither described the real identity of time as that 
which measures nor as that which is measured by something else, but said 
that in order to manifest time, the smallest part of the heavenly circuit is 
taken to correspond to the smallest part of time, and from this it is possible 
to know what sort of a thing and how great time is.  However, when Plato 
wants to explain the nature of time, he says that time came into being 
together with the heavens according to the archetype of eternity and as its 
moving image, because time does not stay put, just as the life with which it 
runs together and alongside does not stay put, but it arises together with the 
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heavens, because it is this kind of life which produces the heavens as well 
and one life which makes the heavens and time. 
(28-30) Therefore, if this life returned to unity, if it could, time too would 
stop with it because it exists in this life and the heavens would also stop if it 
did not have this life. 
(30-40) But if someone were to take the before and after of this movement 
and call it time- on the basis that this is something real- but did not say that 
the truer movement of the soul, which possesses the before and after, was 
something real, he would be most out of place, since he would ascribe to 
movement without soul the ‘before’ and after’, and time which accompanies 
it, but would not ascribe this to the movement which causes and is imitated 
by this movement without soul, and from which the before and after first 
came into existence, since it is spontaneous movement, and just as it 
produces each of its own activities, so too it forms their succession, and at 
the same time as it produces these activities, it passes from one to the other 
of them.  
(41-47) Why then do we refer back this movement of the universe to that 
which contains it and say that it is in time, but do not say that the movement 
of the soul which exists within it in an everlasting passage is in time? It is 
because that which exists before this movement of soul is eternity, which 
neither runs along with it nor stretches out with it. This movement of soul 
was therefore first to descend into time, and it produced time and possesses 
time with its activity.  
(47-49) How, therefore, is time everywhere? It is because Soul is not absent 
from any part of the universe, just as the soul in us is not absent from any 
part of ourselves.  
(49-53) But if someone were to say that time is in something which does not 
have reality or exist, it must be stated that clearly he speaks falsely 
whenever he says 'was' and 'will be,' because 'will be' and 'was' are used in 
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the same sense as that in which he says time will be. But for people of this 
nature, another kind of argument is required. 5 
(53-62) But in addition to that which has been said, it is necessary to 
consider the following, that when one grasps how far a moving man has 
gone forward, one also grasps the quantity of the movement, and when he 
considers for example, the movement of his legs, let him see also that the 
movement in this man, which came before the movement of his legs, had a 
certain quantity, if at least the movement of his body had a fixed duration. 
Indeed, the body which is moved for a certain amount of time will lead us to 
the quantity of the movement- for it is the cause- and to the time of this 
movement, and this movement will lead us to the movement of the soul, 
which is separated out equally.  
(62-66) To what, therefore, will the movement of the soul lead us? For that 
to which one will want to go is already without extension. It is therefore this 
which is primary and in which the other things exist, but it is no longer in 
anything for it will not have anything in which to be. And the same holds for 
the Soul of the universe. 
(66-69) Is time therefore also in us? It is in all souls of this kind and exists 
in a similar way in each of them and all are one. That is why time will not 
be torn apart any more than eternity, which, in a different way, is in all 
things of the same kind. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                           
5
 Here I follow the reading ‘καταθετέον’ suggested in the textual addenda to the OCT (the 
editio minor): see Vol.III of the OCT, p.319. 
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COMMENTARY 
 
 
Chapter I 
 
1. Τόν αἰῶνα (line 1) - πᾶν (line 3) 
 
Plotinus uses the word λέγοντες to refer to a doctrine which both he 
and his students accept but which requires further explication to be 
fully brought to light (cf. II.1.1.1, II.4.1.2, III.6.1.1 and IV.6.1.1-2). 
As we will see, eternity can be said to correspond to Intellect by 
being the mode which unlocks man’s experience of the intelligible 
realities, whereas time belongs to Soul by being the mode which 
unlocks access to the physical universe and sensible realities. 
Furthermore, eternity is defined precisely as ‘what is’ (3.23/34-36) 
and is therefore inseparable from Being (εἶναι, ὄν: 5.21, 6.6-8, 
11.59-62), whereas time is its image (1.19-20, 11.20/29/46-47/54) 
because it arises from a desiring state of the soul which becomes 
extended: ‘μῆκος ἀσθενέστερον’ (11.26). Time therefore represents 
the status of the soul as it loses its seat in the eternal realm of being 
(11.13-14) and falls into a state of becoming (γίγνεσθαι, γένεσις). 
The being of eternity is fixed and never changes (3.9-10, 11.45-46), 
whereas time is closely related to becoming by going towards a ‘will 
be’ (11.55-56) of the future, and this involves its transformation into 
something which does not already exist (and that which does not 
already exist cannot be eternal: 3.29). The idea that eternity and time 
possess different ontological statuses is already put forward by Plato 
in Ti. 27d6-28a4 (cf. Nicom. Ar. I 1, 2.10-16; and Num. fr. 7). 
Furthermore, the correlation of ‘eternity-time’ with the ‘being-
becoming’ distinction can already be found in Philo Mut. 2.67; and 
Plut. De E ap. Delph. 2.0, 393a-b. 
 
2. αὐτόθεν (line 3) - ἀποροῦντες (line 8) 
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Instead of a ‘cursory conceptual apprehension’ (ἀθρόα ἐπιβολή) as 
McGuire and Strange put it (1988, 2.53; cf. II 8.1.40; and Strange 
1994, 2.8n.1), we wish to penetrate the matter itself. Indeed, 
knowing a thing’s name does not mean we have a firm grasp of that 
which we are naming (and this is echoed in 6.38-42; III.5.6.4-6; 
IV.7.4.15-18 and V.3.13.2-6. Cf. Pl. Cra. 421d-422a, 432d and 
436a/b). We are therefore content with naming only if it 
accompanies close examination, which, while leading us to 
difficulties (as Plato warns us in Tht. 208e7-10) is a necessary 
condition for true knowledge. Plotinus cautions, however, that in the 
case of eternity and time, getting to the heart of the matter will not 
be so easy, given their elusive natures. As we will see, eternity and 
time are objects neither of perception nor of discursive or intelligible 
thought, but are instead internal modes in which such perceptions 
and thoughts may be encountered. Plotinus provides us with a clue 
that time and eternity cannot be known through intellectual 
examination alone by questioning whether, through mere concepts, 
we can have a clear experience of them in our souls. In fact, by 
thinking that eternity and time are mere concepts which can be 
known by the soul, we miss the fact that they are in fact states of the 
soul. We must therefore tie our notions of these phenomena to the 
experience of the soul, rather than thinking we have grasped the truth 
through theoretical investigation alone. Modern philosophers have 
tended to identify Augustine as the first philosopher to recognise the 
paradoxically familiar yet misleading and elusive nature of time (see 
for example, Heidegger 1982, 229 and Wittgenstein 1997, I 89). 
Indeed, in Confessions XI.14, Augustine picks up on the elusive 
nature of time when he asks, “quid ergo tempus? Si nemo ex me 
quaerat scio, si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio.” However, as we 
can see, Plotinus frames this problem first, and Augustine’s 
statement paraphrases Plotinus’ own here. Aristotle also alludes to 
time’s elusiveness in Physics IV.10 but not to the deceptive sense of 
familiarity which makes people think that they understand what they 
in fact do not. 
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3.  τἀς τῶν παλαιῶν (line 8) - προσήκει (line 16) 
 
Plotinus believes we should a.) interpret the ancients and compare 
our interpretations to those of other philosophers in the past, b.) 
identify those views which come closest to the truth: for example, 
those of Plato, who achieves the truth completely: V.I.8.11-14, and 
is ‘godlike’: III.5.1.6; IV.8.1.23; and of Parmenides who comes 
close to the truth: V.1.8.15-24. And finally, c.) we should proceed 
from this investigation to our own, unitary and coherent account, 
which may then improve upon previous accounts (cf. II.7.2.3-6; 
VP.14.14-15). This critical approach to ancient sources mirrors 
recommendations of Aristotle as set out in Eth. Nic. VII 1, 1145b2-7 
(cf. Verbeke 1973, 188n.1). Apart from Plato and the pre-Socratics, 
the ‘παλαιῶν’ that Plotinus refers to play a particularly important 
role in his discussion of time, most notably, Aristotle, the Stoics 
(especially Zeno the Stoic and Chrysippus), the Epicureans, the 
Peripatetics (such as Theophrastus) and the Pythagoreans. While 
Plotinus thinks it absolutely necessary to engage with his 
philosophical predecessors in a critical manner, he also emphasises 
the role of reflection upon personal experience (cf. Armstrong 1966-
1988, 296-297). For as we see in 10.9-17, Plotinus believes that 
without such reflection, philosophy is reduced to a merely historical 
investigation of competing views. For this reason, the study of the 
ancients is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for arriving at 
the truth.  
 
4. καὶ (line 16) - γένοιτο (line 20) 
 
Plotinus first follows in Plato’s footsteps by claiming that eternity is 
the archetype and time its image. For in Timeaus 37d5-7, Plato 
defines time as "an eternal image, moving in accordance with 
number, of eternity abiding in unity” (translation by Zeyl). For 
Plotinus, the fact that eternity is archetype suggests not only that one 
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must acknowledge its ontological superiority, but also that it makes 
good sense to prioritise it in his rational and experiential enquiry. For 
a proper account of time may be based on a clear account of eternity, 
given that time is but a ghostly image of eternity. Having become 
familiarised with eternity, therefore, we may see for ourselves that 
time is in fact the image of eternity (see for example 11.19-20 and 
11.46-47 and 13.24-25 in agreement with Ti. 38B6-C2). For we will 
come to see in 11.26 that it is precisely because time seeks more than 
the present stillness of eternity, that it embodies it in an extended 
form, in accordance with the ‘before’ and ‘after’. 
 
5. εἰ (line 20) - ἔχοι (line 24) 
 
Having said this, we could just as well begin by investigating that 
which we mistake for the archetype and find the signs in this image 
of the archetype (which is time) to lead us back to eternity (via 
ἀνάμνησις). This is a strategy we see when Plotinus decides first to 
enquire into the civic virtues (I.2.2.1-4) in order to find out the 
nature of that which they imitate in the intelligible realm (I.2.1.35-
38). Plotinus reassures us that this strategy will be possible as long 
as time really is a likeness to eternity (which we will see is indeed 
the case since time is the image of eternity). Such recollection is 
only possible because the soul has a transcendent aspect (as Plotinus 
states in IV.8.4.21-31) which does not ‘remember’ in a temporal 
sense but rather recognises something outside of time (IV.3.25.27-
35). For this reason, we must not suggest that there is no path to the 
recollection of eternity (and overemphasise Plotinus’ disregard for 
the method of recollection, as Blumenthal arguably does in 1971a, 
96-97) but should rather see that Plotinus prefers to begin with the 
archetype because it is the natural dwelling place of the human soul, 
which means that man may first be able to identify his own nature 
before his life in the realm of time is considered. The second method 
is less reliable since it involves first exploring the nature of time, 
which a person may mistakenly believe is the archetype upon which 
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eternity is based (see Beierwaltes 1967, 149), or the natural abode of 
the human soul, before enquiring into eternity.  
 
Chapter II 
 
1. Τίνα (line 1) - χρόνου (line 4) 
 
Plotinus is interested in where eternity fits in relation to the great 
scheme of things, in the hierarchical order relating to the One, the 
Intellect and the Soul. He begins this enquiry by asking whether we 
should think of eternity as the intelligible nature itself. Plotinus will 
go on to say that this assumption is not viable. We have already 
learned that Plotinus thinks we take things all too much for granted 
when we read the ancients uncritically. He therefore asks us whether 
such a reading can be so simply assented to while comparing this 
view with that of certain philosophers (as attested by Aristotle, Ph. IV 
10, 218b1), most likely Pythagoreans (see Burkert 1972, 75-77; and 
Schibli 1990, 138n.10) that time is simply the entire heavens and the 
cosmos (see 8.1-22 for Plotinus’ rejection of this conclusion) or the 
totality of sensible realities (see Simplicius In Ph. 700.31-701.1 that 
"everything is within the heavens and everything is in time”). The 
assumption that eternity is equivalent to the Intellect, or to the totality 
of intelligible realities, is a tempting but ultimately false postulation. 
 
2. ἐπεὶ (line 5) - συνάγοι (line 9) 
 
Plotinus understands that we relate to the Intellect and eternity in 
similar ways from an introspective point of view. Plotinus presents 
two arguments to support the identification of eternity and Intellect. 
The first is that both are majestic (σεμνότατον). We all have an 
internal vision of the majesty of both eternity and the Intellect (see 
V.5.2.13, VI.7.22.21 and Arist. Metaph. Λ 9, 1074b18 for the 
majestic nature of the Intellect; and V.8.3.18-21 and VI.6.18.19-22 
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for Intellect as the source of majesty) which discursive reason is 
unable to grasp (see VI.7.39.29-34, which also offers Plotinus’ 
interpretation of Soph. 248D6-249A2). The nature of this majesty 
echoes the majesty of the One (see V.5.3.6-15 and VI.6.3.5-9), which 
in turn transcends the majesty of Intellect by being completely 
ineffable (V.3.13.1-6). Similarly, we can also claim that the majesty 
of eternity is derived from the One since eternity is ‘an activity of life 
dwelling in and directed towards the One’ (6.9-11). However, the fact 
that both Intellect and eternity receive their majesty from the One and 
exceed the limits of discursive reason does not mean that they are one 
and the same thing, as Plotinus will explain.  
 
3. καὶ γὰρ (line 9) - αὐτῶν (line 10) 
 
The second argument is that eternity and Intellect contain the same 
things and therefore must be identical. For both eternity and Intellect 
contain the same set of elements, namely the intelligible realities, in 
different ways. On the one hand, Intellect is simply the whole (see 
V.3.5.43-46, V.3.6.7-8 and VI.2.21.3-11) which is the sum of all the 
intelligible realities (see VI.2.18.12-17, VI.2.20.20-23 and 
VI.8.18.26-28) existing as distinct parts (see for example VI.4.14.3-
5). This concept represents neither the nature nor a state of the human 
soul but rather the order of reality which lies below the One and 
above the hypostasis of Soul. Intellect not only unifies the 
intelligibles into this order (see for example III.5.9.3 and VI.7.14.8-
18) but is also the cause of the intelligibles (see V.1.2.20.25-29), and 
contains them as a mathematical set contains its elements, or ‘as a 
genus does its species and a whole its parts’ (V.9.6.9-10). Insofar as 
man is able to perceive the intelligible world when he is ready (see 
for example, I.3.1.12-18), Intellect exists as an external condition of 
possibility for the human experience of the intelligible realities. It is a 
condition of possibility because, without Intellect, man would not be 
able to experience any intelligibles such as Love, Beauty or Truth, 
since Intellect causes these realities and represents their unified 
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nature. It is an external (or exoteric) condition of possibility for 
human experience because it does not owe its existence either to the 
state of the human soul or to the readiness of the human soul to 
perceive this level of reality (which is reality itself, existing below the 
One and above the ghostly image of Soul: see V.1.6.42-49). On the 
other hand, eternity neither causes nor represents the unified nature of 
the intelligibles as Intellect does but instead exists as an internal 
condition of possibility for the human experience of the intelligibles. 
It is a condition of possibility because it is only by taking oneself 
‘back to that disposition which we were saying existed in eternity’ 
(11.1-4) and by making the power whose ‘activity is involved in 
creation and generation’ turn back again, that he can restore his 
original vision and return to the intelligible realm (12.4-12). It is also 
an internal (or esoteric) condition of possibility for human experience 
because it embodies the natural state of the human soul before its 
desiring activity takes its attention away from the intelligible world. 
We may therefore claim that whereas Intellect comprises that 
objective reality which is accessed when man is ready (namely the 
intelligibles), eternity is the subjective means of access to this world. 
And thus, Plotinus claims that the intelligible realities lie first in 
eternity before Intellect: for it is only when man has realised eternity 
within himself that he will have access to the intelligibles. This in 
turn means that eternity stands in relation to the intelligible world as a 
whole, since man perceives the intelligible world all at once rather 
than part by part (similar to the way in which he perceives a face as a 
whole and not each individual feature in distinct acts of perception) 
whereas Intellect, as a unifying and causal concept, receives its 
identity from its distinct intelligible parts (similar to the way in which 
a human face stands in relation to its distinct parts including the eyes, 
nose and mouth and so on). Eternity and Intellect are therefore 
different principles, even though they can both be said to contain the 
same elements and to represent two aspects of Being (as we will see 
in 5.18-22). 
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4.  Ἀλλ᾽ (line 20) - εἴη (line 36) 
  
Plotinus enquires into whether eternity and Rest are the same thing or 
whether eternity participates in Rest in some sense (reminding us of 
Aristotle in Ph. IV 10, 219a8-10 when he asks whether time is 
motion itself or something which participates in it), whereas Plato 
investigates the relationship between Being and Rest in Soph. 250b/c. 
Since Plotinus explicitly identifies eternity with that which is in 3.34-
36 (after Ti. 37E6-38A2), it is arguable that Plotinus is asking the 
very same question that Plato asks in the Sophist, namely whether 
Being (which is also that which is) and Rest are the same thing. Since 
Plotinus saw himself as a faithful disciple of Plato, it should come as 
no surprise to the student that Plotinus will reject the identity of that 
which is with Rest, just as Plato does. Plotinus inherits his specific 
concept of Rest from Plato (as McGuire and Strange 1988, 254 
acknowledge by capitalising the ‘r’ in ‘rest’) who in the Sophist 
defines Rest as one of the five Great Kinds (Soph. 257b, 258e–259a). 
Here, he begins to undermine the identity of eternity and Rest by 
asking the question whether Rest contains the notion of the 
everlasting. Eternity is not the same as Rest since, as Plato says, that 
which is contains not only the concept of Rest but also that of Motion 
(Soph. 250b/c). Since Plotinus equates eternity with that which is and 
that which is includes not only the concept of Rest but also that of 
Motion, and Rest excludes the concept of Motion (see Soph. 254d, 
with 249e–250c), it is impossible to equate eternity with Rest. 
Furthermore, eternity contains the concepts of unity (6.6-8, 12.4-
13/19-22, 13.28-30) and ‘extensionlessness’ (see also 3.15/37) which 
the concept of Rest does not. Finally, whereas the concept of Rest is 
an intelligible reality, we will see that eternity is the mode in which 
the intelligible realities, including the Great Kinds, may be accessed 
in human experience (see my comments on 5.7-12; 11.1-6 and 12.8-
12), since eternity is the origin of experience, rather than something 
which can be pointed to in experience. However, Plotinus claims that 
eternity still participates in Rest because, as we will see in chapter 
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three, eternity is changeless (3.9-10). This means that we can use the 
concept of Rest as a conduit to grasping eternity, or that which is, 
since it is through recognising changelessness, rather than falling 
away into the past or the future, that a true understanding of eternity 
can be achieved. 
 
Chapter III 
 
1. Τί (line 1) - αἰών (line 3) 
 
Plotinus examines a distinction which was established by Plato: 
namely, the difference between the eternal (αἰώνιον) and the 
everlasting (ἀίδιον: see Ti. 29a3, 37d1, e5), both of which are ascribed 
to the intelligible model of the demiurge in the Timaeus. Beierwaltes 
1967, 156-58 claims that only Patristic authors after Plotinus expressed 
any doubt about the synonymity of the two principles, and that there is 
no meaningful difference between the two for Plotinus himself. 
Modern authors tend to agree that the two principles are 
interchangeable because Plotinus describes Intellect as both eternal and 
everlasting (see 2.10-15, IV.7.8.38-43, V.1.6.38 and V.4.2.18) without 
formally demarcating the two notions. However, it would seem that 
Plotinus does in fact wish to distinguish between the two concepts (see 
I.5.7.24-30 and 5.15-18) and to begin an enquiry into whether both can 
be predicated of the Intellect. The main difference, it would seem, is 
that whereas eternity is that which is without qualification, 
everlastingness is that which is always. Since everlastingness is that 
which is in all moments, it is relative to those moments and therefore 
owes its being to time. Eternity exists as the unconditional now which 
envelops the concepts of past, present and future which appear within 
it and therefore transcends those concepts. Everlastingness on the other 
hand exists by embodying those concepts and extending infinitely in 
all directions through them (for example, Plotinus describes the 
heavens and the cosmos as everlasting: see II.1.1-3, III.2.3.30, 
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III.3.6.24 and V.1.2.23). Everlastingness thus goes backwards 
infinitely into the past and forwards infinitely into the future and can 
therefore be compared to an x-axis which goes horizontally, relative to 
eternity which transcends this perspective, as the y-axis, extending 
upwards vertically. Since the Intellect exists outside time and houses 
the intelligible realities, including the forms, it can certainly be said to 
be eternal. However, it is also everlasting since it always exists. 
Indeed, while everything changes in the physical world, the Intellect 
remains the same, fixed and unchanging reality. Since there is no point 
in time at which one can say that the Intellect does not exist, there is a 
sense in which the Intellect is everlasting. However, this is true only in 
a limited sense, since the Intellect transcends time and so is not simply 
everlasting but also eternal. While we can see the difference between 
eternity and everlastingness, it is nonetheless true that eternity is in 
conformity with everlastingness, since everything which is eternal is 
also everlasting (including the intelligible realities and Intellect itself). 
However, eternity cannot be identical to everlastingness because it 
transcends time and thus, a comprehension of the everlasting does not 
imply a comprehension of the eternal. Indeed, while a person may be 
correct in thinking that the intelligible realities always exist, he would 
be wrong to believe that these realities exist in time. 
 
2. ἆρά (line 4) - πολλὰ οὖσαν (line 7) 
 
The concept of everlastingness stands in relation to that of unity since 
it represents a single extended reality through time. However, even 
though everlastingness is not a partless unity in the way that eternity is, 
it is still a predicate of intelligible realities and the five Great Kinds 
(see VI 2.8.25-49). Everlastingness, or that which is always, is 
secondary and dependent upon that which is, which provides the 
conditions of possibility for that which is always (see 5.15-18). If there 
were no ‘that which is’, there would be no grounds upon which to 
make sense of the ‘always’. As we have seen, ‘that which is’ is the 
Intellect, eternity and intelligible realities. Therefore, we can say that 
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everlastingness is dependent on eternity and the intelligible realities 
since the concept would contain no meaning were it not for that which 
exists at all times as a result of its existing outside of time. 
Furthermore, everlastingness accompanies the intelligible realities 
since ‘that which is’ transcends time and so can be acknowledged to 
exist at any point in time, whether past, present or future. On the other 
hand, however, the concept of everlastingness or ‘that which is always’ 
only accompanies ‘that which is’ when it is seen from the point of view 
of time. When ‘that which is’ is acknowledged without reference to 
time, it exists absolutely and without qualification. The concept of 
everlastingness is therefore equally dependent upon time and eternity, 
since without time, everlastingness would simply be eternity; and 
without eternity and the intelligible realities, there could be nothing 
everlasting.  
 
3. Καì (line 7) - ἐν (line 11) 
 
Plotinus’ attention now shifts to the ‘manifold power’ which can be 
interpreted by man as everlastingness when he is in time. This 
manifold power is Being, which Plotinus now discusses in relation to 
the four other of Plato’s five Great Kinds (see Pl. Soph. 254d4-255a2) 
rest, motion, sameness and difference (see also VI.2.8.25-49). Since 
Being is what is, it has the power to take on many identities and to 
express itself in different ways. One example of its transformative 
power is its manifestation as substrate or subject. In this case, it takes 
on  a foundational identity because it grounds the objects which it 
stands in relation to: its ‘that which is’ now stands in relation to all 
objects since the ‘is’ provides both the necessary and sufficient 
condition for the reality of any object and can therefore be perceived in 
different ways. For example, Heraclitus identifies ‘that which is’ with 
motion, since he observes that everything ‘which is’ is in a constant 
state of flux (see fr. B12 DK), whereas Parmenides identifies ‘that 
which is’ with rest, since ‘that which is’ can never be ‘that which is 
not’ (Parm. fr. B8.5-10 DK) and is therefore never changing but only 
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resting in its own nature. For Plotinus, both are only aspects of Being 
and he agrees with Plato when he says that Being is qualitatively 
different to the other four kinds in Soph. 257b, 258e–259a and that the 
other four kinds in fact participate in it. Plotinus claims that Being is 
‘different’ because it contains different beings and ‘same’ because 
those beings conform to its own unified and homogeneous nature, as 
Being. Therefore, the four other kinds are intelligible manifestations of 
Being, or aspects of Being, which depend upon how the observer views 
Being at any given time. Indeed, the way in which Being retains its 
identity while being viewed in different ways can be compared to a 
Gestalt image in which a picture appears as two objects at once 
(although these objects are not perceived simultaneously): in the case 
of a duck-rabbit image, for example. While the Gestalt image remains 
stable, the ways of perceiving the image may change so radically as to 
present altogether different natures to the human observer. As 
Wittgenstein recounts: “I see two pictures, with the duck-rabbit 
surrounded by rabbits in one, by ducks in the other. I do not notice that 
they are the same ... I describe the alteration (change of aspect) like a 
perception; quite as if the object had altered before my eyes... The 
expression of a change of aspect is the expression of a new perception 
and at the same time of the perception’s being unchanged.” 
(Wittgenstein 1997, 193-196). In the case of Being, in a way similar to 
the duck-rabbit image, we perceive the four kinds as if Being had itself 
disappeared, as our attention shifts to one and then another aspect of it. 
The totality of Being must therefore conceal itself in order to allow us 
to see it in its different forms and aspects, which all participate in 
Being without themselves being identical to it. Furthermore, since 
Intellect is Being considered objectively (see my comments on 5.18-
22), the alterations which appear in Being can also be said to appear in 
Intellect. And thus, the other four great kinds occur in Intellect as that 
facet of Being which can be observed. As Hadot puts it (1960, 111), 
“the genera of being ... appear as the different aspects under which our 
partitioning intelligence grasps the unitary life of the Intellect.” 
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Intellect, as the sum of its intelligible parts, is therefore the aspect of 
Being which appears in these different forms.  
 
4. οὕτω (line 11) - καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως (line 27) 
 
On the other hand, eternity exists ‘without extension or interval’ 
because it is the partless aspect of Being which is able to witness itself 
as Intellect, rather than a totality which can be perceived directly 
through the intelligible realities like Intellect (see VI.7.14). Since 
eternity is not ‘thinking’ but ‘life’, as Plotinus claims here and in 
I.1.13.5-7, I.4.3.33-37, III.2.1.31 and 11.48-50 (following Aristotle’s 
characterisation of the activity of Intellect as ‘life’ in Metaph. Λ 7, 
1072b2.6-30, cf. Cael. I 9, 2.79a18-27 and the identification of eternity 
with life by Alexander of Aphrodisias in Mund. A 126), we cannot 
presume to know its true nature through either discursive or intelligible 
thought, but must instead seek to access it within ourselves through a 
deep commitment to the life which Plotinus describes (see my 
comments on 11.1-4 and 12.4-12). This requires devotional practice 
since the life of eternity which Plotinus describes is radically different 
to the temporal conception of life which involves passing from one 
stage to another in an endless linear progression of past, present and 
future. For Plotinus, the only truly desirable life is one which is centred 
on the abundant nature of the eternal present. For since experience 
itself cannot happen in the past or future, our only chance of 
flourishing is in the eternal present (see I.5.2): an eternal present 
reminding us of the completeness (τετελεσμένον) of Being in 
Parmenides (cf. Fr. B8.42) by itself existing as a ‘partless completion’ 
(τέλος ἀμερές). As Sorabji notes (1983, 11-12), the partlessness of 
eternity means that it can neither come into being (γίγνεσθαι cf: Arist. 
Ph. VI 6. 237b9-11; and Num. fr. 5.13-21) nor pass away. Moreover, 
since this presence is partless, it embodies a state of simplicity which 
Plotinus compares to a point (see also VI.5.11.14-21) which in turn 
mirrors the simplicity of the One (see for example VI.8.18.7-22). The 
description of a process of generation as a flow of a point of simplicity 
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into different geometric magnitudes is also found in Arist. De an. I 4, 
409a3-5; and Philop. In De an. 77.30-78.5; cf. Philo Opif. 49; Sext. 
Emp. Math. X 2.81; Iambl. In Nicom. Ar. 57.7-12.; Procl. In Eucl. 
97.6-17; see also Burkert 1972, 66-69). Furthermore, Plotinus 
reiterates that eternity is not the same as the substrate of Intellect. For 
as we have already seen, Intellect is the objective aspect of Being 
which is made up of parts, whereas eternity is Being when perceived as 
a partless whole, as a formless mode of subjectivity. For this reason, 
Plotinus claims that eternity cannot be equated with τὸ ὑποκείμενον 
(3.24) and yet only two chapters later he seems to contradict this and 
claims that eternity is the substrate (5.15-18). We may say that eternity, 
by comporting itself to Intellect ‘gives something of itself to the 
substrate’ (III.6.8.18-20) and is therefore not equivalent to the Intellect, 
while at the same time being inseparable from it. Thus, eternity shines 
from τὸ ὑποκείμενον (the substrate of Intellect) because the light of 
human subjectivity, in its natural desireless condition, enlivens the 
intelligible world in the same way that the light of the sun allows 
plants and animals to flourish on earth, while at the same time being 
separate from these phenomena. For one could at the same time 
associate the light of the sun with the earthly beings and separate their 
natures: on the one hand, the phenomena are surrounded by and filled 
with light, and on the other, they are distinct entities from the sun. In a 
similar way, we may say that the intelligible beings are both 
inextricably connected to and distinct from human subjectivity. 
  
5. Τί γàρ ἄν (line 27) - αἰών (line 36) 
 
Plotinus here echoes Plato (in Ti. 37e5-38a5) and Parmenides (in DK 
fr. B8.19-20 DK), who both claim that eternity is outside of time and 
impervious to change. Indeed, eternity is Being perceived in itself. It 
does not have a future or a past because its identity is precisely that 
which is, and the future and past is what is not, since the future is what 
is not yet and the past is what is not any more (see V.1.4.21-25, 
VI.7.1.45-57 and similar passages noted by Beierwaltes, such as Num. 
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fr. 5.6-7: “Being neither ever was, nor ever will come to be, but always 
is at a determined time, [which is] solely the present”). For that which 
is cannot be associated with or pass into what is not yet (future) or 
what is not any more (past) since if it could, it would cease to be what 
is and would become what is not, or a mixture of what is and what is 
not. Since it is impossible for ‘that which is’ to be that which is not, 
Plotinus concludes that eternity cannot be associated either with the 
past or the future, nor be described as having a beginning or an end. 
Indeed, Plotinus argues that eternity couldn’t come from the past since 
it is Being and if Being had had a beginning, there would have been 
nothing before it from which it could have arisen. Similarly, if it was 
destined to be something else in the future, then it would have to be 
other than itself, namely non-Being, which entails a contradiction and 
is thus impossible. There is a possibility of understanding the claims 
that Plotinus makes here on both an intellectual and on an experiential 
level. Indeed, a student needs to know not only that ‘that which is’ can 
never have a future or a past; he must also honour this truth by 
focusing his attention on this presence in his daily life, so that he is 
never lost in the stream of time which he perceives. This ultimately 
means having an ever-present awareness of the presence of Being 
which serves as the backdrop of all experiences and perceptions. 
Therefore, eternity not only transcends time but is also immanent in 
every moment since it is the here and now. If the student fully imbibes 
Plotinus’ words he will realise that the eternal is not solely a concept 
but a practical reality which can be lived by shifting awareness of the 
linear succession of temporal phases to that which envelops and 
surrounds these phases.  
 
6. γίνεται (line 36) - αἰών (line 38) 
 
Here, Plotinus reiterates that eternity is the life of Being. Many 
scholars view Plotinus’ conception of eternity as unchanging and as 
‘life’ (ζωἡ) to be internally contradictory, since it is difficult to 
conceive of life which is unmoving and atemporal (see Kneale 
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1960/61, 99-100 and references in Strange 1994, 38n.45). As Hadot 
puts it, “to reconcile life and immobility represents one of the 
fundamental problems Plato posed for the whole of Western thought” 
(1980b, 53). However, this problem largely arises from viewing 
eternity as an object which can be understood rather than a subjective 
mode in which entities (including the intelligible realities) appear. 
Indeed, if eternity were an unchanging object which appeared within 
experience, it would be difficult to see how this could be an enlivening 
force or pertain to human experience in any way. However, once we 
see eternity as a subjective mode (arising from the state of the soul), 
we can reconcile these two descriptions. For human subjectivity may 
be conceived as the unchanging context in which Being, the forms and 
the great kinds appear to man. For on the one hand, human subjectivity 
is unchanging since it is provides the space in which all of man’s 
experiences occur, and on the other, it is life, for without such 
subjectivity, Being and Intellect would be reduced to dead abstractions 
with no relation to the journey of the soul. Therefore, similar to 
Nietzsche who in Thus Spoke Zarathustra asks, “Great star, what 
would your happiness be, if you had not those for whom you shine!” 
(1974, 39), we may in turn claim that for Plotinus, there would be no 
life in the great Intellect without those human souls which can access 
this realm through lived experience. Indeed, while many authors claim 
that eternal life is reserved to God alone (see for example, Philo Deus 
32 "so that there is nothing future to God, who has the very boundaries 
of time subject to him; for his life [βιός] is not time [οὑ χρόνος], but 
the archetype of time and its exemplar, eternity”; and Plutarch in De Is. 
et Os. 1, 351e, who similarly claims that god has eternal life), Plotinus 
believes that human beings may themselves exist in this state, since 
they too are divine (see in particular IV.7.10.30-40). Therefore, for 
Plotinus, eternity is not only ‘the mode of life of the intelligible world’ 
(see Philo. Mut. 267); it is also the specifically subjective mode of life 
of the intelligible world: a mode which enlivens Intellect while 
remaining unmoved in its own nature.   
 
51 
 
 
Chapter IV 
 
1. Οὐκ (line 1) - οὐσίᾳ (line 5) 
 
Plotinus claims in 3.23-27 that eternity shines from the substrate 
without itself being the substrate. Yet at the same time he says that 
eternity and the Intellect are in some sense identical. The key is the 
fact that eternity is the aspect of Being which exists as a partless 
whole (see 2.17-19, 3.15-19, 4.37-43 and 6.47-50), whereas the 
Intellect is the aspect of Being which exists in relation to its parts, 
albeit in a qualified sense (see II.4.4.11-20, II.4.5.4-6, 2.17-19, 
III.9.1.29-34, IV.3.4.9-12, VI.6.15.13-15). And thus, the One 
transfers its purely esoteric and purely partless nature to eternity on 
the one hand (see V.3.15.15-18) and its exoteric and relational nature 
to Intellect on the other. From a relational vantage point, which 
seeks to penetrate the metaphysical structure and hierarchy of reality, 
Intellect takes logical priority over eternity since Intellect can be 
known objectively in relation to other metaphysical objects such as 
Soul and the intelligible realities. Therefore, when Being is viewed 
from an objective perspective, eternity can be said to exist “in” (see 
also 2.6-9) and come “from” Intellect because, as the animating 
force connecting all intelligible objects of experience, it is an 
integral part of the nature of Intellect. However, when Being is 
considered from a subjective point of view, eternity has logical 
priority (see 2.10-12) because from the point of view of human 
experience, it is only when man realises the eternal within himself 
that he is granted access to the intelligible objects of experience 
which accompany this inner state of presence. Therefore, eternity 
exists “with” Intellect as its subjective counterpart; is identical to it 
from the perspective of Being; and can be said to come “from” it 
when Being is considered objectively rather than subjectively. 
 
2. τὰ (line 5) -  ᾖ (line 11) 
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Here, Plotinus distinguishes between “primary realities” and 
“primaries”. The primary realities include eternity itself, as well as 
the form of beauty (see I.6.1.53-54 and 6.21-34) and truth (III.9.1.9-
10, V.5.1.54-68), and these primary realities connect the intelligible 
realm into an ordered whole and prevent it from existing as a random 
arrangement of parts: cf. Pl. Tht. 204a7b9; and Arist. Metaph. Z 17, 
1041b11-12. The primaries on the other hand, are those intelligible 
realities which possess the primary realities of truth, beauty and 
eternity as properties (see Kalligas 2014, 586 on 2.20-24 and Smith 
1996, 202). Among these primary realities, eternity is arguably 
unique by existing ‘as if’ in a part of the existent whole. For just as 
rays of the sun enter the earth and illuminate the objects therein 
without strictly being ‘parts’ of the earth, so too may eternity enliven 
and be found within the intelligible realities without itself being a 
part of Intellect. And therefore we may distinguish between eternity 
as a mode of subjectivity, and primaries which exist ‘within the 
whole’ as objective features of Intellect. For eternity connects the 
primaries ‘as if’ it is part of the whole, since it exists as a subjective 
mode shining light upon, and allowing human beings to access, the 
intelligible realm. On the other hand, the other primary realities may 
be said to exist in and originate from Intellect as objective properties 
of the primaries. And thus, one could argue that there is a qualitative 
difference between the claims that ‘all primaries are beautiful’ and 
‘all primaries are eternal’. The former claim points to beauty as an 
objective property of the primaries; whereas the latter points to 
eternity as the subjective mode in which the primaries may be 
experienced. 
 
3. καὶ (line 11) – ἀλήθεια (line 12) 
 
Furthermore, in the intelligible realm, the truth ‘is what it says and 
says what it is’ (see V.3.5.25-88 and V.5.2.18-20 and Emilsson 
1996, 236-38) and therefore does not correspond to some pre-
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existing standard by which it may be validated as true. For since 
‘you cannot find anything truer than the truth’ (see V.5.2.23-24 and 
VI.7.34.27-28) only the truth itself can confirm its own nature.  
 
4. δεῖ (line 12) - εἶναι (20) 
 
However, Plotinus asserts that the nature of the whole (in this case, 
eternity) is such that it does not lack anything (see for example 
V.1.4.12-21 and V.4.2.13-16). Indeed, a whole cannot be deficient, 
for even if its parts were deficient, the whole would remain in 
harmony with itself by transcending the discord of the parts (see 
III.2.16.28-36, V.3.13.16-21 and 6.37-38). The difference between a 
whole and a part therefore regards deficiency, which, as a matter of 
necessity, can never be predicated of the whole but only of the part. 
If the future existed for the whole, the whole would be continually 
deficient, in the sense that at any given point p (present), it would 
always lack something due to arrive at point p2 (existing in the 
future). Since the whole cannot be deficient in anything, and having 
a future necessitates some kind of lack because it only exists 
potentially (see II.5.3.4-8), the whole cannot have a future. Thus, in 
the case of eternity, which exists as a whole, its own end is contained 
in itself, so that nothing can be either added to or taken away from 
its nature (see Nikulin, 2002). Furthermore, if eternity (as an aspect 
of Being) were to lack something, or were due to experience 
something, it would have to lack or be due to experience something 
outside its sphere of influence. The only thing that lies outside the 
sphere of influence of Being is non-Being. If Being were able to 
endure something contrary to its nature (non-Being), it would no 
longer be Being because the conflation of Being and non-Being 
entails a contradiction. Therefore, Being cannot endure anything 
contrary to its nature. We are left with Being in itself, with no 
possible association with past or future. 
 
5. τοῖς (line 20) - εἶναι (line 28) 
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Plotinus here illustrates a key difference between things in the 
intelligible realm and those in the temporal realm: while the 
intelligible realities do not have a future, the sensible realities, as 
parts, are constantly attempting to reach full maturity through motion 
(cf. Arist. Ph. II 1, 192b21-3 and 193b16-18, and Kalfas 1999, 144-
46).  All things in the temporal realm meet the criterion of being a 
thing by virtue of having a possible future and a past. For example, 
when someone cuts down a tree, the tree no longer “will be”, and 
therefore by destroying the tree, the person takes away its “will be”. 
Sensible realities are therefore dependent upon the future to 
guarantee the continuation of their existence (cf. Plut. Quaest. Plat. 
VIII 4, 1007d (trans. Cherniss): “what is subject to generation cannot 
[be] apart from time, etc.”) whereas the intelligible realities do not 
need to acquire anything in time because everything is already 
present to them (see also V.1.4.8-19). Indeed, each time point p in 
the future manifests itself as point p2 in the present (before it 
becomes point p3 in the past) the temporal thing has bought more 
time, and thus increased its share of being. On the other hand, if one 
were to add a ‘will be’ to beauty, truth or eternity, which exist in the 
intelligible realm, the ontological status of the object of investigation 
would immediately be lowered (see also V.9.5.32-36) since anything 
which has a future (or a past) is a part and not a whole by virtue of 
the deficiency that having a past or a future entails. Therefore one 
can assume that by ascribing future and past existence to the 
intelligible realities, one really discusses the images of the 
intelligible realities in the temporal world (like a beautiful object 
rather than Beauty itself, an instance of justice rather than Justice 
itself) rather than the intelligible realities themselves. Having 
distinguished between things in the temporal realm and the 
intelligible realm based on their association (or lack thereof) with the 
future, Plotinus claims that the very meaning of Being differs for the 
two groups. For the intelligible realities, Being is a fixed and 
unchanging state which has everything present to it simultaneously 
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whereas for things in time, their being or “is” constantly changes 
relative to the past and the future (see also II.5.3.28-33, II.5.5.1-5, 
II.9.3.12-15, 11.56-59 and VI.7.1.48-50). Thus, while the intelligible 
realities are whole and eternal, the sensible realities exist as parts in 
time. And therefore, whereas Beauty itself always exists, a beautiful 
(sensible) object has both a beginning and an end.  
 
6. καὶ (line 28) – μέλλοντι (line 33) 
 
As a sensible reality, the physical universe is also subject to 
temporality and thus has a future which it moves towards. Since 
desire belongs to that which is in need (III.5.9.49), the physical 
universe cannot be an intelligible reality, since intelligible realities 
are always already complete (see IV.4.8.48-51). Instead, the physical 
universe moves in a circle towards Intellect (see also II.2.1.1 and 39-
51), resembling the circular movement of Soul as it too aspires to the 
fullness of Intellect (see IV.4.16.23-31). Unlike the intelligible 
realities which exist in a state of perfect stillness, the universe travels 
towards Being, and for this reason never really attains it but instead 
gathers the ersatz being which stands relative to the past and the 
future. Like a dog chasing its tail, the universe goes round in circles 
in search for being and hankers after it, but never achieves it, having 
instead to settle for the image of eternity, which is everlastingness in 
time (see also III.2.1.20-26, 5.12-18 and V.8.12.17). Plotinus 
therefore claims that the cause of the perennial movement of the 
universe is this desire for being, which it fails to achieve precisely 
because it strives to reach it.  
 
7. τοῖς (line 33) - εἴη ἂν αἰών (line 42) 
 
By contrast, since the primaries are whole, they do not seek anything 
but are instead complete, existing as they do in the rarefied region of 
pure Being where past and future are excluded. The complete nature 
of the primaries reminds us of the ‘complete living thing’ of Plato’s 
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Timaeus (31b1; cf. Resp. V 477a3 and Soph. 248e8-249a1) as well 
as Parmenides’ Being (“complete in every direction”: Fr. B8.42-43 
DK) which outlaws non-Being (c.f. Parm.fr. B7.I, 8.12-13, 46 DK). 
For each primary is qualitatively complete by being illumined by the 
qualities of the other primaries (as seen in V.3.15.26, V.8.4.9, 
V.8.9.16-17, and VI.2.8.7-11; see also Kalligas 2000, 28) as well as 
being complete by transcending time. Thus, the primaries are 
complete both by possessing the fullness of Being in eternity and by 
embodying all aspects of Being in the intelligible realm. They are 
also blessed as a result of being what they are and not needing to 
move towards or create anything else (see also III.2.1.38-45 and 
IV.7.9.13-16). By claiming that the future cannot develop in the 
primaries (and not simply that the primaries do not travel towards 
the future), Plotinus reminds us that the primaries cannot simply be 
thought of as parts without a past and a future but as wholes which 
do not admit of any association with past and future. Therefore, it is 
not the past and future which prohibit the primaries from 
participating in them, but the primaries which outlaw past and future 
by virtue of existing in the intelligible realm. This is why Plotinus 
asserts that “there is nothing which is going to be for them (the 
primary realities)” rather than saying that they will not exist in the 
future. For while the future does not exist for the primaries, there is 
no point in the future in which the primaries will not exist. 
Therefore, the primaries a.) transcend time and as a result of a.), b.) 
always exist from the point of view of someone in time and c.) 
cannot aspire to the future or be subject to change or novelty, since 
they exist in eternal stillness. On the other hand, the sensible realities 
have only partial existence since they rely upon the past and future 
(which from the point of view of Intellect are non-existent) for their 
continuation. 
 
8. αἰὼν γὰρ (line 42) - ὄντος (line 43) 
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Plotinus’ false claim about αἰών deriving from ἀεί and ὄν (‘always 
existing’) is also found in Arist. Cael. I 9, 279a27 where it is used to 
support the claim that the sensible world is everlasting (cf. Ph. IV 
12, 221b3-7 and Festugière 1949, 175-82). Furthermore, Whitaker 
1968, 138 suggests that this etymology (already pointing to the 
Platonic conception of eternity as everlasting Being) may well have 
motivated Plato to use the terms αἰών and αἰώνιον in the Timaeus. In 
Plotinus’ case, we must remember to identify eternity in relation to 
the ‘always’ which transcends time rather than the ‘always’ of time 
and everlastingness (see again 2.28-29). 
 
 
 
Chapter V 
 
 
1. Tοῦτο δέ (line 1) - τοιοῦτον (line 7) 
 
Plotinus claims that that which always exists cannot have come into 
being and therefore cannot have a past. Here Plotinus echoes Ti. 
41B2-B4, “since you have come into being, you are not immortal” 
(and Plotinus mentions this passage in I.8.7.9-11). However, it seems 
that we have to interpret the ‘always existing’ here as that which is 
eternal rather than that which is everlasting. This is because Plotinus 
claims both that the universe and time are everlasting (see III.2.1.20-
26 and I.5.7.25-27) and yet that they both came into being (although 
this act of coming into being takes place outside of time: see 6.50-
54, 11.4-6 and 12.22-23 for example).  Since Plotinus claims here 
that that which always exists cannot have come into being in any 
sense, we can infer that he is specifically referring to that which is 
eternal rather than that which is everlasting. Since eternity always 
exists in every sense (by not having a beginning either in time, in the 
human soul, or in the hypostasis of Soul), it cannot have had any 
kind of beginning. Plotinus also asks a rhetorical question about 
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whether we can say that something is eternal if it changes. But we 
already know from 3.11-19 and 12.8-14 that Plotinus rules this out 
on the grounds that eternity is what is, and since what is cannot be 
associated with what was or what will be, eternity remains fixed and 
unchanging in a state of rest and unity. Furthermore, that which does 
not exist as a whole cannot be eternal since it would be deficient in a 
temporal sense, requiring the ongoing passage of time to guarantee 
its being (see my comments on 4.12-20).  
 
2. τί οὖν (line 7) – θεώμενος (line 12) 
 
Here Plotinus presents us with a challenge. The focus on eternity 
moves from theoretical and abstract investigation to practical and 
spiritual enquiry. This spiritual enquiry is a form of meditation, 
where one remains aware of the eternity that surrounds them; where 
there is a shift in attention from the objects within one’s field of 
awareness to the field of awareness itself (cf. my comments on 11.1-
4 and 12.4-22). Thus, we can contemplate all things, such as 
thoughts, perceptions and sensations within the eternal now, rather 
than in temporal sequence (see also I.5.7.24-30). The focus on 
eternity may take its form in the light of other intelligible realities 
which are also eternal such as beauty (see III.5.1.38-42). However, a 
continual focus on the sensible objects which arise in awareness can 
make us blind to the awareness in which those objects are arising, 
the field of vision upon which the images and sensations of life are 
projected. While the sensible objects in awareness come and go, the 
awareness itself, the soul which perceives these objects, does not 
come or go but rather exists outside of time. This soul is therefore 
the natural power which Plotinus refers to as never failing, and is 
eternity itself. For Plotinus claims that we should not attempt solely 
to understand eternity abstractly as though it was something existing 
outside the human soul, but rather should see that it exists within us 
(see also 7.1-5, 11.1-4 and 12.4-12, IV.4.15.15-20, IV.7.10.1-2, 
IV.8.2.31-38). For through devotion and concentration on this divine 
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principle, we are able not only to be that nature that we already 
possess but also to live in full realisation of this truth. Indeed, 
Plotinus’ claim that this eternal awareness does not fail matches 
Porphyry’s account in his Life of Plotinus that Plotinus reduced sleep 
through “continuous turning in contemplation to his intellect” (VP 
8.19-24) and that he “never, while awake, relaxed his intent 
concentration upon the intellect” (VP 9.16-18). Taking Plotinus at 
his word, if this awareness is truly eternal then the life of the soul 
must transcend all states such as waking and sleeping, as well as the 
life and death of the body (see for example, I.6.6.9-11, in which 
Plotinus describes the continuation of awareness after death in a state 
of aloneness). Plotinus therefore requires us to shift our focus from 
the temporal realm, which is the usual focus of our lives, to the 
eternal space which is usually in the background, so that eternity 
may flood our vision and transform us.  
 
3. εἰ οὖν (line 12) – ἐμφαινομένης (line 18) 
 
Anything which is eternal is necessarily everlasting (see my 
comments on 3.1-6). As we have already seen, although that which 
is eternal necessarily transcends time, it is also the case that by 
transcending time, that which is eternal exists at all points in time 
and so can be described as everlasting. Take for example the natural 
power which Plotinus refers to as the eternal nature within man. If it 
is true that this natural power (of awareness) is eternal, then it must 
also be the case that it is everlasting. This is because the natural 
power which exists outside of time and which is aware of thoughts, 
perceptions and sensations occurring in time, is necessarily aware of 
these things at each point in time in which each of these things 
arises. However, not everything which is everlasting is eternal, for 
both time itself and the sensible universe are everlasting without 
being eternal (cf. III.3.6.24; see also Strange, 1994, 34n.34.) 
Furthermore, Plotinus defines eternity as that which admits of no 
addition since if it could receive something more than it already had, 
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it would need some future time to fulfil its destiny and would 
therefore be subject to time (see also my comments on 3.11-20, 4.20-
28 and 5.1-7). This passage echoes many others in which addition is 
associated with alienation from and opposition to pure Being (see for 
example, I.1.2.19-21, I.1.12.10-21, I.6.5.39-45, II.6.1.53-58, 
III.6.6.23-32, V.5.13.9-11, VI.5.12.15-22, VI.7.41.14-17). Indeed, 
since Being is already perfect and still, any addition to it results in 
imperfection and motion. Thus, the eternal ‘is’, when added to, 
becomes the ‘was’ and ‘will be’ of time. Addition to the eternal 
present therefore causes a person to fall away from eternity and 
dwell instead in everlasting time, which imitates eternity by 
continuing in perpetual “desire for Being” (4.29-31). 
 
4. ὅθεν σεμνòν (line 18) - ἐν ζωῇ (line 22) 
 
Plotinus here describes eternity as majestic: a word Plotinus uses to 
describe Intellect as well (see V.3.13.2-3 and my comments on 2.5-
9), and associates it with Intellect (the hypostasis which eternity 
allows man to access). The whole passage conveys a devotional and 
mystical attitude, since eternity is described both as a god and as an 
immanent aspect of Being wishing to reveal its own nature and that 
of Intellect to mankind. Plotinus’ description here therefore 
heightens the religious sense which already accompanied the word 
αἰών during his own lifetime (see Nock 1934, 78-99; Festugière 
1944-54, 4:176-99; and Zuntz 1992, passim). Furthermore, although 
eternity is identified as majestic by virtue of its proximity to 
Intellect, it is also majestic in a way that Intellect is not since it 
‘proclaims’ itself to human beings as that which is: the present 
which has no past or future and which constitutes the essence of 
experience. Eternity is therefore tied to human subjectivity in a way 
that Intellect is not, since eternity is internally accessible to human 
beings through their contemplation of stillness and presence. 
Therefore, although Intellect and eternity are equally accessible to 
man, the former remains an objective and external feature of man’s 
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experience, whereas the latter manifests itself to man as the still 
voice of his own nature, thereby proclaiming its identity to man from 
within. And thus, Plotinus describes eternity as fully grounded in 
‘life’, a word which carries the specific connotation of the power of 
human subjectivity in animating and illuminating the intelligible 
realm (see my comments on 3.11-20). Nevertheless, eternity remains 
connected to Intellect as an aspect of Being, which we can see from 
Plotinus’ use of Parmenidean terms: for as well as being majestic 
(see also 2.15-17, V 8.3.18 and Pl. Phlb. 53c6), eternity is ἀτρεμὲς 
(“unshakeable”: III 2.2.16, VI 9.5.14 and Parm. fr. B8.4 DK), ταὐτὸν 
(“self-identical” or “the same”: Parm. fr. B8.29 DK), and βέβαιον 
("firm": VI 5.1.9 and Pl. Ti. 29b6).  
 
5. εἰ δ᾽ἐκ πολλῶν (line 22) - εἶναι (line 30) 
 
By virtue of being the subjective aspect of Being, eternity allows 
man to perceive all beings (both sensible and intelligible). Therefore, 
Plotinus warns against thinking that eternity cannot exist with 
multiplicity or that these two concepts are mutually exclusive in any 
way. On the contrary, since eternity is the life of Being, it is present 
to everything at all times and is made up of the many (see also 
VI.5.12.1-7). Therefore, Plotinus’ vision of eternity is not that of a 
separate transcendent realm in the heavens but rather of an immanent 
presence pervading all things. The ability to access eternity is 
therefore not dependent upon travelling to a different reality away 
from the multiplicity of beings in the sensory world, but rather of 
changing one’s disposition and cleansing the doors of perception so 
that its reality can become manifest to us (see 11.1-4) in everyday 
experience. Since the many is accommodated by eternity, it is indeed 
possible to say that it is made up of many parts (see Armstrong 
1966-1988, 313, 1-2) although the Greek is simply “ἐκ πολλῶν”. 
However, this interpretation may lead us into difficulties since in and 
of itself, eternity is partless (see 2.17-19, 4.37-43 and 6.47-50). We 
explain this apparent tension in Plotinus’ philosophy by claiming 
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that while eternity is in and of itself partless, there is no 
contradiction in perceiving multiplicity in eternity, since it unlocks 
access to Intellect, which is itself a multiple (see for example 
V.3.10.7-14). Therefore, as the empty presence of awareness, 
although eternity is not many things in itself (unlike Intellect), it is 
filled with the things which it allows man to access in the realms of 
Intellect and Soul. And thus it is the partless aspect of Being which 
allows man to perceive Being in relation to its parts.  
 
 
Chapter VI 
 
1. ‘Eπειδὴ δὲ (line 1) - εἶναι (line 9) 
 
Plotinus here refers to Ti. 37d6 as evidence that Plato believed that 
eternity was a manifestation of the One, but it is probable that this 
passage from Plato points back to Parmenides’ conception of Being 
in B8.29 DK, and therefore that Plato was associating eternity with 
the unity of Being rather than with the One. From Plotinus’ 
perspective, however, eternity derives its partless nature from the 
One (see IV.8.6.9) and like the One cannot be conceptualised solely 
in relation to the intelligible realities (like Intellect can) or the 
sensible realities (like Soul). It therefore shares in common with the 
One an esoteric nature which cannot be grasped through objects 
alone (for the One is ‘simple before all things’: V.4.1.5). This makes 
eternity a different emanatory expression from Intellect, which 
shares with the One a hypostatic and exoteric nature as the source of 
beings (see III.2.1.20-26, III.8.9.44-51, V.1.7.9-10, VI.2.20.25-29 
and VI.8.18.32-41). And thus eternity is the ‘life of Being around the 
One’ (cf. 3.11-20 and my comments): for eternity is the subjective 
expression of the One which animates and enlivens the intelligible 
realities (while the One itself is beyond life: see III 8.10.2-3, V 
3.16.35-38). Furthermore, by virtue of the ever-present and 
everlasting nature of eternity, Plotinus claims that eternity “dwells”: 
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an activity of the One-Good itself (see I.7.1.18-19 and VI.8.16.25-
26) which on the level of Being becomes contemplative life (see 
V.5.5.1-14, VI.7.15.1-13; Pl. Ti. 29b6-7; and Aubenque 1976, 82). 
Indeed, although eternity exists as a unified whole, it is not by its 
own merit that it does this, but because unity is an expression of the 
One. Thus, eternity receives its unified nature from the ultimately 
simple and pure principle of the One (see V.2.1-5) which transcends 
everything (see for example V.3.12.47-50 and V.5.6.8-10). Here, we 
could argue that Plotinus clarifies the aim of the spiritual exercise in 
the previous chapter (8-12), which entails contemplating eternity by 
a ‘natural power that never tires’. For through stillness, which is the 
hallmark of eternity, we may find that we are capable not only of 
discovering eternity, but also of ascending to the One (see V.5.4.1-
10). 
 
2. τὸ γὰρ (line 9) - ἀιών(line 21) 
 
Eternity, as the principal activity of Being and Intellect, is 
necessarily timeless since all activities of Intellect contain their own 
end without requiring extension in time (see Arist. Metaph. Θ6, 
1048b18-35, McGuire and Strange 1988, 252-53; and Kalligas 2000, 
32). According to Sorabji 1983, 113, Plotinus’ conception of eternity 
as a timeless present is the first of its kind and had a great influence 
on the philosophers of the Middle Ages through Boethius (see De 
trin. 4.64-77; De consol. philos. V 6.9-31; and Beierwaltes 1967, 
198-200). Since eternity is the timeless present, its characteristics are 
different from both time and everything existing within it. Time 
contains ‘this and that’ in the sense that it is comprised of past, 
present and future whereas eternity does not (see again 3.15-19). If 
the present is ‘this’, the past and future are ‘that’. It is possible to 
differentiate between the ‘this’ in the present and the ‘that’ which 
has gone into the past, as well as the ‘that’ which is yet to arrive in 
the future. By contrast, eternity exists only as ‘this’ and its Being is 
neither relative to the ‘that’ of the past nor of the future. For this 
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reason, it has no extension and cannot be ‘unrolled’ (see also 
III.8.8.32-38 in which the word ἐξελίσσω is also used to describe the 
decline of the Intellect from the ultimate simplicity of the One to a 
state of multiplicity), ‘stretched’, or ‘prolonged’. Furthermore, since 
eternity, as the life of Intellect, is partless and unextended in such a 
way, human beings are able to come into contact with the 
intelligibles suddenly in the timeless present (see V.3.17.24-30 and 
V.8.7.12-17) rather than over an extended period of time.  
 
3. ὅταν δὲ (line 21) - ὡς μὴ ἐπιλείψοντός ποτε (line 26) 
 
Plotinus here warns us that saying that eternity always exists can 
lead to a misunderstanding with regards to the true nature of eternity. 
The danger with associating eternity with the word ‘always’ is that 
we may get the impression that eternity is a permanent feature of 
time; that it persists through it and increases in being with each 
passing moment (see 2.28-29, 3.1-6, V.1-7 and my comments 
above). Furthermore, just as myths draw down eternal realities into 
temporal sequence in order to communicate meaning to the reader 
(see III.5.9.24-29), so Plotinus must use words which designate 
things of a lower order of reality, such as ‘ἀεί’ signifying everlasting 
existence in time, to describe things pertaining to the higher order 
like eternity. Therefore, the word ἀεί does not signify that eternity 
exists everlastingly within time but rather that it is necessarily 
present to each possible temporal point given that it transcends time 
(cf. Procl. In Ti. I 239.2-6, who distinguishes two distinct meanings 
of ἀεί and Leg. X 904a8-9 where Plato makes the distinction 
between the eternal" (αἰώνιον) and the "indestructible" (ἀνώλεθρον). 
See also Strange 1994, 40 and Sorabji 1983, 114-116). Thus, even if 
one rightly describes eternity as something which always exists and 
which at no time has not existed nor will cease to exist, he may still 
have an incorrect understanding of eternity by interpreting the word 
‘always’ in the way that it is usually understood: namely as a state of 
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endless continuation in time, rather than the mode of being which 
transcends time. Therefore, we can identify the difference between 
the everlasting and the eternal: the everlasting always exists through 
never-ending existence within time, whereas the eternal always 
exists by transcending time. 
 
4. τὸ δὲ (line 26) – τὸ πᾶν (line 36) 
 
Since eternity is Being, Plotinus believes that it would make more 
sense simply to say that eternity exists, rather than that it always 
exists. For to say that eternity always exists could mislead people 
into thinking eternity is temporal in some sense (see my comments 
above; cf. Weiss 1941, 235). However, due to the incorrect 
attribution of Being to bodies by Aristotle and the Stoics (see Pl. Ti. 
35a2-3; Apul. De Plat. I 6, 193-4) people misunderstand what Being 
really is. Indeed, people mistake existence for becoming because the 
only things that they perceive existing are things which exist in time. 
Therefore, Plotinus must temporarily accept the deficient definition 
of existence which they have presupposed and add ‘always’ (ἀεί) to 
it in order to restore its true and original meaning. Plotinus compares 
this linguistic concession to one used to remedy the distortion of the 
meaning of the word ‘philosopher’ by sophists and mere scholars 
(see Plotinus’ views on Longinus for example in VP 14.20). For 
when sophists and mere scholars make people believe that 
philosophy is something other than it really is, it is necessary to 
make a distinction for the layman between a ‘philosopher’ and a 
‘true philosopher’ (here Plotinus most likely draws upon Plato, Soph. 
235a1-2 and Aristotle, Metaph. T 2, 1004b17-26; cf. Beierwaltes 
1967, 202). He may then be able then see that what he calls 
philosophy is not really philosophy at all, but a kind of imposter 
posing as philosophy. Only when he sees this can he embark on 
investigation into the truth. Plotinus therefore helps us to see that 
adding the words ‘always’ and ‘true’ to the words ‘existence’ and 
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‘philosophy’ do not help us distinguish two types of existence or two 
types of philosophy but rather to discern the difference between 
existence and philosophy in themselves and their respective 
imitations, which are mistaken for the things in themselves. As a 
result, Plotinus encourages us to replace ‘ἀεὶ ὤν’ (‘always existing’) 
with ‘ἀληθῶς ὤν (‘truly existing’) in our minds, since we can now 
attest to the fact that eternity does not always exist in the way that 
everlastingness does (see my comments above), but rather always 
exists by being outside of time. This substitution signifies that we are 
aware that the only things which truly exist are those which always 
exist (in the atemporal sense), such as eternity and the intelligible 
realities. 
 
5. πᾶν οὖν (line 37) – λέγοιτο (line 42) 
 
Here Plotinus continues the theme of setting opposition between 
things in themselves and their imitations. Having already pinpointed 
the difference between eternity and its imitation in everlastingness 
and having alluded to the difference between philosophy and its 
imitations, Plotinus turns his attention to the concept of perfection. 
We learn that perfection can be ascribed only to eternity and eternal 
things. This is because the eternal is not deficient in any respect and 
exists as a whole outside of time, impervious to corruption by it (see 
my comments on 4.12-20). To possess wholeness means to be 
perfect since the wholeness is complete, and perfection requires that 
nothing needs to or could be added or taken away from the thing 
claiming perfection (see III.6.6.10-32). For if something needed to 
be added or taken away, it would be imperfect by definition and if it 
could be added or taken away it would be imperfect by virtue of 
being subject to alteration and destruction (as we have seen in 4.33-
43). The eternal is thus the model of perfection. By contrast, things 
existing in time may seem to be perfect but can in fact never truly be 
so. For example, although the heavenly sphere and celestial bodies 
are of a higher order than earthly bodies, they are still imperfect 
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because of their corporeal natures (see II.1.8.19-28, 4.28-33, 12.15-
19 and II.1.2.6-10; cf. Resp. VII.530B2-3). The case for the 
perfection of certain things in time is compelling at first: since 
everything in the hierarchy of reality is in the right place in relation 
to everything else according to its level of unity and internal 
harmony, there can be no mistakes in the allocation of bodies to 
souls. For this reason, there is a sense in which the allocation of a 
body to a soul is an act of perfection, since each body is wholly 
appropriate for the soul which embodies it. However, Plotinus 
rejects this kind of perfection as another category error since 
perfection in itself has the qualities of atemporality, wholeness and 
true existence. Thus, while a body may be appropriate for a soul, it 
can never be perfect in itself because it does not possess these 
qualities. Indeed, Plotinus reaffirms the necessary connection 
between the temporal and the deficient and thus outlaws the 
tenability of calling things in time perfect, reminding us of his claim 
that the names of archetypes should be reserved for the archetypes 
alone (cf. III.6.17.21-37). For on the one hand perfection, existence 
and philosophy are the archetypes; and on the other, those things 
which attempt to copy these archetypes and fail to live up to their 
standards are their imitations.  
 
6. ὅτῳ δὲ ὑπάρχει (line 43) - καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ (line 50) 
 
Eternity cannot be measured because it has no duration. Thus, while 
it is possible to say that a finite object lasts a certain length of time 
(according to the distance between its beginning and end point) and 
that there is such a thing as an endless length of time, which has no 
beginning or end, eternity cannot be regarded as lasting any length of 
time because it transcends time. Thus, asking how long eternity lasts 
would be like asking about the feathers of an elephant. Both 
questions presuppose associations which do not in fact exist. And 
Plotinus argues that eternity cannot be associated with time or 
duration because it exists prior to them. This does not mean that 
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eternity existed before duration in time. For this would simply trap 
eternity within time, given that any ‘before’ or ‘after’ must 
necessarily happen within time since both are concepts regarding 
relative positions within time itself. Instead Plotinus means that 
eternity exists logically prior to time (see 1.16-20), that it is on a 
higher level in the hierarchy of reality, existing on the level of Being 
which is beyond both time and space. For this reason, eternity cannot 
have any contact with time because if it did, it would get caught up 
in it and be a part of it, rather than a whole. And Plotinus reiterates 
what we already know, namely, that eternity is a “pure partlessness” 
both in itself (see 2.17-19 and 4.37-43) and in the way that it is 
internally accessible to human beings, as life (see also 3.15-19). 
Plotinus therefore emphasises the fact that eternity cannot contact 
time in any way because if it did, it would become involved with 
temporal extension and therefore cease to be eternity altogether.  
 
7. τὸ δ᾽" ἁγαθὸς ἦν” (line 50) - εἰληχότων (line 57) 
 
Plotinus contends that when Plato says, “he was good” (Ti. 29e1), he 
suggests temporal priority in order to convey an essence which 
possesses logical priority alone. Thus, we should not take Plato’s use 
of the past tense literally but see it as a way of expressing, 
allegorically, he who precedes time and its subjects (see Kalligas’ 
introduction to II.1 [2014, 249-253]; Pepin 1964, 86-94; and Sorabji 
1983, 268-7). And this God who is “he” is usually the One-Good for 
Plotinus (see for example I.1.8.8-12, I.2.6.3-7, I.6.3-12 and II.2.3.18-
22). However, since in the Timaeus, “he” is the Demiurge who exists 
below the level of the Good and who creates the cosmos, we should 
take the “he” here to be the Plotinian equivalent of the Intellect and 
intelligible realm, existing as an intermediary level between the Soul 
and the One (see V.1.6.41-46). Like both eternity and time, the 
physical universe transcends the (other) sensible realities because it 
has neither a beginning in time nor a temporal cause. However, 
unlike eternity, the universe has a kind of atemporal beginning 
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provided to it by Intellect which is logically prior to it (cf. I.5.7.25-
27; III 2.1.20-26; and Baltes 1976-78, 1:133-34). In order to support 
his interpretation that Plato also believed the creation of the universe 
to be non-temporal, Plotinus points out that Plato rejects the 
attribution of past and future to the intelligible realities (see Ti.37e4-
38a2), while claiming that they exist ‘always’ (see Ti. 51a1). And 
thus, Plotinus infers that the creation of the universe happened 
outside of time: for if the intelligible beings always exist outside of 
time, it follows that their acts of creation do as well.  
 
 
Chapter VII 
 
1. Tαῦτα οὖν (line 1) - αἰῶνος (line 5) 
 
As Plotinus makes clear in 1.7-16, we must not simply repeat other 
people’s statements but seek to reach an understanding of eternity 
and time ourselves. Reaching an understanding of eternity requires 
not only a theoretical grasp of its nature but also the willingness to 
direct attention towards it until it becomes one’s natural state of 
being (5.7-12, 11.1-4). Plotinus wishes to show us that our very 
ability to investigate the nature of eternity shows that eternity is not 
alien to us but, on the contrary, integral to our being. Indeed, here 
Plotinus may have taken inspiration from Plato’s Meno 80d-e, in 
which Socrates states that we cannot enquire into something 
without first knowing the object of enquiry. For since knowledge 
of eternity already belongs to the soul, we must ourselves make 
contact with the knowledge that the soul already has in order to 
bring understanding of it into our lives. This process of 
recollection, which is not a temporal remembering but a bringing 
into action of the knowledge of the higher soul (see again 
IV.3.25.27-35) requires both the avoidance of simply repeating 
others’ opinions without reflection, and the purposeful connection 
to the transcendent part of the soul which can facilitate the return to 
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intelligence and thus the re-identification with the intelligible 
realities (cf. IV.8.4.21-31 and Gerson 1994, 119-20). And only 
through recollection of such a kind can one immediately link the 
knowledge of our ability to investigate the intelligible realm to the 
conclusion that we must have a share in it. Indeed, by virtue of the 
fact that we are not tabulae rasae but souls with perfect knowledge 
(see IV.7.12.8-11), not in the sense of possessing correct 
propositions about the truth but by being the truth (see 4.11-12), we 
must always already have a share in everything which is perfect, 
including eternity (see also I.1.2.5-25). 
 
2. ἀλλὰ ἐν χρόνῳ (line 5) - κατέβη χρόνος (line 10) 
 
However, Plotinus recognises the problem of reconciling three 
different claims. The first is that eternity does not have contact with 
time (see 6.47-50), the second that we exist in time and the third 
that we have a share in eternity. At this point, Plotinus wishes only 
to raise the question of how these three claims could be compatible 
and believes that we will be able to find the answer when we have 
discovered what time is. We know that the answer must have 
something to do with Plotinus’ belief that a part of a person’s soul 
is undescended and exists beyond time in the intelligible realm or 
with the One, with a corresponding part which is lower (see 
IV.8.1.1-11, IV.8.4.21-31, IV.8.8.1-13, III.4.3.18-27 and V.I.10.1-
18) and bound to Soul and temporality (see for example, 11.15-35). 
However, in order to understand fully the sense in which we exist 
in time, we first have to discover what time is, which will be the 
central focus of the rest of the treatise. Plotinus even claims that we 
must discover what time is in order to know what it means to be in 
eternity since human beings have a share in both, and thus, without 
knowing how we exist in time, we will never fully understand how 
we exist in eternity. It is only with knowledge of both eternity and 
time therefore, that we will come to know the relationship between 
the two principles and the way in which we exist in both 
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simultaneously. Since time is the image of eternity (1.19-20) and 
exists with Soul on a lower level than the intelligible realm (see 
IV.4.15.1-4), we must descend from eternity by shifting our 
investigation from this higher realm to the lower plane of time. 
However, Plotinus informs us that we are not descending all the 
way into non-being in contemplation of time, but are rather 
stopping somewhere in between, since time is the image of eternity 
(3.22-36, 5.21, 6.6-8, 11.59-62).  
 
3. εἰ μὲν περì (line 10) - λόγος (line 17) 
 
In 1.16-20, Plotinus claimed that once we had found out what 
eternity was, it might soon become clear to us what time was as 
well since time is meant to be the image of eternity. Even though 
Plotinus does indeed conclude that time is the image of eternity, he 
changes direction here by saying that we should consider the 
arguments of the ‘blessed ancients’ and work out our account of 
time with their arguments in mind, rather than simply attempting to 
deduce the nature of time from the nature of eternity which we 
have now discovered. The method Plotinus prescribes for 
investigating the nature of time reflects not only his approach to the 
investigation of eternity (see 1.13-16) but also his broader 
methodological approach. This entails enquiring into the remarks 
of the ancients and assessing their veracity in relation to his own 
account, which is reached both through reason and through 
reflection on his own experience (cf. 1.13-16 and Armstrong 1974, 
171-94). Indeed, we cannot rely solely on rational thought and 
argumentation but must rather discover whether the conclusions we 
have reached lie in harmony with the voice of our pre-rational 
intuition, or internal awareness (ἐννοίᾳ). This internal awareness is 
vital for accessing higher knowledge: for as Kalligas notes (2014, 
599-600), Plotinus most likely used the term ἐννοίᾳ with Middle 
Platonists such as Plutarch in mind, for whom the word signified 
innate concepts existing within the descended soul which provided 
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the foundation for scientific reasoning (see Quaest. Plat. I 4, 
1000e: “innate conceptions” [ἔμφυτοι νοήσεις], the anonymous 
commentator of the Theaetetus (Anon. In Tht. 47.44-45), and 
“Alcinous” (Didasc. 4, 155.26-34) - cf. also Cic. Tusc. I 24.57). As 
a set of innate concepts, this internal awareness could therefore 
provide the means to a recollective process by linking the soul with 
pre-existing intelligible truths (cf. Strange 1994, 26-28; and 
Opsomer 1998, 206-10). 
 
4. τριχῇ δ᾽ ἴσως (line 17) - τῆς τεταγμένης (line 27) 
 
Plotinus suggests that we separate the investigation of time into the 
three categories into which ancient explanations of time fall: 1.) the 
identification of time with motion, 2.) the identification of time as 
what is moved and 3.) something belonging to motion. Plotinus 
rules out the idea that time is rest or associated with rest in any way 
based on the fact that time depends upon an endless sequence of 
instants correlating to the ‘before and after’ (πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον; 
cf. Arist. Ph. IV 11, 219a33-b1) which are always different to one 
another, with the result that time is never the same, and therefore 
never at rest (cf. Wagner 1996b, 76). There are a further six 
subcategories of belief about time which correspond to the three 
primary categories. 
 
1.a.) Time is all motion: comes from Aristotle, Ph. IV l0, 218b9-
18, who identifies it as a common belief: “But as time is most 
usually supposed to be motion and a kind of change ...” (trans. 
ROT). However, “Aetius” I 22.7 (Dox. Gr. 318 = SVF 2:514) 
claims that “the majority of Stoics” thought time was identical to 
“motion itself”; cf. Clark 1944, 337. 
 
1.b.) Time is the motion of the universe: comes from Aristotle 
Ph. IV l0, 218a33-b1: “‘some assert that it is ‘the movement of the 
whole’”. According to Simplicius In Ph.700.17-21, commentators 
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including Eudemus, Theophrastus and Alexander (cf. op. cit. 
705.5-7) attributed this view to Plato (cf. “Aetius” I 22.1 = Dox. 
Gr. 318a9-10; and Diog. Laert. III 73). 
 
2.) Time (as what is moved) is the sphere of the universe: also 
comes from Aristotle Ph. IV l0, 218a33-b1: “some assert that ... it 
is ‘the sphere itself’”. This view was ascribed to the Pythagoreans 
based on the claim of “Aetius" (op. cit. 318a2-3), but others may 
have attributed this view to the Pythagoreans based on a 
misunderstanding of Archytas, who associated time with the 
‘interval of the all’ (see [Archyt. Cat.] 24.16).  
 
3) Time is something belonging to motion: comes from Aristotle 
Ph. IV 11, 219a9-10: "Since, then [time] is not motion, necessarily 
it must be something belonging to motion." This general category 
is then split into three further subcategories. 
 
3.a.) Time is the interval of motion: comes from Zeno the Stoic 
(see SVF 1:93- “Zeno declared time to be ‘the interval of motion’” 
-and 2:510; cf. 2:515). This view was accepted by many Platonists 
in a modified form as “the interval of the motion of the universe”: 
see “Alcinous” Didasc. 14, 170.24-25; “Aetius” I 20.2 = Dox. Gr. 
318a4-5; Sext. Emp. Math. X 170; and Runia 1986, 217. 
 
3.b.) Time is the measure of motion: is the view held by Aristotle 
(see Ph. IV 12, 220b32-221a1, and 221b7) with the idea that since 
the units used to measure motion are temporal, time is the measure 
of motion in general.  
 
3c.) Time is the accompaniment of motion: is primarily an 
Epicurean doctrine: see Usener 1966, 2.11 [fr. 2.94.10-11); cf. 
Epicurus Ep. Her. 72-3; and Lucr. I 459-60: “likewise, time does 
not exist in itself, but there ensues upon events themselves a sense 
of it ....” Cf. also Demetrius Lacon apud Sext. Emp. Math. X 2.19-
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27: “accident of accidents”. However, it also found expression as a 
Stoic doctrine propounded by Chrysippus (SVF 2:509): “the 
interval concomitant with the motion of the universe”. Cf. Verbeke 
1973, 196-97 and Rist 1969, 273-80. Finally, certain Peripatetics 
also defined time as “an accompaniment of motion” 
(παρακολούθημα κινήσεως) and attributed this view to Aristotle 
(see Themist. In Ph. 91.15-16, and cf. Arist. Ph. IV 12, 22la24-25). 
 
3d.) Time is something belonging either to all motion or only to 
ordered motion: 3d.) is not a subcategory of 3.) like the others but 
rather specifies the kind of motion which time is meant to be 
associated with. As Kalligas 2014, 602 notes, the belief of the 
ancients regarding whether time should be associated with all 
motion or solely with ordered motion was correlated with their 
position in the Platonist debate as to whether the universe was 
created outside of time or within time (see my comments on 6.50-
57). On the one hand, those who claimed that the universe was 
created outside of time believed that neither time nor the universe 
had a beginning, and therefore, given that time was at least as 
primordial as motion, that we should associate time with all kinds 
of motion, both orderly and disorderly. On the other hand, those 
who believed that the universe was created in time had to explain 
Plato’s claim that the creation of time took place alongside, rather 
than before, the formation of the orderly motion of the heavenly 
bodies by the Demiurge (Ti. 37d5-e4). They did this by claiming 
that time could be associated with the orderly motion in which the 
universe was fashioned. This association of time with orderly 
motion meant both that time was logically prior to the universe 
(given that the latter was created in accordance with the former) 
and that it was created concurrently with the universe according to 
Plato’s claim. This in turn meant that time could not be associated 
with disordered motion, which Plato claimed preceded the creation 
of the universe by the Demiurge. And thus, Plutarch in Quaest. 
Plat. VIII 4, 1007c-d (trans. Cherniss), claims that “Plato said that 
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time had come to be simultaneously with heaven but there had been 
motion even before the generation of heaven. Time there was not, 
however, for there was not order either ... but motion indeterminate 
(κίνησις ἀόριστος) ... Time, then, since it is thus necessarily 
implicated and connected with the heaven, is not simply motion 
[cf.1.a.)] but ... motion in an orderly fashion that involves measure 
and limits and revolutions.” Cf. also Procl. In Ti. I 276.31-277.7; 
and Baltes 1976-78, 1:43-45. 
 
Chapter VIII 
 
1. Κίνησιν μὲν (line 1) - χρόνος δὲ οὔ (line 8) 
 
Here the two options included in 3d.) are addressed: namely the 
idea that either time is all motion or only ordered motion, the 
former of which is also the conclusion found in 1.a). Plotinus’ first 
argument is that time can neither be ordered motion nor all of 
motion because all such motion exists in time (and thus Plotinus 
subscribes to Aristotle’s claim in Ph. VI 4, 235a11 that “every 
motion occurs in time.”). As Kalligas 2014, 602 notes, Plotinus’ 
criticisms are levelled only at the idea that time is a kind of 
physical motion for he will come to identify time as a kind of non-
physical motion in 11.43 (cf. Callahan 1979, 100 and chapter III of 
my interpretative essay). Furthermore, even if motion were not in 
time, it could not then claim the identity of time itself, since, given 
that time is the standard upon which movement is measured (cf. 
Arist. Ph. IV 12, 221a4-7, b21-22), this would mean that 
movement was measuring itself which is impossible. Plotinus’ 
second argument is that movement cannot be time because 
movement can totally cease but time never does, since time 
measures both that which is in motion and that which is motionless 
(cf. Arist. Ph. IV 221b7-9).  
 
2. εἰ δὲ (line 8) - εἰς τὸ ἥμισυ ἡκούσης (line 14) 
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Plotinus now addresses 1b) which presents the claim that time is 
the unceasing motion of the universe (see Arist. Cael. II 1, 284a2-
6). This unceasing motion is manifest through the revolutions of 
the universe. After each revolution, the universe returns to the point 
at which it started, known as the ‘Complete’ (τέλεος) or ‘Great 
Year’ (μέγας ἐνιαυτός) (see van der Waerden 1952, 129-38). 
Plotinus believed in the existence of repeated revolutions of the 
heavens (see V.7.1.23-25) and most likely had Plato’s description 
of the Great Year in mind here (see Ti. 39c5-d7). However, he 
disagreed with the claim that time was identical to the revolution of 
the heavens on the grounds that this could imply that time was not 
uniform to all things. For if two ‘Great Years’ took different times 
to reach completion, for example, if the heavens took half the time 
to complete a revolution in year 2 than in year 1 (and thus double 
the time in year 1 than in year 2), and time were identical to the 
revolutions themselves, then time would be half of itself and 
double of itself at once. But this is impossible, because time must 
be the uniform standard upon which the motion of the heavenly 
bodies (including the ‘Great Years’) is measured, and not itself 
subject to change. For this reason, Plotinus claims that time is not 
the motion of the universe.  
 
3. καὶ τὸ ὀξυτάτην (line 14) – καὶ μέρος αὐτοῦ (line 19) 
 
We may also interpret 1b.) to mean that time is not the motion of 
the universe but the speed of that motion. Each revolution of the 
outermost sphere takes less time to complete (and is greater in 
length than) those of the other heavenly circuits. Therefore, the 
movement of the outermost sphere is quicker than that of the other 
heavenly circuits. Since time is uniform to all things (cf. Arist. Ph. 
IV 10, 218b13 and Clark 1944, 339-40), it cannot be the speed of 
any, or all, of the spheres because they possess different speeds. 
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Furthermore, time could not be any particular speed because it is 
the standard by which speed is measured.  
 
4. Εἰ τοίνυν (line 20) - χρόνος εἶναι (line 22) 
 
Plotinus then rejects the conclusion that time is the sphere of the 
universe itself (2.) by claiming that this association could only be 
posited on the basis of the motion of the sphere (cf. Aristotle Ph. 
IV 10, 218b5-9), which has already been distinguished from time 
(see my comments on lines 8-19 above).  
 
5. Ἆρ᾽ οὖν (line 23) - ἅμα ἔσονται (line 30) 
 
Now that we have ascertained that time cannot be identified as 
movement, Plotinus next turns to the Stoic claim that time is the 
interval that motion traverses (3a.). Plotinus rejects this definition 
on the basis that the claim threatens the uniformity of time. For 
different movements have different intervals. Therefore, if time 
were the interval belonging to all movements, then there would be 
infinite times corresponding to the different intervals of the infinite 
number of movements. Furthermore, if time had infinite iterations 
and were not uniform, there would be no marker by which to 
measure and compare the different intervals of movement.  
 
6. εἰ δὲ (line 30) - ἡ κίνησις αὕτη εἴη (line 32) 
 
Plotinus next turns to the Platonic modification of the Stoic claim 
in 3a.): namely that time is the interval of motion of the universe. 
Plotinus has four objections to this definition. Firstly, if interval 
(διάστημα) here denotes the temporal rather than spatial interval of 
movement, then the claim that time is the same as the duration of 
motion is in fact no different from the claim that time is motion 
itself, which Plotinus has already refuted.  
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7. Τοσήδε μέντοι (line 32) - τὸ διάστημα ἕξει (line 37) 
 
Secondly, time is not the distance of movement in any spatial sense 
either. This is because we can only measure distances travelled in 
space with spatial markers. For example, the distance that a 
revolution of a heavenly circuit achieves in miles is a spatial and 
not a temporal determination. This claim therefore confuses time 
and space. 
 
8. ἁλλὰ τοῦτο (line 37) - ἐν χρόνῳ (line 53) 
 
Thirdly, one can posit the quantity of movement not only in spatial 
terms but also in terms of movement itself, as the sum total of a 
particular movement (cf. Strato fr. 76, and Boethus of Sidon apud 
Huby 1981, 399 ( = Anon. Schol. in Arist. Org. 20.17-22, 1:45 
Waitz). However, time is not the quantity of movement. This is 
because there are an infinite number of movements (for which 
reason, movement is a ‘multiple’). To call movement, which is a 
multiple, time, would be akin to calling any particular degree of 
heat, temperature. This is a mistake because there is no one degree 
of heat, such as ten, twenty or thirty degrees, which can be defined 
as temperature itself. Temperature transcends all these degrees of 
heat and exists separately to the heat which it measures. Similarly, 
time is not any or all of the quantities of movement, which 
relentlessly appear and reappear like the waves of the ocean, 
because then there would be several quantities of time and no 
constant by which to measure the quantity of movement. Thus, 
while the quantity of movement belongs to the concept of 
movement itself, time must transcend this quantification, in the 
way that the concept of temperature transcends all degrees of heat. 
Indeed, since movement is a ‘multiple’ which manifests in the 
physical universe, it cannot be a uniform or abstract measure of all 
quantities of physical movement like time can. Therefore, since 
there are multiple quantities associated with multiple iterations of 
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movement, and time is not a physical quantity, we can claim that 
time is not the sum total of any particular movement. Furthermore, 
all three interpretations of the term ‘interval of movement’ - 
distance, duration and quantity - are all associated with that which 
exists over time non-instantaneously. Since they are non-
instantaneous and exist within time, they cannot be time itself.  
 
9. εἰ δὲ (line 53) - ἔξω τιθέμενος (line 62) 
 
Fourthly and finally, Plotinus rejects the claim that time could be 
the interval of movement in relation to extension (παράτασις). For 
extension must either refer to temporal duration, spatial duration, or 
quantity of movement, which all exist within time (meaning it 
cannot be identical to time). But the essence of time must transcend 
that which exists within it. For this reason, if one were to identify 
time as an interval, it would have to exist on a different ontological 
level to the interval of motion which exists within it (see chapter III 
of my interpretative essay).  
 
10. καὶ γὰρ αὖ (line 63) - ἔξωθέν ἐστιν (line 69) 
 
Furthermore, it would be impossible for space to be motion 
because space also includes both that which is in motion and that 
which is at rest. For just as the same time passes for the earth 
(which moves around the sun) as for the sun itself (which stays 
still), so too does space remain constant while objects are in motion 
and at rest.  
 
 
Chapter IX 
 
1. Ἀριθμός δὲ (line 1) - σκεπτέον (line 2) 
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Plotinus now turns to 3.b): Aristotle’s definition of time as the 
number of movement (Ph. IV 11, 219b1-2: “for this is what time is: 
the number of motion in respect of the before and after”; cf. also 
Cael  I 9, 275a14-15). He adjusts Aristotle’s definition by changing 
‘number’ to ‘measure’ on the basis that motion is continuous and 
‘number’ suggests that it is finite (according to the critique of Strato, 
fr. 75: “for he [sc., Strato] does not admit time to be the number of 
motion, since a number is a discontinuous quantity (διωρισμένον 
πόσον), while motion and time are continuous (συνεχές), and the 
continuous is not numerable (τό δὲ συνεχές οὐκ ἀριθμόν).”Cf Alex. 
Aphrod. Mund. A 69).  
 
2. πρῶτον μὲν (line 2) - μέτρον ὄντα (line 15) 
 
Plotinus then questions whether it is possible to have a measure for 
all movement when a.) disordered movement exists and it is not 
clear how it would be possible to measure something which is 
disordered and b.) ordered movement exists alongside disordered 
movement, meaning that we have two types of movement which 
may require different measures (if it is even possible to measure 
disordered movement in the first place). Plotinus suggests that two 
measures are not required for the two types of movement similar to 
the way in which two numerical systems are not required for 
counting two different types of animals. Just as you can say that 
there are ten animals if you see five horses and five cows because 
they are both types of animal, so you can measure two different 
types of movement with the same measure on the basis that they are 
both kinds of movement. However, the discovery that time may 
measure both ordered and disordered movement alike does not 
reveal the essence of time but only its function. For time exists 
independently of the movements it measures similar to the way in 
which number exists independently of the things (such as horses and 
cows) that it counts. And therefore (as I argue in chapter III of my 
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interpretative essay) we can only discover the essence of time by 
looking beyond the physical motion which it will end up measuring. 
 
3. εἰ μὲν (line 15) - μοναδικοῦ (line 17) 
 
However, if time exists abstractly and independently like number, in 
what way can we say that it is different from number? (The term 
μοναδικός here means “consisting of abstract units”: see LSJ, s.v.I; 
and cf. VI.3.13.5-7 and Pl. Phlb. 56d4-e3.) 
 
4. εἰ δὲ (line 17) - ὅση ἡ κίνησις (line 31) 
 
Plotinus now examines Aristotle’s definition of time as the measure 
of motion (see Ph. IV 12, 220b32-221a1, and 221b7), which presents 
time as a continuous magnitude rather than a numerical multiplicity 
(however, I argue in chapter III of my interpretative essay that 
Plotinus’ conception of the essence of time, conceived independently 
of the sensible motion which it measures, could be understood 
numerically as the degree of desire of each individual soul). Here, 
Plotinus claims that if time is a measure then it must consist of a 
certain length, like a ruler (doing the measuring) which is itself of a 
certain magnitude. Time is thus conceived as a line which runs 
parallel to movement which measures the movement. But if time 
existed as a line like this, its length would be determined by the 
length of the movement. In which case, how could we more 
plausibly say that time was that which measured movement rather 
than the other way round (cf. Arist. Ph. IV 12, 220b14-18)? For if 
time is a measurable magnitude, then not only do we revert to 1a) 
which claims that time is identical to motion; we must also admit 
that it cannot itself be an independent measure. Plotinus invites us to 
consider that we may be able to use the measurement of a given 
magnitude in order to measure time itself (see chapter 12). As 
Kalligas 2014, 606 notes, Plotinus seems to suggest that time 
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depends upon a person to measure movement with the implication 
that time is not absolute but somehow related to human subjectivity 
(we will see that time, for Plotinus, may be understood as the 
desiring mode of human subjectivity which we have called the third 
mode of the esoteric: see my comments on chapters 11 and 12, as 
well as chapters II and III of my interpretative essay).  
 
5. ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ μὲν (line 31) - μέτρον γίνεται (line 35) 
 
He who holds that time is a measure of movement which is not 
uniform will have to show how time can be a measure of so many 
types of movement at once. On the other hand, proving that time is 
the measure of ordered movement alone (a difficulty raised by 
Aristotle in Ph. V 4, 228b16-18), as a uniform and single entity, will 
be easier, since one would only have to demonstrate time measuring 
a single phenomenon. By analogy, it is easier to demonstrate how 
something could be a measure of one type of thing like solids rather 
than two things at once like solids and liquids, which cannot be 
measured in the same way (since the former possess area whereas 
the latter has volume). 
 
6. εἰ δὲ δὴ (line 35) - ὃ τοσόνδε ἐστίν (line 50) 
 
Plotinus now considers the possibility that time is the magnitude of 
movement which has been measured (another variation of 3b.), 
rather than that which measures the movement. However, the 
question remains as to what actually measures time now that time is 
assumed to be that which is measured rather than that which does the 
measuring. Moreover, if time is that which is measured, it is either 
the magnitude of the movement (reverting to 3a.) which has been 
measured, or the number which quantifies the magnitude of this 
measured movement. But if time is the number doing the 
quantification of the magnitude, then it is not a continuous measure 
running alongside time but a definite quantity, and it is not possible 
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for a definite quantity to measure that which is continuous. 
Furthermore, by conceiving time as a number, we are able only to 
achieve a glimpse of time in relation to a particular magnitude, as a 
certain quantity, and this is not time itself but only an interval of 
time (and thus the numerical conception of time also collapses into 
3a.). In order to know the essence of time, we cannot be satisfied 
with finding out a particular length or interval of time but must 
instead search for that which possesses such length or magnitude, 
and this cannot be done by appealing to the concepts of length and 
magnitude alone.  
 
7. ἀλλ᾽ ὁ ἀριθμὸς (line 51) - ἡ δεκάς (line 55) 
 
Here Plotinus investigates the possibility that the essence of time 
could be an absolute number (cf.9.15-17) which is completely 
independent from movement but which can nonetheless be used to 
measure the magnitude of movement. Plotinus may here have in 
mind the Peripatetics who believed that time could not itself be 
quantified numerically but could rather be used to quantify and 
number other things (see Simpl. In Ph. 714.32-34; 729.7-15; Philop. 
In Ph. 738.24-32). We are therefore presented with the possibility 
that the essence of time could be something radically different from 
its measuring function. For if the essence of time is completely 
abstract, this would suggest that it transcends the physical world, and 
therefore that it could exist without the physical motion which it 
measures (see Strange 1994, 43-37). As I argue in chapter III of my 
interpretative essay, the view that the essence of time transcends 
physical motion is supported by Plotinus’ characterisation of time as 
a primordial activity of the desiring human soul (see 11.15-20/43-
45/12.19-22) which causes and is thus logically prior to either the 
physical universe or physical motion (see 11.4-14). We will 
therefore see that the essence of time is an activity arising in the 
human soul (while it is still in the intelligible realm) which sets into 
motion the activity of Soul and the generation of the physical 
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universe (see 11.27-33). Time therefore exists on a higher 
ontological plane to the physical motion which it measures, similar 
to the way in which numbers exist on a higher ontological level than 
the things which they quantify (see VI.6.5). For time remains aloof 
from sensible objects and sensible motion since it is not itself a 
physical phenomenon but rather a condition of possibility for 
phenomena. However, as we will see, although time exists on a 
different ontological level to the physical universe, it can be 
measured with the help of regular movement existing within it, 
which will in turn enable us to measure physical phenomena in 
general with the use of temporal units.   
 
 
8. ἢ οὗτος (line 55) - ὁ χρόνος (line 68) 
 
If time is the number which measures movement, then it must do so 
according to the ‘before’ and ‘after’. Plotinus claims that the ‘next’ 
and ‘after’ (and therefore presumably the ‘before’) in fact begin with 
the original movement of the human soul as it journeys away from 
Intellect and eternity, before the generation of the physical universe 
(11.15-27). There is therefore a primordial sense of sequence before 
man’s soul fully descends into the physical universe which is 
generated as a result of his restless and desiring nature. However, 
this primordial sense of sequence is translated into the sequence of 
‘nows’ which exist in relation to the appearances of the physical 
universe, so that the ‘before’ and ‘after’ also come to be associated 
with physical movement. In fact, in the physical universe, the 
‘before’ and ‘after’ is created by positing two distinct points in 
relation to a movement, which then results in a multiplicity of 
‘nows’  (nun: cf. Arist. Ph. IV II. 219b12-18). However, Plotinus 
warns us here that defining time as the ‘before’ and ‘after’ is 
problematic, since recourse to the ‘before and after’ cannot reveal to 
us the essence of time itself, but instead point us to that which is 
spatial and that which is temporal. Firstly, as Aristotle observed, the 
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‘before’ (πρότερον) and the ‘after’ (ὕστερον) primarily signify 
spatial location (op. cit. 219a14-15). To use the example of 
Themistius In Ph. 145.27-148.2, when we posit the ‘before’ and 
‘after’ of a runner on a racetrack, we say that the movement of the 
runner at the starting line was ‘before’ his movement at the finishing 
line, which in turn happened ‘after’ his movement at the starting 
line. However, the concepts of ‘before’ and ‘after’ here embody two 
spatial points on the racetrack, representing opposite extremities of a 
particular magnitude of movement. The association of a spatial 
‘before’ and ‘after’, conceived in terms of a beginning and end of a 
spatial magnitude, cannot be time for Plotinus, since this would 
amount to the reduction of time to space, for which reason Plotinus 
rejects 3.a.) (the identification of time with the interval of the motion 
of the physical universe; cf. my comments on 8.32-37). The 
alternative to associating time with a spatial ‘before’ and ‘after’ is to 
identify it with a temporal ‘before’ and ‘after’. In the words of 
Themistius (ibid.) “when we divide movement and cut it up by 
‘nows’ into many segments, are we doing anything else than 
speaking of time and of parts of time? For the past and the future of 
which time consists are nothing else than the before and after of 
movement, which are always determined by ‘nows’ and numbered as 
distinct from one another. Therefore time is identical with the before 
and after in movement, when these are determined and numbered; 
and they are determined in no other manner, than when ‘nows’ 
impinge upon the soul in twos, one as ‘before’ and limit of a prior 
movement, the other as ‘after’ and limit of a posterior movement, 
i.e., just as when we conceive of these as extremities and as different 
from the middle” and in 150.19-23 Themistius continues, “for the 
before and after of movement are numbered according to the passage 
of that which is moving, ... and because that which is moving comes 
to be at one time at the place before, and at another time at the place 
after, for this reason too there come into being on the one hand the 
before, and on the other the after, of movement”. However, for 
Plotinus, this identification of time with temporal magnitude is 
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equally untenable as its identification with spatial magnitude. For a 
temporal magnitude is a ‘before’ and ‘after’ which both exists within 
and is measured by time, meaning that it cannot be identified with 
time either. Therefore, Plotinus rejects the definition of time as a 
number which measures according to the ‘before’ and ‘after’, for the 
number arrived at will signify either a spatial or a temporal 
magnitude and not time itself.  
 
9. ἔπειτα διὰ τί (line 68) - τοῦτο λάβοι (line 75) 
 
Since a number can only quantify a magnitude within time, it cannot 
reveal to us the essence of time. For employing numbers helps us to 
fulfil time’s function, which is to measure movement, but this does 
not say what time is in and of itself. Therefore, we should be careful 
not to confuse number with time itself. For saying that number is 
essential to time itself (when it is in fact only essential to our ability 
to measure temporal magnitude) would be like saying that without 
our quantification of a given magnitude, the magnitude would not 
exist as a definite quantity. On the contrary, time exists before the 
numerical determination of temporal magnitudes, similar to the way 
in which magnitudes exist as a definite quantity before we discover 
this quantity through measurement. The analogy Plotinus uses here 
is arguably strained given that time transcends the temporal 
magnitudes which we measure, whereas a given magnitude is the 
very thing we discover through measurement, with no underlying 
essence left to be discovered once we determine its quantity. 
Nevertheless, time and spatial magnitudes exist whether or not we 
make a numerical determination about temporal magnitudes or those 
spatial quantities. Therefore, Plotinus here is not rejecting idealistic 
views of time (pace Kalligas 2014, 608) but is rather claiming that 
we must not confuse our understanding of temporal magnitudes, 
achieved with the help of numbers, with the essence of time itself. 
By contrast, time is dependent on the concept of the ‘before’ and 
‘after’ which he associates both with physical movement and the 
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movement of the human soul as it journeys away from Intellect (see 
my comments on 7.17-27; 9.55-68). And thus, we must understand 
that the term ‘movement’ (κίνησις) here signifies more than physical 
movement alone (cf. Arist. Ph. IV 11, 219a4-6). 
 
 
10. ἀπείρου δὲ (line 75) - πρὶν μετρηθῆναι (line 78) 
 
Time is not a finite magnitude but is rather infinite (ἄπειρος) and 
therefore cannot be numerically determined. Neither can it be a 
number since numbers themselves are finite (ὡρισμένος: cf. VI 
6.2.1-10 and 17.3; cf. Aristotle, Ph. VIII 1. 251b19-26). And thus, 
we may distinguish time from temporal intervals (which we may 
refer to as temporality). For time may be conceived, as Themistius 
claims (In Ph. 148.2-6), as an infinite timeline upon which particular 
intervals of time may be demarcated. This infinite timeline exists 
whether or not human beings demarcate temporal intervals, but the 
demarcation of intervals cannot take place without the original 
timeline. Time therefore exists logically prior to the temporal 
intervals which are demarcated. However, the view presented here 
that the essence of time is infinite may be misleading. For, as we will 
see in 12.15-25, time is produced by the human soul and comes to an 
end when the desiring activity of the soul stops. Therefore, although 
time is potentially infinite, according to the potential for the activity 
of the human soul to continue indefinitely, it is actually finite in the 
case of each soul which returns to eternity by stopping the original 
activity which caused him to move away from Intellect and eternity. 
For this reason, the potentially infinite timeline (upon which 
temporal intervals can be demarcated) may come to an end at any 
point, in accordance with the cessation of the desiring activity of 
man’s soul. And thus, Plotinus’ conception of time includes both the 
concepts of the finite and the infinite simultaneously.  
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11. διὰ τί δὲ (line 78) - πρὸς ἔννοιαν χρόνου (line 84) 
 
Plotinus here acknowledges that the key to unlocking the essence of 
time may well be found by enquiring into the human soul and human 
subjectivity (as he will explore in detail in chapters 11 and 12). 
However, he reiterates that we must not think that our measurement 
of temporal magnitudes brings time into being in any sense. For the 
existence of time precedes our attempts to try to quantify or measure 
temporal magnitudes, as do the temporal magnitudes themselves. 
And therefore, even if we discover that the human soul is required in 
order to measure time (or the temporal magnitudes which are 
demarcated within time’s infinite nature), this still does not reveal to 
us that nature, or essence, which we are attempting to measure. 
 
Chapter X 
 
1. Tὸ δὲ παρακολούθημα (line 1) - ἐν χρόνῳ (line8) 
 
Plotinus now turns to 3c.) which identifies time as an 
accompaniment of movement. Here Plotinus chooses to interpret the 
word ‘παρακολούθημα’ in terms of temporal rather than logical 
association even though he is aware that the word may also have a 
non-temporal meaning (see for example VI.3.2.6 and VI.6.4.3). This 
may be because he wishes to introduce time as a kind of logical 
concomitant to the movement of the soul in chapter 11 (see 
particularly 11.15-20 and 43-45). Here however, he claims that if 
time were an (temporal) accompaniment of movement, it would 
either accompany movement a.) at the same time as the movement, 
b.) before movement had begun or c.) after it had finished. However, 
in all three cases, the accompaniment of movement is conceived as 
existing temporally since it exists at the same time as, at a time 
before, or at a time after movement. Therefore, such an 
accompaniment of movement exists in time no matter what 
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relationship it has with movement. This being the case, time cannot 
be such an accompaniment of movement. 
 
2. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ (line 9) - τὸν χρόνον εἶναι (line 17) 
 
Plotinus now claims that the arguments he has levelled against 3b.) 
suffice to disprove the qualified claim that time is the measure of the 
movement of the universe (which appears in Alexander of 
Aphrodisias De temp. § 10; cf. Sharples 1982b, 69-70). This 
definition of time also appears in a fragment which Huby 1981, 
398ff. attributes to Boethius of Sidon (Anon. Schol. in Arist. 
Organon 21.14-18 Waitz): “Hence in measuring circular motion-
which is the first and foremost of all motions-according to itself, 
time also measures the others, so that time will be the number of 
circular motion both as numbering and as numbered, while of the 
remaining motions only as numbering, but not also as numbered”. 
Having raised his objections to numerous accounts of time in 
chapters 8 and 9, Plotinus now suggests that we must shift our focus 
away from what time is not towards what time is (which we shall 
discover in the following chapters). He points out the importance of 
attempting to understand the problem of time directly by claiming 
that we must not only engage in a historical study of the views of 
previous philosophers, but should also carry out our own 
philosophical enquiry (since we can study philosophical works either 
“for the sake of philosophy or of general knowledge” [φιλοσοφίας ἢ 
ἱστορίας ἕνεκα]: see Albinus Is. 5, 149.28-29 and Sen. Ep. 108.6; 
cf.1.13-16 and 7.10-17). This is especially important now that the 
ancient accounts have failed to define the essence of time. We must 
therefore turn away from the accounts of other philosophers in order 
to find out for ourselves what time really is.  
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Chapter XI 
 
1. Δεῖ δὴ (line 1) - ἓν ἑστῶσαν (line 4) 
 
Plotinus returns to the subject of eternity here, reminding us of his 
original plan to set out an account of time in relation to its archetype 
(cf. 1.16-20; 7.12-13). The secret of time is thus hidden in eternity 
and can only be unlocked by enquiring into the eternal nature which 
time imitates: a nature which is ἀκλινής, or ‘unswerving’ (a term 
found in Parmenides Fr B8.4-6 DK; cf. II.2.2.1-4, II.9.2.3, VI.8.9.32-
33 and Plut. De E ap. Delph. 393a). However, Plotinus claims that 
we must not only return to the subject of eternity but, more precisely, 
to the disposition within us which exists in eternity. This 
‘disposition’ has already been identified as the ‘natural power which 
never fails’ (5.7-12) or the higher part of the human soul which rests 
in the intelligible realm (see IV.2.1.1-7 and V.1.10.13-18) and 
contemplates Intellect and eternity. Plotinus therefore sets out the 
recognition of the simplicity and silence of eternity as the necessary 
condition for a meaningful investigation into the nature of time. This 
requires a shift from rational to supra-rational contemplation since 
our aim is not only to gain a conceptual understanding of eternity but 
to recognise our identity with it so that we may then dwell in it (6.8-
12). This willingness to take a leap of faith and go deeply into the 
stillness of Being will then prepare us for the discovery of the origin 
and nature of time.  
 
2. Χρόνος δὲ (line 4) - τοῦ ὑστέρου (line 6) 
 
According to Plotinus, time at one stage did not yet exist. This seems 
to imply that eternity existed before time came into being. But we 
know that Plotinus cannot mean this because he insists that eternity 
cannot be associated with the concepts of the ‘before’ and ‘after’ on 
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the grounds that they are temporal notions (cf. 6.43-50, 10.1-8; Arist. 
Metaph. Λ 6, 1071b8-9). Therefore, in order to understand Plotinus’ 
statement, we must once again distinguish between temporal and 
logical priority. Indeed, in the hierarchy of reality, eternity exists at 
the loftiest height below the One (see 6.1-12; V.3.13.1-6) and is thus 
logically prior to time, which in turn exists as its image. However, 
eternity could in no way be temporally prior to time since anything 
claiming to be prior to time already exists within it: as Plotinus has 
already stated, the ‘before’ is a temporal concept. Therefore, we 
must assume that Plotinus’ employment of the word ‘οὔπω’, 
meaning ‘not yet’, is another example of his using tensed language 
to describe a non-temporal reality (cf. 6.21-36 with my comments). 
Indeed, just as the claim that eternity ‘always’ exists could mislead 
someone into thinking that eternity is a temporal phenomenon, so 
claiming that time did not exist ‘yet’ in the eternal realm could lead 
to the assumption that eternity existed before time and thus within 
time. We must therefore view the ‘yet’ here as demarcating two 
points on the ontological scale of reality, with eternity existing on 
the level of Being and Intellect and time existing on the level of Soul 
(cf. 11.43-56). From the point of view of the journey of the human 
soul, Plotinus’ claim that time did (or rather does) not exist for the 
intelligible beings suggests that time does not exist absolutely but 
only for those who choose to descend into a lower level of reality. 
This descent is caused by the desire of human souls for something 
more than the present state, namely an ‘after’ which can replace the 
present (see also 11.20-27). The origin of time can therefore be 
located in eternity, rather than in time, since this is where the human 
soul attempts to enter into an exciting narrative (see chapter II of my 
interpretative essay).   
 
3. Τούτων δὴ (line 6) - ὧδέ πως (line 11) 
 
Plotinus here invokes the Muses, who represent the music of the 
spheres (cf. VP 22.16-17; Plut. Quaest. conu. IX 14.4, 745b and 
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14.6, 746a) and which therefore only come into existence after time 
does. This invocation, along with the personification of time, lends 
dramatic character to the passage which has the effect of making the 
reader feel that he is privy to divine revelation and knowledge (cf. 
Kalligas 2014, 450-451 on III.2.3.20 and Ferwerda 1990, 204-6). 
The dramatic character of the passage is further intensified by 
Plotinus’ use of the word ἐξέπεσε in describing the ‘falling off’ of 
time, as the term refers back both to Homer’s ‘ἔμπεσε’ in his 
description of the setting alight of the ships of the Achaeans by the 
Trojans (Iliad 16.113) and to Plato’s description of the equally 
disastrous sedition which caused the overthrow of a harmonious 
government (see Resp. 545d8-e1). Therefore, through dramatisation, 
as well as the employment of the term ἐξέπεσε in reference to Homer 
and Plato, Plotinus is able to emphasise the calamitous nature of 
time’s coming into being, which stands in stark contrast to his 
description of the peaceful and still atmosphere of eternity in 11.1-4.  
 
4. ὡς πρότερον (line 12) - ἡσυχίαν ἦγε (line 14) 
 
As the image of eternity, time can trace back its existence to eternity, 
since it carries the stamp of eternity within its own nature. Indeed, 
the roots of time can be found in eternity itself, since until it goes 
astray by venturing out beyond eternity, it exists in fullness and 
presence. Thus, time is aware both of its lesser existence and its 
undiminished nature as pure Being at the point of source, where 
there is no ‘before’ or ‘after’ (see also 3.20-36 and 4.12-28). At this 
source, time is not yet time at all but instead remains still and quiet 
as eternity. And thus, even though Plotinus agrees with Aristotle in 
saying that "there can be no before and after if there is no time" 
(Metaph. Λ 6, 1071b8-9; cf. Alex. Aphrod. Mund. A 68-69), he once 
again uses tensed language, in this case employing the word ‘before’ 
to describe the experience of presence without temporal extension 
(reminding us of his use of the words ‘always’ and ‘yet’ in 6.21-36 
and 11.4-6 respectively, which also refer to supra-temporal 
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existence). Once again, Plotinus’ use of temporal language to convey 
logical priority may remind us of the way in which myths describe 
eternal realities in a temporal context in order to communicate their 
causal relationship (cf. my comments on 6.21-24; III 5.9.24-29).  
 
5. Φύσεως δὲ (line 15) - εἰργάσμεθα (line 20) 
 
On the one hand, the undescended part of the soul remains eternal by 
resting in the seat of Being and not seeking anything outside of the 
present, such as the past or the future (see for example, IV.3.25.13-
31). On the other hand, the part of the soul that descends into time 
itself creates time by making the choice to be autonomous (see also 
IV 8.5.26 and V 1.1.3-5); and thus, rather than existing with eternity 
and the intelligible realities in a state of acceptance and surrender, it 
makes the choice to set out on its own. Man’s journey therefore 
involves the movement away from eternal unity with the other 
intelligible realities to the aloneness and alienation of the fragmented 
image of this divinity, which is time. This is an attractive option for 
the person who wishes to gain that which eternity cannot offer, 
which is the possibility of better things in the future. However, 
Plotinus signals that man is mistaken to believe that this choice will 
lead to fulfilment in time, by using the word πολυπραγμόνησις (cf. 
III 2.1.42-4 and VI 3.23.4), signifying the restless activity of the 
soul. For as Kalligas 2014, 611 notes, πολυπραγμόνησις is a concept 
similar both to curiositas (which contributed to the demise of Lucius 
and Psyche in Apuleius' Metamorphoses), and to περιεργία, the 
‘meddling’ which leads to the destruction of the soul in Plutarch, De 
Is. et Os. 352b, and the Hermetic Korē Kosmou = CH Exe. XXIII 14 
(cf. Festugière 1944-54, 3:83-85; Lancel 1961, 31-37 and Baladi 
1970, 11-12). Thus, the decision of the human soul to seek happiness 
in the future is a calamitous one: for as we learn in I.5.6, time is not 
able to bring about an increase in well-being since fulfilment 
necessarily exists in the present and not in the past or the future. We 
therefore hold the view that Plotinus is here presenting a journey of 
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the human soul rather than that of the hypostasis of Soul (in 
agreement with Armstrong 1966-1988, vol. III, 338, n. 1; McGuire 
and Strange 1988, 209, n. 102; Smith 1996, 209 and Baracat Jr, 
2013, 32-33; and pace Beierwaltes 1995, 238-239 Rist 1983, 137-
138, Kalligas 2014, 612 and Gerson 2018a, 347), and reject the view 
most recently supported by Gerson et al. that Plotinus’ claim that 
‘we produced time as an image of eternity’ (αἰῶνος εἰκόνα τὸν χρόνον 
εἰργάσμεθα) refers to the position of the Platonist school rather than 
the actual production of time by human souls. For Plotinus claims 
that that ‘which made (human) souls forget their father God and be 
ignorant of themselves and him... was audacity and coming to birth 
and the first otherness and the wishing to belong to themselves’ 
(V.1.1.1-5) which indicates that the urge to ‘govern itself and be by 
itself’ is an attribute not only of the hypostasis of Soul but also of the 
human soul as it shifts its attention away from Intellect and eternity. 
Elsewhere, Plotinus reminds us that the human soul is not only a 
passive recipient of the activity of the hypostases but is also a ‘cause 
which initiates activity’ (III.1.8.4-8); an activity which signifies the 
shift from ‘the contemplation of real being’ (Ibid.) to that of its 
concomitant, namely ‘this (sensory) world’ (IV.8.7.17-24). Our 
interpretation therefore emphasises Plotinus’ belief in the active and 
causal nature of the human soul as it turns its attention away from 
the intelligible world. And thus, we believe that in 11.27, Plotinus 
begins to describe a parallel process on the level of Soul, which 
creates time only as a consequence of the original activity of the 
human soul. The desire of the human soul to embark on a journey 
away from Intellect is still inextricably connected to the movement 
of the hypostasis of Soul: as Armstrong acknowledges, ‘we are 
souls, part of universal soul and already present as it moves out from 
eternity’ (cf. IV.3.2.1-5 and IV.3.6.4-8).  
 
6. ἐπεὶ γὰρ (line 20) - πρόεισιν (line 27) 
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The power of the human soul to journey into time may be compared 
to the power of a seed to grow into a tree. In both cases, what is 
gained in extension (temporally for the soul and spatially for the 
seed) is lost in unity (see 2.31-34). Indeed, in the case of the human 
soul, that which is gained through representation in time comes at 
the cost of the pure presence of Being, eternity and Intellect (see also 
II.5.5.1-7 and IV.7.13.1-12; cf. Trouillard 1961, 131 and Simons 
1985, 60-61, 72-73). The grandeur attained is only apparent, since 
real grandeur exists in unity and simplicity and not in extension and 
the acquisition of experience. Indeed, that which is extended is 
necessarily weaker than that which is not extended, since that which 
is extended exists only as a part which is subject to generation and 
destruction, rather than as a whole which is eternal and impervious 
to alteration (see 6.47-54). However, extension in time and space is 
not only a digression from eternity but an imitation of its Being: for 
by attempting to become greater the human soul goes from a state of 
timeless presence, to one of continual searching for more and more 
present moments which are identified as the ‘next’ and the ‘after’. 
By searching in this way, the soul continually misses its eternal 
target (see again 4.29-31), since identity with Being cannot occur 
through movement towards a goal in time, but only by resting in the 
stillness of presence. 
 
7. οὕτω δὴ (line 27) - περιλαβοῦσα (line 33) 
 
Similarly, the Soul attempts to acquire being by moving in a circular 
motion in what Plotinus calls a desire for Being (see also 4.28-33 
and IV.4.16.23-31). Its movement is more harmonious and beautiful 
than other kinds of movement by virtue of being circular (see 
II.1.8.15-19) but still falls short of the standard of Intellect. For 
Soul’s movement in time can only imitate the procession of Intellect 
from the One, which is eternal (see II.2.3.20, II.4.5.25-28 and 
III.8.8.32-38). Therefore, the cause of time is the very attempt by 
both the human soul and the hypostasis of Soul to become more 
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powerful through extension into that which does not yet exist (in the 
future). The sensible universe and human souls exist within the 
hypostasis of Soul and subsequently receive time from Soul since 
Soul moves into time and then endows the sensible universe and 
human souls with temporality: see IV.3.9.29-36 and IV.4.15.10-20. 
Here we find an example of a nuanced divergence from Plato, who 
claimed that the creation of time and the heavenly bodies happened 
simultaneously (Ti. 37d5-e3). For Plotinus believes that the essence 
of time is logically prior to its manifestation in the physical universe, 
since the former is the psychical cause of the latter, which is natural 
(cf. Simplicius In Ph. 792.11-16 on this distinction). This is why he 
claims that psychical time comes first (11.29: πρῶτον) and only then 
(11.31: ἔπειτα) enters into the sensible universe to fulfill its ordering 
function. We therefore agree with Manchester 1978, 129-30 (pace 
Kalligas 2014, 613) that there are two kinds of time: we call the 
former kind of time, which arises as a desiring motion of the human 
soul and hypostasis of Soul, ‘psychological time’ or the essence of 
time. On the other hand, we call the latter kind of time, which is the 
exoteric product of psychological time and Soul, ‘mechanical time’ 
(see chapter II of my interpretative essay). For we argue that such a 
distinction is necessary for explaining why Plotinus claims in 12.4-
22 that we can return to eternity in our present embodied state. There 
Plotinus states that if we were able to stop the desiring activity of our 
soul, then time would be destroyed and we would return to eternity 
(19-22). According to the belief that Plotinus does not distinguish 
between kinds of time, we would have to choose between two 
equally unlikely interpretations of 12.19-22: one alternative is that 
man’s return to eternity would necessitate his physical death since 
the physical body cannot exist without time and Plotinus claims that 
the return to eternity means the end of time. The other alternative is 
that Plotinus is conducting a thought experiment and does not really 
believe that we can return to eternity. But this approach would seem 
to contradict his suggestion that we must attempt to achieve this very 
goal in 11.1-4. By presupposing two kinds of time, on the other 
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hand, we can claim that we can escape from psychological time 
while remaining in an embodied state in mechanical time (see my 
comments on 12.4-22 and chapter II of my interpretative essay).  
 
8. ὲν ἐκείνῃ γὰρ (line 33) - δοκοῖ τι λέγειν (line 45) 
 
Moreover, Plotinus claims that the sensible universe moves in the 
time of Soul (οὐ γάρ τις αὐτοῦ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς τόπος ἢ ψυχή). 
Therefore, whereas Soul is associated with the essence of time as its 
co-creator, the sensible universe is a product of time, so that its 
connection to the essence of time exists only through the human soul 
and the hypostasis of Soul. As a conduit to the essence of time, the 
discursive reasoning of Soul is one of succession rather than 
simultaneity: cf. I.8.2.9-19, III 9.1.34-37, IV.4.1.11-16, V.3-17.21-
29, VI.9.5.8-10; Beierwaltes 1967, 57-58; Blumenthal 1971a, 107; 
and Porph. Sent. 44, 50.10-22. See also Max. Tyr. XI 9, 139.14-17: 
“Whereas the divine intellect, like the sun beating down, has sight of 
every place on earth at once, the human intellect is like the sun in its 
progress, passing at different times over the different parts of the 
whole.” This in turn means that all events exist in time since 
succession implies a before and after, and that which exists before or 
after anything else is temporally situated (see also 12.4-13). Since 
the life of Soul manifests itself through successive events, the 
continuation of the life of Soul itself is also temporal. Finally, 
Plotinus claims that time is the life of soul (here he refers to the 
human soul rather than the hypostasis of soul). Here we penetrate 
into the essence of time: for the essence of time is not something 
existing externally to man but is rather embedded in his subjective 
experience as the mode in which all things in Soul appear to him. As 
Kalligas 2014, 614 notes, Plotinus’ approach to time here bears 
similarities with that of Immanuel Kant who claimed: “Time is 
nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuition of our 
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self and our inner state” (see Kant 1998, 180 [A 33 = B 49]). See 
also Sorabji 1983, 138-39. 
 
9. εἰ γὰρ αἰών (line 45) - τὸ ἐκείνου μιμήσεται (line 59) 
 
Having linked the life of Soul to time on the basis of Soul’s 
production of succession, Plotinus now defines time as the life of 
Soul coming to achieve this succession as it goes from one event to 
another. He reminds us that time is associated with a motion of 
succession, in contrast to the motion of the Intellect which exists in 
simultaneity (see 4.28-31 and 11.27-28 and IV.4.1.11-16). 
Furthermore, we are reminded that time is the image of eternity (cf. 
Pl. Ti. 37d5-7; Soph. 235d6-236b), which in turn is described as 
unchanging and identical (cf.3.15-23; Pl. Phd. 78d2). As I discuss in 
detail in chapter II of my interpretative essay, time can be 
understood as the image of eternity insofar as it exists as a mode of 
experience below eternity which permits human beings to experience 
the realm of Soul.  And since time exists primarily in relation to 
Soul, it could be said to be the image of eternity similarly to the way 
in which Soul is described as the ghostly image of Intellect 
(V.1.6.46-49). For it is through the perpetual motion of time that 
Soul seeks to achieve the eternal fullness of Being which Intellect 
possesses (see 4.20-22/24-37). Similarly, time’s uninterrupted 
perpetuity (see 8.35-36) can be ascribed to its attempt to close the 
gap between distances in order to achieve the unity which eternity 
possesses by virtue of never having created a ‘before’ and ‘after’ 
which separates objects and events (3.34-38). Finally, by coming 
into being, time attempts to achieve in parts, through infinite 
extension, what eternity possesses by already existing as a whole 
(2.17-19, 3.15-19, 4.37-43 and 6.47-50). Thus, time is a state of 
alienation from Being which results from the attempt to progress 
towards the future instead of remaining in the present (cf. 4.24-28, 
11.11-14 and Gloy 1989, 317-18). Furthermore, whereas eternity 
recognises itself as Being and is willing to rest in it (see also 
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3.23/34-36, 5.21 and 6.6-8) time continually seeks something more 
than Being and subsequently moves away from it (see 11.15-33). 
 
10. δεῖ δὲ (line 59) - ὁ αἰών (line 62) 
 
Just as eternity is the life of Being and Intellect (3.7-15/36-38, 5.19-
22/25-28, 6.6-12/17-21/47-50, 11.1-4/45-46), so time is the life of 
Soul (11.35-56, 12.1-12/20-22, 13.23-30). As the life of Soul, time is 
not a temporal accompaniment of Soul, just as it is not a temporal 
accompaniment of physical motion (as we saw in 10.1-8). Rather, it 
exists as a logical concomitant of the desire of Soul to move away 
from Intellect, which then produces temporality. Furthermore, 
whereas eternity and Intellect are the subjective and objective 
manifestations of Being, respectively, time and Soul are the 
subjective and objective manifestations of the journey away from 
Being. By journeying away from Being (4.19-24/28-31, 11.15-33), 
time can only represent eternity and, as a result, become its image 
(1.19-20, 11.20/29/46-47/54). Thus, just as eternity is the life of 
Being and Intellect, or the desireless state of subjectivity which 
corresponds to unchanging presence (as explored in greater depth in 
chapter II of my interpretative essay), so time is the life of Soul, or 
the desiring state of subjectivity relating to the succession of the 
‘before’ and ‘after’.  
 
Chapter XII 
 
1. Νοῆσαι δὲ (line 1) - τὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἔχον (line 4) 
 
Time progresses quietly because we do not notice it, since it is the 
uniform and uninterrupted activity of the Soul. Thus, whereas 
movement is perceptible, since it has several iterations which come 
and go and vary in speed and length, time recedes from our attention 
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by existing as the constant phenomenon behind that which captures 
our attention by constantly changing.  
 
2. εἰ δὴ πάλιν (line 4) - τὸν χρόνον γεννᾷ (line 22) 
 
Plotinus now provides us with a spiritual exercise aimed at helping 
us to fully experience the divine unity of eternity (which may 
ultimately derive from the myth in Plato's Statesman: cf. 272d6-
273a4 and Num. fr. 12.17-22). We must imagine that we are turning 
the descended part of our soul (and not the hypostasis of Soul, as 
Kalligas suggests in 2014, 615-616; cf. my comments on 11.15-20) 
which helps to produce time and the things which come along with 
it, towards eternity, so that this part of our soul becomes inactive and 
still. While doing this exercise, we refuse to seek happiness and 
meaning in time and become inwardly still and quiet. Although 
motion continues around us, we now connect to a part of ourselves 
which is not in time but rather witnessing the world of motion from a 
place of stillness, which accompanies Being. We thus enter into 
eternity, which is the realm of pure subjectivity, since in this state, 
one’s attention is no longer directed either to worldly activity, a 
memory of the past, or any expectation or desire in the future. 
Instead, attention is redirected back to itself and rests in the unity of 
the realm of experience which seeks nothing and therefore lacks 
nothing. Thus, by imagining ourselves turning this descended soul 
back to eternity, we shift our attention and identification from the 
descended part of our soul which is concerned with movement, time 
and the acquisition of being, to the undescended part of ourselves 
which is resting in Being and exists eternally, impervious to 
alteration, generation or destruction. One may be puzzled by 
Plotinus’ claim that we can turn back the lower part of the soul, since 
some passages (such as IV.8.8.1-13, III.4.3.18-27 and V.1.10.13-18) 
suggest a strict and unalterable dualism within the soul such that the 
lower part of the soul has no communication with the intelligible 
realities. This in turn would mean that the road to enlightenment has 
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nothing to do with any activity or orientation of the lower part of the 
soul, since the lower part of the soul, which is called ‘lower’ because 
it enters into a body which is divisible (IV.3.19.1-8), is necessarily 
precluded from the realm of intelligible being which is indivisible 
and whole. Since a body cannot exist without a soul (IV.3.9.29-36), 
one might think that this lower soul is destined to remain so until the 
death of the body. Other passages such as IV.8.3.21-31, however, are 
comparable to this passage in suggesting that the lower part of the 
soul can ascend to the intelligible realm and return to its pure and 
indivisible nature. It is possible to reconcile this apparent 
contradiction by observing the different stages of the journey of the 
human soul. At first, when the human soul desires something more 
than its present state (11.15-20), one part of it enters into a state of 
distension in time and space while the other remains still in the 
intelligible realm (at which point the higher and lower parts can be 
distinguished). However, when man puts a halt to his desiring 
consciousness and his attention returns to a pure state of stillness, he 
destroys the cause of his embodiment, and thus the lower part of the 
soul, while still being divided until the death of the body, recognises 
its original identity with its higher part and returns to eternity and 
Intellect. By turning one’s attention back to eternity, one can thereby 
‘escape to the upper world’ and avoid further incarnations (see 
III.4.2.12-15 and VI.7.7.17-23. Plotinus’ belief in the possibility of 
avoiding reincarnation explains VP 1.1-2, in which Porphyry claims 
that Plotinus seemed ashamed of having a body). The duration of 
time between man’s cessation of his desiring state and his total 
identification with the higher part of the soul in the intelligible realm 
signifies the level of activity of the desiring soul: if the desire is 
strong and persistent, this ascent will take longer than it will for a 
soul with weaker desire. Either way, after the death of the body, the 
non-desiring subjectivity of man ensures that he remains in a state of 
formless unity and timelessness in the realm of Intellect. The fact 
that time vanishes when the soul enters this non-desiring state is 
ample proof for Plotinus that soul first generates time through desire.  
102 
 
 
3. διὸ καὶ εἴρηται (line 22) - ὁ δὲ ἐν χρόνῳ (line 25) 
 
Both time and the sensible universe arise simultaneously through the 
desiring activity both of the Soul and individual human souls (11.20-
30). However, while they arise and dissolve simultaneously (see also 
Pl. Ti. 38b6-7), the universe can be said to exist within time (see also 
11.31-35 and IV.4.15.15-20). This is because time is the desiring 
mode in which the human soul is able to experience the physical 
universe, whereas the sensible universe is the objective 
manifestation arising out of this desiring mode. And thus the 
production of time is logically prior to that of the physical universe, 
since time, as a subjective mode, provides the condition of 
possibility for the physical universe and not vice versa. However, 
since man experiences sensible objects and the sensible universe as 
soon as he enters into this subjective mode, one can say that both 
time and the universe arise simultaneously.  
 
4. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι (line 25) - τοῦ χρόνου (line 36) 
 
Although Plato appears to identify the heavenly circuits with time in 
Ti. 39d1, Plotinus employs different parts of the Timaeus (38B6, 
38C6, 39B2) and Epinomis 978D1-6 to support his claim that the 
movement of the stars and the heavenly circuits are not themselves 
time but rather the means of measuring it, similar to the way in 
which the alternating sequence of day and night gives us the concept 
of the number two (cf. Ti. 39b6-c1, 47a4-6; and [Pl.] Epin. 978d1-4). 
Indeed, since time is the state of desiring subjectivity, it is 
immeasurable because it has no extension in and of itself but only 
produces extension by means of the before and after (see 11.11-20) 
and the physical universe at large (see 11.27-30). For this reason, 
time cannot be measured directly but only indirectly through the 
sensible world which accompanies it. This can be done by selecting 
things which have an (apparently) regular interval such as two 
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sunrises and then by using this interval to measure this elusive and 
non-physical phenomenon called time (see also 12.12-19). Thus, the 
indivisible and ungraspable subjective state called time is measured 
through the divisible, quantifiable and objective universe which both 
appears with and exists within it.  
 
5. οὐ γὰρ (line 37) - καὶ μὴ μέτρον (line 40) 
 
Plotinus once again rejects Aristotle’s definition of time as the 
measure of motion (in Ph. IV 12, 220b32-221a1, and 221b7; cf. my 
comments on 9.17-31). For he claims here that it makes no sense to 
define time as a measure (or for time to define itself as such, to 
continue the theme of personification we encountered in 11.11) 
because it does not have determinate extension. This is why it ‘will 
not be torn apart’ as we see in 13.67-68; why it is invisible and 
ungraspable (see my comments on 25-36 above); and why we cannot 
perceive it as a fixed standard by which to quantify anything else. 
Instead, time is the very thing which is in question and therefore that 
which we attempt to measure rather than to use as a measure. 
 
6. ἡ οὖν κίνησις (line 40) - τῆς δηλώσεως (line 49) 
Time measures movement incidentally because the regular, 
observable intervals of movement which we use to measure time 
yield temporal units which can then be used in the measurement of 
all other movement. For example, once the earth’s orbit round the 
sun is used to define what a year is, we then say that this recurring 
orbit takes a year to complete and can also measure other intervals of 
motion relative to that temporal unit (for example, by saying that 
each season lasts roughly one quarter of the year). And thus we can 
use temporal units (such as the orbit of the earth or the Great Year: 
cf. 8.8-14) to measure all other kinds of movement. Since we cannot 
measure movement without first measuring time with the help of the 
heavenly bodies, we cannot say that time is the direct measure of 
movement but only that it incidentally measures movement (cf. 
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Matter 1964, 198-199). For since time is indivisible and ungraspable, 
we need to turn to an observable and repetitive interval of movement 
in the sensible world before we can then go on to measure other 
kinds of movement using temporal units. Therefore, in the words of 
Kalligas 2014, 617, the movement of the planets acts as a kind of 
cosmic clock: for while the movement is not itself time (pace 
Guthrie 1962-81, 5:299-300), it makes time manifest and enables us 
to measure it. 
 
7. τὸ οὖν μετρούμενον (line 49) - κατὰ συμβεβηκός (line 55) 
 
The heavenly circuit therefore does not produce but rather measures 
time by being the regular and recurrent interval or limited motion by 
which we are able to say that time has passed. After we create 
temporal units in accordance with this instance of limited motion, we 
are then able to measure all instances of motion according to these 
units (thus, having measured the revolution of the earth on its own 
axis with respect to the Sun, we say that it is a day long, and can then 
measure all things as being equal to, more than or less than a day in 
duration). Therefore, time only becomes the measure of motion by 
proxy, since it is the limited motion and not time itself which enables 
us to create the temporal units which end up measuring motion. 
Furthermore, time must be different from the limited motion itself 
because it is abstract and unlimited, whereas the limited motion is 
observable and contingent. For which reason, time is not only an 
incidental measure but is also measured incidentally (κατὰ 
συμβεβηκός), since once measured, it is shown to transcend the 
contingent nature of the limited motion doing the measuring. Thus, 
having defined a day as the regular interval of the earth revolving on 
its own axis with respect to the sun, the temporal unit of a day 
represents a certain quantity of time which exists separately from the 
specific and limited motion of the earth. This shows that time is 
indeed different from the limited motion by which it both measures 
and is measured. 
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8. καὶ οὕτως ἂν (line 55) - ὅσος ὁ τόπος(line 61) 
 
Plotinus here uses spatial examples from Aristotle Ph. IV 12. 221a2-
4 in an attempt to clarify what he has just said. He first compares 
defining time as a temporal interval to identifying a particular length 
(such as a cubit) with the concept of length itself. For similar to the 
way in which a cubit is a certain length but not the concept of length 
itself, so a temporal interval (for example, a year) pertains to time 
without itself being time. Similarly, to define time as a specific 
temporal interval is like saying that that movement is a certain 
distance in space (like a mile). For just as one can never arrive at the 
concept of movement from the concept of space alone, so we will 
never arrive at an understanding of time simply by observing 
temporal intervals. We must instead endeavour to define time and 
movement so that we know what it means for something to be a 
temporal interval or to have traversed a certain distance.  
 
Chapter XIII 
 
1. Χρόνον οὖν (line 1) - καὶ ταῦτα ἐνηλλαγμένως (line 13) 
 
Plotinus reiterates that the heavenly circuit and motion in general 
exist within time (cf. 11.31-35 and 12.25), but that time does not in 
turn exist within these things since it exists on a higher ontological 
level, being the activity of Soul which produces the condition of 
possibility for succession and becoming through the ‘before’ and 
‘after’ (11.11-20). However, although time does not exist within the 
heavenly circuit, its existence is revealed through the heavenly 
circuit because the regular and ordered movement of the heavenly 
circuit mimics the uniform and uninterrupted progression of the 
passage of time (see 8.35-36). Indeed, although many things which 
exist in time are at rest at any given moment, and could also reveal 
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the existence of time, it is easier both to become acquainted with 
time and to keep track of it by observing something in motion than at 
rest (cf. Sext. Emp. Math. X 18), since that which is in motion 
moves forward in imitation of time’s extension, whereas that which 
is at rest copies the unchanging and still nature of the intelligible 
realm (cf. 7.20-22 and 11.11-14). And this is why it is movement, 
and not rest, which measures time, as we have already seen (see 
above my comments on 12.25-36). Furthermore, due to the elusive 
nature of time and the compelling nature of movement, it is easy to 
make the same mistake as the Peripatetics and confuse the function 
of time with that of motion: for in fact, time is not primarily that 
which measures motion but that which is measured by motion (cf. 
Callahan 1979, 141). 
 
2. ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως (line 13) - γράφοντες (line 18) 
 
Plotinus gives the benefit of the doubt to those, such as Aristotle, 
who claim that time is a measure by suggesting that they could mean 
that time is that which is measured rather than that which measures. 
Here Plotinus may be thinking of passages such as Ph. IV 12, 
220b14-16: “not only do we measure motion by time, but also time 
by motion”. In this case, the object measured is the measure, and the 
subject doing the measuring is the noun at the end of the clause (e.g. 
“the line is the measure of the ruler”). Plotinus claims that we should 
not blame his predecessors for their lack of clarity because their 
writings were intended for students who already knew which 
interpretation was correct from their lectures. However, it is possible 
that Plotinus’ position on the ambiguity of his predecessors’ claim 
signals the desire to soften the blow of his reversal of their 
conclusion rather than genuine puzzlement as to what they were 
trying to argue. 
 
3. ὁ μέντοι (line 18) - ἐργάζεται (line 28) 
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Plotinus’ account of time falls more closely in line with that of Plato 
than any of his other predecessors since in Ti. 39b2 Plato seems to 
imply that the creation of the movement of the heavenly bodies helps 
to reveal the nature of time through number. However, Plotinus goes 
one step further than Plato by claiming that time is directly measured 
by the heavenly circuit. Furthermore, Plotinus directly follows in 
Plato’s footsteps by identifying time as the image of eternity 
(borrowing from Ti. 37d5 and 38b8) and by reiterating that the 
sensible universe and time both come into existence simultaneously 
(see 12.22-25). 
 
4. ἐπιστραφείσης οὖν (line 28) - οὐκ ἔχων (line 30) 
 
Furthermore, Plotinus restates his belief that just as the sensible 
universe and time come into being together, so they dissolve 
together when the desiring activity of the human soul finally stops 
(cf. my comments on 12.4-22). For while it may be impossible for 
the life of Soul itself to return to unity, Plotinus suggests human 
beings are able to achieve this reversion by trading the life of desire 
for that of stillness and presence (cf. 11.1-5).  
 
5. εἰ δέ τις (line 30) - τὴν μετάβασιν αὐτῶν (line 40) 
 
Plotinus argues that we cannot abstract the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of 
time (which is discussed in 9.55-68 and 11.35-45) from Soul because 
the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of Soul is the condition of possibility for the 
‘before’ and ‘after’ of time. Indeed, the hypostasis of Soul constructs 
time with the help of the human soul by unfolding from presence 
(11.15-27) and the germination of this unfolding is logically prior to 
the succession of events in the sensible universe which time presides 
over. However, since Plotinus claims that time is not itself temporal 
because it encompasses that which is temporal (IV.4.15.18-20), we 
may be able to identify the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of Soul as the 
psychical ‘before’ and ‘after’ of the essence of time before it is 
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perceived in relation to sensible objects and events (cf. IV.4.16.1-16; 
Beierwaltes 1967, 285; and Smith 1996, 211). Thus, Plotinus wishes 
us to trace back the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of the physical universe to 
that of Soul so that we recognise that physical temporal succession 
has its roots in the kind of succession which is the essence of time, 
namely the movement of Soul away from eternal Being (cf. Smith 
1998, 337-40). Indeed, the point at which Soul departs from Being 
signifies the birth of desire for physical existence, and this ‘before’ 
and ‘after’ is not yet temporal, although our language makes it seem 
like that (reminding us of 6.21-36 and 11.4-6 where Plotinus uses 
tensed language to describe non-temporal reality). Instead, its 
‘before’ and ‘after’ is a split in subjectivity from its non-desiring 
state of unified contemplation to a reaching out to something other 
than itself, which results in the creation of temporality and the 
sensible universe.  
 
6. διὰ τί οὖν (line 41) - αὐτῆς ἔχει (line 47) 
 
The imperceptible movement of the hypostasis of Soul (12.30-31) 
begets time and the movement of the sensible universe and at the 
same time enslaves itself in time (see 11.27-33). On the other hand, 
the movement of the human soul, which is the original cause of time, 
is inherently atemporal, and is therefore logically prior to both Soul 
and time (11.15-27). For the human soul retains a part which abides 
in eternity (the undescended soul) while having a part (the descended 
soul) which falls by becoming fixated through its ‘restless nature’ 
and ‘unquiet power’ by progression and extension (cf also my 
comments on 12.4-22). Thus, the movement of the human soul arises 
in eternity and produces time, whereas the movement of Soul falls 
into temporality. Soul itself, however, as a hypostasis abstracted 
from its movement, possesses an atemporal nature (cf. IV 4.15.12-3).  
 
7. πῶς οὖν (line 47) - ἡμῶν μέρους (line 49) 
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Since the life of Soul is time (11.43-45), the universe which Soul 
produces is temporal (12.24-25). Since the universe is contained 
within the prior principle of Soul, there is no part of the universe 
which exists outside of Soul and therefore no aspect of it which 
exists outside of time (11.27-33). Therefore, just as the soul is 
omnipresent in the human being (IV.9.1.1-4), so Soul and its 
temporal activity are ubiquitous in the sensible universe (see 
V.1.2.30-40 and VI.4.1.1-8). 
 
8. εἰ δέ τις (line 49) - τρόπος λόγων (line 53) 
 
Therefore, time neither exists in anything unreal (since Soul is real), 
nor is it itself unreal. For one cannot at the same time affirm the 
‘was’ and ‘will be’ of the body and soul (as Plotinus does: see 
IV.7.1.20-22 and IV.4.15.10-17 respectively) while denying the 
existence of that by which the ‘was’ and ‘will be’ are produced. 
Thus Plotinus goes against those, such as the Peripatetic Critolaus 
(fr.14), who claim that time is simply “a concept or measure, not 
something subsistent (οὐκ ὑπόστασιν)”; see also Glucker 1994, 20-
23. Furthermore, such a view may also amount to an evasion of our 
own responsibility to recognise our natural resting place in the 
eternal seat of Being (11.17-20). For if we do not believe we are in 
time in any way, there is no reason to attempt to lead ourselves back 
to eternity in the way that Plotinus suggests in 11.1-4 and 12.4-22. 
 
9. ἐκεῖνο δὲ (line 53) - τὰ ἴσα διειστήκει (line 62) 
 
The movement of the human body corresponds to and is caused by 
the psychical movement of the human soul. For each instance of 
man’s physical movement embodies a particular interval of his soul 
as he progresses towards the ‘next’ and the ‘after’ (11.15-20). The 
relationship between the human soul and the human body is 
therefore analogous to that of Soul and the sensible universe: for in 
both cases the movement of the former produces and dictates the 
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extent of the movement of the latter (see above my comments on 
13.30-40) with the logical consequence that the movement of the 
latter manifests that of the former (see also my comments on 12.22-
36). Furthermore, the original, psychical motion of the human soul is 
not chaotic and random but is rather ‘separated out equally’, 
proceeding in a regular and ordered sequence. This is because, like 
the hypostasis of Soul, the human soul moves ‘with a motion not 
belonging to that eternal world but which resembles that motion and 
wishes to be an image of it’ (11.27-33). The original movement of 
the human soul therefore exists on a higher ontological level than the 
physical motion it begets in the human body, since the movement of 
the human soul constitutes the essence of time, whereas physical 
motion exists only within time.  
 
10. τὴν οὖν κίνησιν (line 62) - τοῡ παντός ὡσαύτως (line 66) 
 
The movement of the human soul does not have a cause other than 
its own desiring state, since that which exists prior to such 
movement is eternity itself, which exists without interval. Eternity 
cannot, therefore, be held responsible for that which moves away 
from it since it exists in a state of unity and stillness. Since that 
which is prior to the movement of the human soul does not cause or 
determine it in any way, the movement itself must have primary 
existence (see also III.1.8.4-8). Thus, while everything in the 
sensible universe exists as a consequence of the activity of the 
human soul, the movement of the human soul is primary and self-
caused.  
 
11. ἆρ᾽ οὖν (line 66) - τοῖς ὁμοειδέσι πᾶσιν (line 69) 
 
Plotinus concludes by reiterating that time is within us, reminding us 
that it is caused by our movement away from eternity (11.15-20) and 
is thus an activity of our individual soul (12.22-25) as much as it is 
of the hypostasis of Soul (11.59-62). However, time only exists in 
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souls ‘of this kind’, namely those who have not ‘escaped to the 
upper world’ (III.4.2.12). Time is thus the subjective condition of 
desiring consciousness which belongs to those souls who desire to 
gain more than what is available to them in the eternal present, and it 
is by virtue of this condition that all such souls share common 
ground. Since it is a subjective mode, it cannot be directly split up or 
divided (see 12.28-31) but can only be made manifest through 
motion (of the heavenly circuit, for example: 12.22-36). Similarly, 
eternity is also indivisible by virtue of being a subjective condition, 
but its condition is one of non-desiring consciousness (see 12.4-22) 
and is knowable only to beings who pledge their allegiance to a life 
of timeless presence (4.33-37).  
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INTERPRETATIVE ESSAY 
“So we must not go after other first principles but put this first, and then 
after it Intellect, that which primally thinks, and then Soul after Intellect (for 
this is the order which corresponds to the nature of things) ... it remains to 
investigate in our present discussion, if we are to posit more than these 
three, whatever other natures there could be beside them.” (II.9.1.12-20) 
At the beginning of III.7, Plotinus sets out his method of 
investigation of the two principles of eternity and time.  He begins by telling 
us that we must first investigate eternity, since it is the archetype upon 
which time is modelled (1.16-20). He then proceeds to map out his account 
of eternity, which includes a number of aporias stemming from the 
beginning of his enquiry in chapter two. For example, should we identify 
eternity with Intellect (2.1-3)? Or is eternity equivalent to rest (2.20-21), 
substance, motion or everlastingness (3.1-11)? These questions are both 
asked and directly investigated by Plotinus within the treatise. However, the 
reader may well be struck with further aporias which are not so easily 
resolved within the treatise itself. For example, how can the principle of 
eternity correspond so closely to Intellect (5.19-22) while at the same time 
being distinct from it (2.10-15)? How could the one even conceivably be 
different to the other, when both are defined as Being (eternity in 5.19-22, 
6.6-8, 11.59-62 and Intellect in V.9.8.16-19 and VI.2.18.12-17, for 
example)? And in what sense can eternity be understood to come from and 
be orientated towards the One (6.1-2)? While Plotinus’ analysis within III.7 
goes a long way to solving such problems, it is the contention of this thesis 
that we can only get to the bottom of the matter, in regard both to the 
questions which Plotinus directly investigates and the apparent 
contradictions which still remain unsolved after the analysis is through, by 
placing the treatise within the context of the Enneads as a whole. This 
requires us to approach the treatise as containing the whole within itself, 
even though it is materially only a small part of it. We therefore aim to 
investigate III.7 with the presupposition that 'each part is not cut off from 
the whole; but (instead that) the whole life of it ... lives and thinks all 
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together in one, and makes the part the whole and all bound in friendship 
with itself’ (III.2.1.28-32). 
Furthermore, in order to discover fully what Plotinus’ conceptions of 
eternity and time are, we must discover their relationship to the hypostases 
of the One (and the Good), Intellect, Soul, as well as to the human soul. In 
other words, we must discover where eternity and time fit in Plotinus’ 
overall topography of principles, and thus discern their unique (combination 
of) characteristics. While Plotinus sets out on such a project in III.7 by 
distinguishing eternity from Intellect, by identifying eternity as ‘the life of 
being around the One’ (6.6-9), as the archetype of time and as having an 
intimate relationship with the human soul (see for example 5.7-12, 6.1-9, 
7.1-5 and 11.1-4), we can only understand the significance of these claims 
and the reasoning behind them if we have a correct understanding of the 
way in which the One produces the hypostases, and why this emanative 
production is fundamentally different to that which generates eternity and 
time. For on the one hand, the One emanates objective features of reality 
and is thereby the origin of all objects, including the intelligible and sensible 
realities contained by Intellect and Soul. On the other hand, however, it also 
emanates subjective features of reality such as eternity and time which 
cannot be reduced to objects of experience, since they are the modes in 
which knowledge of objects is made possible. The former exoteric aspect 
therefore pertains to the objects of experience, whereas the latter esoteric 
aspect pertains to those subjective states in which objects are experienced. 
We call the latter aspect esoteric precisely because it is the inner sanctum of 
the principle, and is prior to its exoteric aspect, since the objective and 
exoteric aspect can only exist because of the totally non-objective character 
of the One (see for example, V.2.1.1-7)6.  
We may therefore understand the derivation of the order of nature from the 
One in two ways: firstly as an exoteric process of emanation, resulting in the 
hypostases of Intellect and Soul, and secondly as an esoteric process of 
emanation resulting in the principles of eternity and time, which exist as 
modes of human subjectivity. The exoteric process of emanation may be 
                                                           
6
 See also my footnotes on page 6 of the Introduction. 
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understood objectively: for we can grasp the nature of the One, Intellect and 
Soul as hypostases or underlying principles, since they exist as placeholders 
or sets which contain and exclude certain elements (or which contain all 
elements in the case of the One) independently of human subjectivity. On 
the other hand, understanding the esoteric process of emanation which 
produces eternity and time requires investigation into the subjective modes 
of the person who wishes to unlock access to the direct experience of 
Intellect and Soul. For by unlocking the modes of time, eternity and absolute 
negation which allow the soul access to Soul, Intellect and the One, man 
will find that he possesses not only theoretical understanding, but also direct 
experience of the three hypostases. For example, while the nature of the One 
as a set of all sets, and as the source of all things can be understood through 
concepts, the encounter with the One achieved through absolute negation is 
far beyond the scope of discursive reason and therefore transcends words. 
Similarly, while we may have concepts of Love, Beauty and Truth in the 
intelligible realm, these concepts are transformed into direct experience 
once man recognises his eternal nature. Finally, in the case of Soul, the 
concept of a sensible reality is but a ghostly image of the experience of a 
sensible reality perceived within the mode of time. And therefore, the true 
natures of the hypostases are only discoverable when man embarks on an 
investigation into his esoteric journey, pertaining to his subjective mode of 
experience in the case of Intellect and Soul, and to a supra-subjective mode 
in the case of the One.  
On the one hand therefore, we begin with the utterly simple One which 
contains everything, and then proceed to Intellect which contains pure 
realities, before reaching Soul which contains those realities whose purity is 
mixed in with impurity. In this way we perceive the exoteric order of nature 
as the three hypostases and the realities they contain. On the other hand, 
according to the esoteric process of emanation, man discovers more than 
mere concepts of the productive hypostases and the things they contain. For 
the esoteric is the companion of experience rather than of concepts, and man 
must embark on the journey of purification in order to access Intellect and 
the One in his own experience. Since there are three hypostases whose 
innermost natures can only be accessed through experience, there are three 
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corresponding modes which man must enter into in order to encounter them. 
These we will call the modes of the esoteric. The first mode of the esoteric 
is achieved through the act of absolute negation which allows man to 
encounter the One. It is a modeless mode since it entails the union of 
identity with something which transcends identity. The second mode of the 
esoteric is achieved through the negation of desire for physical experience. 
This non-desiring mode of experience is called eternity.  Finally, the third 
mode of the esoteric arises from the mode of desire which delivers man into 
the realm of Soul. This desiring mode of experience is called time. By 
showing why eternity and time are modes of the esoteric, we will be able to 
show why Plotinus calls them the life of Intellect and Soul respectively, 
without identifying them as Intellect and Soul. We will also be able to see 
why eternity exists on the same ontological level as Intellect, why time 
exists on the same ontological level as Soul and why Plotinus calls time the 
image of eternity. 
In this first chapter, we will attempt to show how the One may be conceived 
as the first mode of the esoteric and to fully extrapolate its main 
characteristics, so that we will then be able to see the way in which eternity 
exists in and is ‘orientated towards’ it. After mapping out the view that the 
One is the first mode of the esoteric, we will be able to explain why eternity 
can be conceived as the second mode of the esoteric, pertaining to the 
negation of the desire for physical experience, and finally why time can be 
understood as the third mode of the esoteric, pertaining to the state of desire 
for physical experience. For we argue that Plotinus’ treatise ‘On Eternity 
and Time’ is an account of three modes, one of which is presupposed (the 
One), and the second and third of which are investigated and brought to 
light.  
 
 I: THE FIRST MODE OF THE ESOTERIC 
In order to encounter the One, man must recognise himself as the One. The 
mode of the encounter with the absolute is therefore nothing other than the 
absolute itself. For this reason, the mode is modeless, for it cannot be 
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separated from that which it seeks to access. On the journey of liberation, 
man must understand that he has to negate his qualities and attributes in 
order to encounter the ultimate principle. He must therefore see that there is 
a way for him to achieve union with the One. While logically it may seem 
very easy to realise such a truth, namely that the man who seeks in fact 
seeks nothing other than himself (since all the hypostases exist within him: 
V.1.10.1-6; V.3.17.33-38), it may take a long time to know this in 
experience. For the esoteric eludes man not by existing far away from him 
but rather by being so close (and even identical to) his very nature, so that 
by looking for it through his senses or through concepts, man continually 
seeks outside his own nature that which can only be found by turning 
inwards in silence. For the sake of explication therefore, we must take the 
vantage point of the man who wants to realise the One and map out the 
journey of negation which may lead him to this principle. For it is not by 
adding but rather by taking away that man will be able to encounter his true 
nature.  
Man’s journey of liberation includes the subtraction of all things which 
exceed the numerical value of One. This means that he must subtract 
everything, since anything which is a thing, whether a hypostasis or an 
intelligible or sensible reality is greater than the absolute from which it 
springs. Thus he must rid himself of identification with Intellect and Soul 
(which Plotinus describes as multiplicities in III.8.9.1-5, VI.6.9.29-31 and 
V.1.5.13-14 for example), the corresponding intelligible realities and myriad 
forms of Soul in order to reach the One. Man cannot subtract anything from 
his own nature with the presupposition that it is outside himself. Instead, he 
must recognise that the One, the Intellect and Soul exist within him and 
remove all identification with these secondary and tertiary realities so that 
he may realise his nature as the ultimate and primary principle (see 
III.8.9.19-28, V.3.17.33-38, VI.7.36.21-27, and VI.9.4.24-30). By achieving 
this he ‘rushes to (the) One’ (V.5.4.8-11) ready for ‘fulfilment and 
illumination by the first nature’ (VI.9.7.12-17). This is every man’s end, for 
there is nothing more precious than to attain the absolute union with this 
ultimate principle. In order to subtract everything which is quantitatively 
greater than the principle of the One, man must begin by negating the 
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principle of plurality associated with the realm of Soul. Let us therefore map 
out the way in which he must negate the plurality associated with Soul 
before showing how he can transcend the realm of Intellect. In order to 
transcend Soul, he must rid himself of the idea that he has only partial 
existence. He can achieve this by completing three tasks.  
The first task man must complete is to remove the desire for physical 
experience. For the root cause of man’s descent into the temporal realm of 
Soul is his soul’s desire to ‘govern itself, be by itself and ... to seek more 
than the present (11.15-20). This can only be achieved by entering into a 
limited physical body through which he perceives an outside world and 
believes himself to be isolated and separate from everything around him. 
Through the desire for physical experience, man becomes enchanted with 
the partial existence of sensible realities so that he only perceives the 
primary realities such as Beauty, Love and Truth in the context of physical 
objects and not as pure forms existing in themselves. In order to reverse this 
fate, man must imitate the intelligible realities by extinguishing the desire 
for the physical realm in the knowledge that he is already complete (see 
IV.4.8.48-51). He must therefore follow in Plotinus’ footsteps by curtailing 
his desire for physical experience, which entails going beyond merely 
theoretical enquiry. For like Plotinus, who according to Porphyry ‘never 
relaxed his self-turned attention except in sleep’ and reduced his sleep ‘by 
taking very little food’ (VP.8.19-24), man may attempt to turn back the 
activity of soul to Intellect and in this way negate the causes of his descent 
into the temporal realm of Soul.  
The second and closely related task that man must perform in order to 
destroy his illusory belief that he possesses only partial existence is to cut 
away his identification with the body. For as soon as man thinks that he is 
the physical body, he falls into the illusory belief that he is only a small part 
of a grand physical cosmos and thus strays from his true nature. He must 
instead realise that the soul is separate from the body, (even if it becomes 
divided by entering into it: IV.3.19.1-8) and that death spells the end for the 
body alone (I.6.6.9-11). In order to realise these claims on an experiential 
rather than a solely theoretical level, he must practise viewing the body (and 
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each sensible thing around him) as nothing more than an empty image so 
that it is not given undue attention or admiration. For once his attention 
shifts away from the sensible realm, it will then land upon the higher 
realities, including his own original nature, which are intelligible and 
substantial. He will then understand why Plotinus was purportedly ashamed 
to have a body (VP.1.1-2) and why he refused to sit for a painter or sculptor 
to have his portrait made. For Plotinus realised that sensible existence was 
nothing more than a pale and fleeting reflection of the substantial and 
eternal intelligible realm and thus queried, ‘why, really is it not enough to 
have to carry the image in which nature has encased us, without your 
requesting me to agree to leave behind me a longer-lasting image of the 
image, as if it was something genuinely worth looking at?’ (VP.1.7-9). It is 
in this context that we must receive his encouragement to ‘remove what is 
superfluous, straighten up what is crooked, clean up what is dark and make 
it bright ... until the godlike splendour of virtue shines forth’ (I.6. 9.7-24). 
For unless we ensure that ‘nothing extraneous is mixed within’ (Ibid.) by 
rejecting the attribution of sensible qualities to our own natures, we will 
continue to miss the requirements for an intelligible life. He must instead 
seek to avoid further incarnations (see VI.7.17-23) by realising that he is not 
a partial physical reality but a whole intelligible reality.  
The final task which man must achieve in order to negate his false 
conception of himself as a partial reality is to transcend his discursive 
reason. For discursive reason takes as its subject the whole of nature and 
attempts to comprehend it part by part, so that it splits up what is always 
whole and complete. As Plotinus claims, discursive reason ‘makes the one 
be not one, and we bring forward as it were parts of it and posit these, each 
of them as one and call it a genus, being unaware that we do not know the 
whole all at once, but bring forward piece by piece and join them up again, 
being unable to hold them back for long as they hasten to themselves’ 
(VI.2.3.26-30). As long as we turn to discursive reason as the primary 
means for attempting to access reality, we will always be drawn back to a 
world of parts, existing in a state of extension and separation, since by 
employing discursive reason we can only ‘consider one thing after another’ 
(V.3.17.21-24) and therefore have the power to grasp only that which exists 
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in a dual state of being: this and that; here and there; subject and object. In 
this state of being, we employ a tool for accessing a realm of duality to try 
to comprehend the absolutely simple. We therefore approach the intelligible 
realities such as Justice and Beauty as though they were ‘axioms’ and 
‘expressions’ rather than seeing that they exist in a supreme state of identity 
with one another (V.5.1.38-41). This means turning to non-discursive 
comprehension like the wise men of Egypt by discarding ‘the forms of 
letters which follow the order of words and propositions and imitate sounds 
and the enunciations of philosophical statements’ (V.8.6.1-5) so that we can 
directly encounter reality rather than simply thinking about it theoretically. 
We will then perceive that the real awaits us in eternal presence without 
admitting any kind of extension or thinking.  
By negating the multiple, man destroys the causes of his embodiment and 
shifts from a life of plurality to unity. He strips away his false identifications 
and comes to rest in unity. For once a man has purified himself of physical 
desire ‘he will see an Intellect which sees nothing perceived by the senses, 
none of these mortal things, but apprehends the eternal by eternity, and all 
these things in the intelligible world, having himself become a universe full 
of light’ (IV.7.10.30-36). Through purification of the sensible, therefore, 
man achieves union with all the primaries, forms and the intelligible realm 
itself as he recognises himself as an intelligible reality. Indeed, since 
Plotinus contends that man’s fall from his original form came from ‘a 
restless nature’ (11.15), it would make sense that ‘stopping this life, which 
(is neither) ... orientated towards nor dwelling in itself’ (12.4-7), would lead 
back to the intelligible realm and thus restore to man the original state of his 
soul. When man undertakes this first level of purification of sensible 
realities, he enters into the second mode of the esoteric, called eternity. For 
his mode of experience arising from his practice of purification shifts to 
unity, so that he while he is still embodied, he perceives that which has no 
extension in time and space, and after the death of the body, is released from 
any consideration of the spatio-temporal. He enters into the intelligible away 
from the sensible.  
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While the achievement of man to recognise his original nature in the 
intelligible realm should not be taken lightly, overemphasising such an 
achievement prevents man from realising the true end of his journey which 
does not exist in opposition to anything, called the One, or the Good. 
Indeed, Plotinus claims that there are no differentiations in the One 
(VI.2.9.13-14) nothing can be contrary to the transcendent Good (I.8.6.27-
28): for since the Good ‘is not of a particular quality’ and since it 
‘transcends substance’ it is not contrary to anything, unlike substance itself 
which is contrary to non-substance (I.8.6.32). The ascension into the One, 
which is a purer unity than Intellect, is therefore man’s greatest challenge: 
for the soul’s encounter with the One is the moment of the death of the 
subject-object distinction; a death which occurs outside not only time and 
space but also eternity and the intelligible realm. Once the soul reaches this 
great principle, it loses its existence as a separate subject and becomes 
everything. Instead of being seduced by the multiple, it acknowledges it as 
its creation, and the multiple in return bows to it, in the knowledge that it is 
bowing to its source. The order of emanation is therefore restored to 
ultimate perfection, with no distinction between the sacred and profane. And 
thus, in order to journey from the second mode of the esoteric to the first, he 
must negate his identification with all the eternal and intelligible 
characteristics and forms. This means removing identification with all the 
attributes of eternity from his perception of his own nature. Upon entering 
into the intelligible realm, he must therefore cease to identify himself as an 
archetype or even as Being itself. For only by resisting the temptation to 
say, ‘I am this’ can man demonstrate that he has transcended the desire even 
for Being, Beauty and the Good. Indeed, he will have negated subject-object 
altogether, since by refusing even his existence, he destroys the conditions 
for separation from the One and thereby becomes it.  
We can therefore see that an act of absolute negation is required to enter into 
this modeless mode. We call the result of absolute negation a mode because 
it pertains to an individual’s subjective experience. However, we also call it 
modeless because in the case of the One the shift in subjectivity must be so 
radical that the subject-object distinction is extinguished by the absolute in 
the process, which in turn is not only a stratum of reality but the source of 
121 
 
all reality itself. Indeed, by being content to transcend the subject-object 
dichotomy, man transforms into the purest unity which at once transcends 
and embraces all things as its own kin rather than remaining an intelligible 
reality which rejects from its domain all sensible realities. Herein therefore 
lies the difference between the first and second modes of the esoteric: the 
first mode entails ultimate sacrifice, ultimate negation and the corresponding 
acceptance of all things whereas the second mode entails sacrifice only of 
the sensible realities and thus both negates and accepts only a limited range 
of characteristics and realities. The second mode is therefore a state of 
negating physical experience on the one hand and affirming intelligible 
experience on the other. For the realm of the intelligible is a realm of 
identity and Being which rests in itself and refuses to go out into the realm 
of appearances. On the other hand, we can see that the first mode of the 
esoteric is contradictory at heart: by journeying beyond Being, man 
encounters all beings as part of himself.  
We have so far explored the One as a principle pertaining to absolute 
negation. For Plotinus is very clear that the principle which he calls the One 
only has a name to guide the seeker towards the negation of multiplicity and 
that even the term ‘the One’ must be negated when man comes to encounter 
the principle in his lived experience (V.5.6.26-36, VI.9.5.20-24). This is 
because the One transcends all knowledge, language and even the majestic 
principle of Intellect because Intellect is still something and the One is the 
absolute existing before ‘something’ came to exist (V.3.13.1-6). This in turn 
is why man can only enter its solitary nature in total solitude (VI.9.11.38-
43): for as long as he is in multiplicity and carries ‘a burden which hinders 
his vision’ (VI.9.4.16-24) he will be ‘taking something with him which 
keeps him from the One’ (Ibid.). It is clear therefore that Plotinus believes 
that an encounter takes place when the soul of the human being has reached 
the One but that the encounter, as well as that which is encountered is barred 
from conceptual knowledge. We can therefore say that the One, conceived 
as the absolutely negative principle which transcends reality and evades all 
description, is absolutely mysterious and esoteric. 
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However, there are also passages in which Plotinus insists that the One is a 
positive principle. As the absolute monad, it is the first of all numbers 
existing in all other numbers ‘primarily or secondarily’ (V.5.5.7-12) and is 
therefore within all things since they all share in its monadic form. After the 
One, the monad is closest to Intellect since Intellect exists as a ‘One-Many’ 
(V.3.15.10-11; VI.7.14.11-12) by possessing all things in eternal actuality 
(IV.7.10.32-35) while falling short of the absolute unity of the One 
(III.2.1.26-34). Thus both Intellect and the intelligible realities are very 
close to the One by existing in its image, one step down in the order of 
nature. After Intellect, Soul also possesses the form of the monad, albeit in a 
less direct sense than Intellect, since it exists as a One-and-many (V.I.8.23-
27) by containing all things ‘as a multiple with one part in one place and one 
in another’ (V.I.2.38-40) and by ‘producing its activities one after the other, 
and then another which succeeds that which precedes it (11.35-40). 
Therefore, even Soul, along with the sensible realities it contains, is 
connected to the One as ‘an expression and a kind of activity of Intellect, 
just as Intellect is of the One’ (V.I.6.41-46). This means that all entities, 
whether intelligible or sensible, possess the nature of the monad in one way 
or another. And thus, Plotinus presents the One as totally immanent as well 
as absolutely transcendent. This exoteric aspect of the One is further 
supported by Plotinus’ claims that the One is the cause of all things (V.3.15-
27-39) which can be thought of as the King at the summit of reality, 
presiding over Intellect and Soul below it (V.V.3.6-15). For as the grandest 
and most majestic principle, the One exists both as the cause of all things 
and as a kind of divine autocrat which looks over his great kingdom atop a 
lofty throne. And therefore, it is also ‘God’ and the ‘First’ (V.1.7.17-21 and 
V.5.9.33-35), since it is not only a mechanical first cause but also the first 
life of all things which must be revered as ultimately sacred. All these 
descriptors place the One at the top of the hierarchy of nature by presenting 
it either as first cause, or as the principle to which all beings must bow in 
acknowledgment of the divine context of their existence.  
It is therefore evident that there is not only an esoteric aspect of the One 
accessible by the via negativa, but also an exoteric aspect which can be 
affirmed as the cause and container of all things (V.3.15.24-30). While 
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absolute negation will yield us an ineffable encounter with the One as the 
principle of absolute transcendence and thus absolute absence from any 
knowable hypostasis or object (whether intelligible or sensible), it is also the 
case that by being absolutely negative, the One is also able to be absolutely 
positive and to produce and affirm the great order of nature, all the way 
from the lofty heights of pure Intellect to the heavy and earth-leaden depths 
of matter in Soul. For it is by virtue of the fact that the One is wholly 
transcendent that it refuses to be limited to the concept of transcendence and 
makes itself known by becoming fully immanent to and through the great 
chain of Being. Rather than existing as a principle of pure negation which 
negates without a trace of affirmation, the One negates absolutely, so that it 
negates not only the lower hypostases and the realities they contain but also 
its own very identity as a negative principle. By negating its own identity as 
a negative principle, it thereby exists simultaneously as absolutely positive 
principle from which all things arise. Plotinus makes this point by claiming 
that ‘life and thought and all things come from the One, because that God is 
not one of all things … and is not confined to any shape’ (V.1.7.17-21), that 
‘it is because there is nothing in it that all things come from it’ and ‘because 
it seeks nothing, has nothing, and needs nothing (that it) overflows, as it 
were, and … makes something other than itself’ (V.2.1.5-10). For if the One 
were a ‘something’ or clung to identity of any kind, it would exist in 
opposition to something else with a different identity and could not 
therefore be the ultimate principle existing beyond identity. Rather, it is only 
by being completely empty of identification of any kind that the One is able 
to contain the multiple while remaining a simple and transcendent unity. 
The One is therefore absolutely transcendent by negating all positive 
attributions and absolutely immanent by negating its own identity as a 
negative principle. We come closest to its nature by claiming that it 
endlessly negates and that it is therefore both positive and negative (since 
through this radical negation it affirms all things) and neither positive nor 
negative (since this same act of negation denies all things). The internal 
nature of the One therefore manifests itself dialectically to discursive 
reason, since every time the mind tries to capture its essence (of which there 
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is none), it finds that the One has already negated its concept and remained 
one step ahead of it.  
We have now discovered that the two aspects which we thought were 
distinct and contradicted one another are in fact part of one unified nature. 
For the esoteric transforms into the exoteric and vice versa, so that there are 
no longer two distinct principles of esoteric and exoteric but one esoteric-
exoteric phenomenon. In fact, once we have unified these aspects in our 
minds, this new unified concept then dissolves since each individual word 
only has meaning in the context of opposition and contrast to its 
complementary principle. The same can be said of the human soul which 
wishes to access the One in lived experience, which must ‘touch that light 
(of the One) … by the light which is also its means of seeing’ (V.3.17.32-
36) by recognising itself as that empty and luminous nature which it 
mistakenly believed existed outside itself. We must therefore take the 
notions of the esoteric versus exoteric; purity versus impurity; experiential 
knowledge versus conceptual knowledge; and mode of experience versus 
external cause of experience merely as devices which help us on the path 
towards the realisation of the supreme principle. For in the end we must get 
rid of all such distinctions if we wish to arrive at ‘the ultimate which is the 
first … (and) beautiful of itself.’ (V.9.2.1-18) 
Having investigated how man may achieve the One by entering into the first 
modeless mode of the esoteric through the act of absolute negation, we may 
turn to III.7 and use the investigation into the One to help us illuminate 
Plotinus’ propositions regarding the natures of eternity and time. For it is the 
claim of this thesis that the One does not only emanate its exoteric nature to 
Intellect and Soul to form the three hypostases, but that it also emanates its 
esoteric nature to eternity and time which can be understood only in relation 
to the human soul and its path of liberation rather than as objects within the 
hypostases. We will therefore claim that eternity and time can be conceived 
as the second and third modes of the esoteric, since they come into being 
through man’s subjective disposition and give him access to the hypostases 
of Intellect and Soul respectively. By defining eternity and time as modes of 
the esoteric, we will be able to map out the way in which their emanatory 
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characters differ from those of Intellect and Soul which we will describe as 
exoteric principles which can be understood objectively. We will therefore 
see why eternity shares much in common with time by being subjective 
modes which make experience possible, in contrast to Intellect and Soul 
which are those conditions of possibility for experience which are knowable 
objectively and which are therefore exoteric. We will also see that eternity is 
like Intellect and unlike time by being a principle of purity, and that time 
and Soul are principles of impurity. Finally we will aim to show why 
eternity is the mode of comportment to Intellect and why time is the mode 
of comportment to Soul. In this way we aim to demonstrate that on all levels 
of nature, man cannot separate what he experiences from his own mode of 
subjectivity.  
 
II: THE SECOND MODE OF THE ESOTERIC 
Now that we have discovered what it takes for man to reach the ultimate 
level of reality (which is beyond reality), we must descend to the next level 
of reality below the One and attempt to discover once more the content of 
man’s experience and the conditions of possibility for such content. We may 
now use the word ‘experience’, for on this level there is no doubt that the 
individual human soul encounters objects and that the link between the soul 
and such objects can be labelled experience, unlike in the case of the One 
where no separate identity is able to survive. For in the realm below the 
One, man experiences the intelligible realities, which include the pure 
forms, the primaries and the great kinds. However, we must also attempt to 
reveal how Plotinus aims to make sense of such experience by showing how 
it is possible for man to encounter this realm of purity, wholeness and 
completion. Plotinus does this by naming and explicating three different but 
intimately related principles which make pure experience possible. The first 
is Intellect; the second is eternity; and the third is Being. It is arguable that 
one of the major aims of III.7 is to find out the unique role of eternity as a 
condition of possibility for pure experience as distinct from those of 
Intellect and Being. This therefore also means understanding the role that 
the principles of Intellect and Being play in making the experience of the 
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intelligible realities possible as well. Once we have discovered how eternity, 
Intellect and Being function as distinct conditions of possibility, we will see 
how the One emanates its power in different ways upon these three 
principles. We will attempt to argue that eternity is the mode of experience 
which man must enter in order to experience the intelligible realities; that 
Intellect is the cause of the intelligible beings independent of man; and that 
Being is the state of conformity between eternity and Intellect, which 
comprise its two aspects. 
Let us first enquire into the nature of Intellection in order to discover why 
Plotinus claims that eternity is different from Intellect (see 2.10-15), while 
being identical to it in some way (see 5.19-22). The main difference that 
Plotinus identifies between eternity and Intellect in III.7 is that eternity 
exists as a partless whole (2.17-19, 3.15-19, 4.37-43 and 6.47-50) whereas 
Intellect exists as a whole in relation to its parts (2.17-19). As we will see, 
Plotinus’ splitting up of Intellect and eternity in order to examine them as 
individual principles ends up being a rather artificial exercise, since they are 
in reality inseparable. However, when Intellect is viewed separately from 
eternity, we begin to understand why it has parts and eternity does not. For 
without eternity, Intellect is devoid of life, and therefore ceases to stand in 
relation to the experience of partless unity and instead becomes an object of 
theoretical enquiry whose unity is perceived in relation to multiple parts. 
Indeed, Intellect is that hypostasis which has unfurled from the absolute 
unity of the One into the unity which expresses the multiplicity of pure 
forms (see III.8.8.32-38; V.3.10.7-16; VI.7.17.39-43 and VI.9.5.12-16) or 
the ‘One-Many’ (V.3.15.10-11; VI.7.14.11-12) which is a plurality-in-unity 
(see III.2.1.26-34 for example). This means that the principle of Intellect 
only achieves its unity by subsuming multiplicity in such a way that no part 
or form is ‘cut off from the whole … (so that) the whole life of it … lives 
and thinks all together in one and makes the part the whole and all bound in 
friendship with itself’ (III.2.1.30-32). This multiplicity of parts is not only a 
feature of the identity of Intellect but is central to its very nature: for 
Intellect achieves its unity by representing the unified summation of the 
intelligible realities. Thus, ‘Intellect does not apprehend objects which pre-
exist it—as sense does sense- objects—but … itself is its objects’ (V.4.2.45-
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48) so that it can be described as all things intelligible (see II.9.6.28-34; 
III.3.3.20-23; V.1.4.19-21; VI.2.20.20-23 and VI.6.7.1-4) and not solely as 
that which contains them. Intellect therefore not only encompasses the 
intelligible realities ‘as a genus does a species and a whole its parts’ 
(V.9.6.9-10) but is also ‘a composite of all…with all its contents’ 
(VI.2.18.12-17). Thus, just as it is impossible to conceive of intelligible 
realities without Intellect; it is also impossible to conceive of Intellect 
without the intelligible realities.   
While on the one hand Intellect exists as the sum total of the things it 
contains and therefore cannot be conceived without the existence of the 
intelligible realities, Plotinus also maintains that it is logically prior to its 
parts (VI.2.19.18-21). We may attempt to grasp the paradoxical nature of 
Intellect both being and, in some sense, transcending its elements, by 
comparing it to that of a mathematical set. According to Georg Cantor, the 
creator of set theory, a set is a ‘gathering together into a whole of definite, 
distinct objects of our perception (Anschauung) or of our thought – which 
are called elements of the set.’ (Cantor 1895, 481) Intellect may also be 
described as a ‘gathering together into a whole’ of distinct objects of 
thought, namely the intelligible realities. For Intellect is a whole (V.3.5.43-
46; V.3.6.7-8; V.9.6.9-10; VI.2.21.3-11) which is made up of distinct 
intelligible realities (see VI.2.20-23) which are distinct objects of 
intellection (see VI.4.14.3-5). These distinct objects are in turn elements of 
the set of all intelligible realities known as Intellect (see VI.2.20.25-29; 
V.9.8.3-7 and VI.9.2.21-27). Intellect can therefore be conceived as a kind 
of metaphysical set standing in relation to the elements it contains. For on 
the one hand, Intellect is logically prior to its elements because if the set of 
intelligible realities (Intellect) did not exist, then necessarily no intelligible 
realities would exist either, in the same way that there could be no even 
numbers without the set of even numbers; no odd numbers without the set of 
odd numbers; and no prime numbers without the set of prime numbers. 
However, unlike the relationship between a Form and its particular, where 
there is only a one-way dependence of the particular upon the form (for 
example, a particular instantiation of beauty in the material world requires 
the existence of Beauty in the realm of the forms but not vice versa), 
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Intellect, existing in a similar fashion to a set-theoretical concept, requires 
its elements as much as its elements require it. For just as there could be no 
set of even numbers without the existence of two, four, six and eight to 
provide its content, so there can be no set of intelligible realities without the 
intelligible realities themselves. And thus, there is no Intellect without the 
form of beauty; the form of the triangle; or the form of the table. However, 
although this biconditional dependence exists between the concept of 
Intellect and the intelligible realities, Plotinus still claims that Intellect is 
logically prior to its elements because Intellect itself represents the unity of 
the intelligibles (see for example VI.7.14.11-18) and it is precisely this unity 
which separates the intelligibles from the spatio-temporal objects of Soul. It 
is also on account of the logical priority of Intellect that Plotinus designates 
it as the cause of the intelligibles (see for example, VI.2.20.25-29) since its 
unity logically precedes and therefore accounts for the unified existence of 
each individual intelligible reality. And thus, we can now understand why 
Plotinus claims that Intellect is inclusive as a whole which ‘stands in 
relation to its parts’ (2.17-19): for it represents the unified completion (as 
well as the cause) of the distinct intelligible realities. 
Furthermore, Intellect stands in relation to a very specific range of parts. We 
have already seen that Intellect contains the forms, such as the form of good 
(as distinct from the Good itself) and the form of beauty (as distinct from 
Beauty itself)7; and we also know that it employs the great kinds in its act of 
intellection in order to distinguish itself from those intelligible realities 
which it contains, making it a One-Many. However, there are also many 
things which Intellect does not include by virtue of its ontological status 
being either too great or too lowly. For example, Intellect does not include 
sense objects (IV.7.10.32-40; V.4.2.47-49 and VI.9.3.22-27 for example) or 
discursive reason (IV.8.1.1-11; V.3.3.19-21 and V.9.7) because it transcends 
Soul, whose life entraps its elements into a state of deficiency, extension, 
generation and destruction (see for example 11.54-59). Neither, on the other 
                                                           
7
 As Gerson 2018b, §2 states, the Platonic Form of the Good should not be confused with 
the concept of goodness as an intelligible attribute. The former is the supreme principle 
which is synonymous with the One, whereas the latter is the manifestation of goodness on 
the level of Being (see VI.7.15.9-11). Similarly, Beauty may be seen as synonymous with 
the Good (I.6.6.21-24) and is distinct from its manifestation in the intelligible world.  
129 
 
hand, does Intellect include the One (V.4.2.42-43), the Good (V.9.2.23-28) 
or Absolute Beauty since these things transcend it by existing beyond Being. 
Intellect can therefore be understood as the set of intelligible parts and 
intelligible parts only, which separates it from the Soul and the One since it 
transcends the Soul (which contains only non-intelligible parts) and falls 
short of the One (which contains everything and nothing at the same time in 
a paradoxical act of transcendence). Thus, like all sets which are neither 
universal (containing all elements) nor empty (containing no elements), 
Intellect includes certain elements which can be called its members (and 
thus conforms to the set theoretical principle of inclusion) and excludes 
those things which do not meet its conditions of entry (conforming to the 
principle of exclusion).  
Of those elements which Intellect includes, the human soul is unique in 
sharing in the domain of Soul which is lower than Intellect because it is 
divided into a higher and a lower part (see for example V.1.10.1-18 with 
regards to the higher part and IV.8.1.1-11; IV.8.4.21-31; IV.8.8.1-13; 
III.4.3.18-27 and V.I.10 with regards to the lower part) and therefore 
represents the intersection of the two hypostases in its embodied state by 
sharing in both principles at the same time (see V.3.3.36-40). It is therefore 
clear that Intellect is inclusive of parts in the way that a (non-universal and 
non-empty) set includes its elements8, since both represent a specific 
domain which contains and excludes certain elements and which can share 
certain elements with other domains without contradiction (like the human 
soul in the case of Intellect and Soul, or the number two in the case of the 
set of even numbers and the set of prime numbers).  
Now that we have mapped out an overall picture of the way in which 
Intellect exists as a whole in relation to its parts, we may attempt to identify 
the emanatory character of Intellect in relation to the One so that we may 
then be able to distinguish this principle from eternity, which emanates from 
the One in a different way so that it ‘contains the totality of the intelligible 
realities simultaneously, not as parts’ (2.18). We have already seen that the 
                                                           
8
 For an accessible introduction to the topic of set theory, see: Pollard, Stephen, 2015. 
Philosophical Introduction to Set Theory. New York. Dover Publications.  
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One contains an esoteric and an exoteric aspect: an exoteric aspect 
pertaining to the relational qualities of the One which can be grasped 
objectively, and an esoteric aspect pertaining to the non-relational qualities 
of the One which can only be encountered through the subjective mode of 
absolute negation. We said that the former exoteric aspect was the 
hypostatic nature of the One as cause and container of all reality, whereas 
the latter esoteric aspect was the nature of the One as an ineffable unity 
which could not be understood relationally but rather encountered as 
something utterly transcendent. The exoteric aspect was posited 
independently of man’s subjective path of liberation, whereas the esoteric 
aspect was postulated in the context of man’s journey to enlightenment. And 
thus, we stated that the innermost nature of the One was only accessible to 
the man who had negated everything and thus satisfied the necessary 
epistemological conditions for union with the absolute metaphysical 
principle. How then shall we trace out the hypostasis of Intellect as a 
principle arising from the One? And in what way does it imitate the One 
while at the same time straying from its absolute nature? For while we know 
that Intellect is an expression of the One (V.1.6.41-46) and that it is 
produced by it (V.2.1.13-16), we must presently investigate the nature of 
this expression and production in order to identify Intellect and thereby pave 
the way to understand eternity as a different principle existing on the same 
ontological level.  
The first thing which Intellect receives from the One is its purity. For since 
both Intellect and the One are pure (see VI.2.8.4-11 and V.5.4.5-6 
respectively) and Intellect is an expression of the One, we can deduce that 
Intellect receives its pure nature as a direct emanation from the One. 
However, while the One is pure by rejecting any differentiation (VI.2.9.13-
14) and by being absolutely transcendent, Intellect is pure by ‘separating 
itself by differentiation into parts which are not cut off from each other, 
(while being) altogether forever’ (IV.3.4.9-10). The purity of the One is 
therefore associated with the fact that it is unpolluted by any identification, 
even with Being itself (see for example, I.7.1.19-20) so that it is able to flout 
the law of non-contradiction and exist as all things and nothing all at the 
same time (V.2.1.1). On the other hand, Intellect is pure by rejecting from 
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its domain that which does not match its ontological status and therefore 
contains only the intelligible realities (VI.2.8.1-4) and outlaws entities in 
Soul such as sensible objects and the lower part of the human soul (though it 
accounts for these realities by providing their archetypal form: III.6.6.10-14; 
V.9.9.1-8). Thus, one could claim that the One remains pure by being 
untouched by the multiple it contains (VI.2.10.14-15) whereas Intellect falls 
short of the absolute purity and simplicity of the One by becoming a part of 
the multiple (see for example, V.4.2.9-10; VI.2.21.3-11 and VI.6.9.29-31) 
and achieves only a lower level of purity by subsuming this multiplicity into 
one unified concept which Plotinus calls a One-Many. Since the One 
accepts all things unconditionally, it is the principle of both that which is 
pure (or intelligible) and that which is not pure (non-intelligible). Therefore, 
we can say that the One transfers its purity to Intellect so that Intellect is 
also a principle of purity, but that through the process of emanation the 
purity of the One is diluted so that the purity of Intellect is not absolute and 
all-encompassing like the One which accepts pure and impure realities alike, 
but is instead limited to an elite group called the intelligibles. Therefore, 
while the One and Intellect are both pure, the One is the principle of both 
the pure and the impure alike, whereas Intellect is the principle only of the 
pure. 
The second thing which Intellect receives from the One is an exoteric 
nature. We may recall that the One has an exoteric and hypostatic nature 
which can be grasped objectively. For as we have seen, the One is described 
in V.2.1.1 as ‘all things’ (affirming the objects it stands in relation to), as the 
‘productive power of all things’ in V.1.7.9-10 (affirming its nature as cause) 
and as that in which all things have their existence (V.3.15.24-30). These 
qualities of the One as a hypostatic principle can clearly be grasped by the 
mind and require no special mode or path of negation to comprehend. This 
is why we say that the One has an exoteric nature which can be accessed 
intellectually and an esoteric aspect which requires spiritual transformation. 
The former is associated with relational concepts such as containment and 
cause which can clearly be understood without recourse to purification or 
spiritual practice and pertains to the principle of the One as a hypostasis 
rather than as an ineffable and mysterious singularity. And it is this aspect 
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which is transferred to Intellect which, when separated from the notion of 
eternity, is simply a hypostatic principle and nothing else. For as we have 
seen, Plotinus’ notion of Intellect is presented as a kind of set-theoretical 
concept which can only be grasped in relation to its parts but which is at the 
same time logically prior to and the cause of the realities which it contains. 
Since this set of attributes exhausts the nature of Intellect, we could claim 
that Intellect is a purely exoteric principle. For Intellect does not possess any 
of the characteristics which esoteric principles do: it is not an internal mode 
symbolising a level of maturity which unlocks access to certain realities and 
is not arrived at through the negation of desire or physical existence. Thus it 
provides the objective rather than the subjective features of man’s 
experience. This means that, like all hypostases, Intellect can be understood 
as a stage on the additive process of emanation proceeding from the pure 
simplicity of the One, and that it is somewhat detached from man and his 
subjective journey of liberation since its objective existence is always 
statically present regardless of man’s ability to negate the objects of his 
experience and rise to a higher level of reality. 
However, the principle of Intellect does provide the content of man’s 
experience of the intelligibles (if this experience is indeed possible) since it 
is the cause and the sustainer of the intelligibles. It must therefore have 
something to do with man’s subjective journey of liberation since this 
journey is inextricably linked to man’s experience of all stages of reality, 
from the lowest level of matter to the highest level of the One. What is not 
immediately clear is how man could come to have lived experience of a 
hypostasis and its contents when the hypostases themselves are purely 
objective principles which exist independently of man’s subjective modes. 
For the only reason that man is able to experience the One is not because of 
its exoteric, hypostatic nature but because it also has an esoteric aspect 
which is not objective and which can be encountered directly after man has 
undergone the necessary purifications. How then could man experience 
Intellect or the intelligibles if Intellect does not have an esoteric aspect? The 
answer would seem to be that for every hypostasis under the One, there 
exists an esoteric principle which provides its counterpart and which makes 
man’s experience of the contents of that hypostasis possible. In the case of 
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Intellect, this counterpart is called eternity or the second mode of the 
esoteric. For whereas Intellect exists as a cause existing independently of 
man, eternity exists as a mode constituting man’s innermost nature; whereas 
Intellect functions as a metaphysical set which affirms its parts, eternity 
stands as a subjective principle which negates parts; and whereas Intellect 
can be understood objectively, eternity evades such an understanding. We 
may therefore claim that unlike Intellect which is an exoteric principle, 
eternity is an esoteric principle. The reason that we say that Intellect and 
eternity are counterparts is that Plotinus insists that they are both secondary 
(and not tertiary) principles directly below the One: the former representing 
the second level of the exoteric through the imitation of the hypostatic 
nature of the One and the latter representing the second mode of the esoteric 
as that which imitates the ineffable and non-relational aspect of the One. As 
we will see, both principles are necessary (and together sufficient) principles 
for man’s experience of the intelligible realities which can in the end be 
seen as the two complementary aspects of Being.  
Having explored Intellect as the secondary exoteric principle, let us now 
turn to eternity as the second mode of the esoteric. We must first seek to 
understand the way in which eternity can be described as a mode 
constituting man’s innermost nature. In 11.15-27 Plotinus claims that we 
‘produced time as an image of eternity’ by means of ‘an unquiet power’ 
which desired something more than the experience of eternal presence. The 
human responsibility for the generation of time is reiterated in 11.43-45 
when Plotinus claims that ‘time is the life of the soul in a movement that 
changes from one way of life to another’; in 12.4-12 where he says that if 
we put a stop to the activity which is ‘involved in creation and generation’ 
then nothing would exist except eternity and in 12.19-22 where he claims 
that when soul goes away from that activity time is destroyed since this 
activity of the soul generates time. It is therefore the desire for some future 
state and for the world of sense and physical experience which comes along 
with the activity of the making and production of the human soul which 
produces time. Since the desire for ‘the next and the after’ (11.17-18) is the 
cause of time, it makes sense that desireless resting and quietude (see 11.1-
4) would link man to the eternal. For in Plotinus’ descriptions of time are 
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the clues which we need to return to eternity: for example, we should allow 
‘the all to be continuously present to (us)’ (11.22-23); we should remain as 
‘a quiet seed’ (11.23) rather than ‘proceed(ing) into a weaker extension’ 
(11.26-27); and we should resist going towards ‘according to the principle 
and nature of the ‘after’’ (11.5-6) and instead ‘make this power turn back 
again and stop this life’ (12.4-5) so that we can be ‘at rest, identical to itself 
and the same and already boundless’ (11.45-46). However, there is an 
asymmetry between Plotinus’ two descriptions of the way man’s desiring 
state relates to time and the way in which his desireless state relates to 
eternity. For whereas Plotinus claims that man’s desire generates time, he 
does not claim that man generates eternity. For while time is directly 
produced by man and Soul’s self-enslaving dispositions (11.20-33), eternity 
is not created in any way but exists simply as ‘what is’ or as Being (3.34-36; 
6.12-14). We must therefore seek to understand how it is possible that on 
the one hand man’s desiring consciousness generates time but on the other 
that his non-desiring consciousness does not produce eternity. We will do 
this by introducing an analogy that can help us to resolve this issue so that 
we will be able to see more clearly why for Plotinus time is a product of 
man’s consciousness but not eternity; what eternity is in and of itself; and 
why we can claim that eternity is an esoteric principle which can be 
separated from Intellect as an exoteric principle.  
Let us now imagine that a person goes to a cinema to see a film. At the 
cinema, there are five conditions of possibility for man’s experience of the 
film which we will consider. The first is the desiring consciousness of man 
wishing to see the film; the second is the conscious awareness of the person 
watching the film; the third is the film itself; the fourth is the filmmaker; and 
the fifth is the world outside the film in which the film is seen and projected. 
Let us begin with the desiring consciousness of the man who wants to see 
the film. When the person begins to watch the film, he soon becomes so 
involved with the film and identified with the protagonist that he begins to 
share his fears and desires to become invested in the overall narrative 
centred around him. The person goes to see the film because he is bored 
with his everyday experience and wants the excitement of losing himself in 
a film. He therefore chooses to ‘seek more than the present’ by becoming 
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emotionally involved in a narrative with a past, present and future, thereby 
becoming constantly invested in the ‘next and the after’ of the film (see 
11.15-20). This activity of seeking excitement in a narrative is a pre-
requisite for the person’s becoming involved with the time of the film. For if 
he were content with his present state without the film, he would not have 
gone. Furthermore, the time of the film only exists because he, along with 
other people like him, wish to go to watch such exciting films as these. It is 
therefore the seeking of an exciting narrative with a past, present and future 
which is met by the film-making process. In a similar way, according to 
Plotinus, man in his eternal state seeks the excitement of a before and an 
after in time and thereby enters into a physical existence which is at the 
same time the result of his desire to enter into it and co-created by an 
external force (by Soul in the case of physical existence or by a filmmaker 
in the case of the analogy). Time for Plotinus, like the film time, is therefore 
produced by the desire for the narrative of a before and after and this then 
sets in motion the process of the creation of an appropriate realm in which 
such experience can occur, such as the realm of physical experience or the 
film itself. The analogy helps to clarify what Plotinus means when he says 
that time is the result of an activity of making and production: for just as 
there would be no film timeline without the making of the film, so there 
would be no time without the making and production of the human soul and 
the hypostasis of Soul. 
Let us now turn to the conscious awareness of the man watching the film. If 
time is the activity of immersion in the before or after and the forgetting of 
the present, then the eternal is the constant presence before and behind the 
before and after. If the person continues to watch the film and identify with 
the character, he will be in a state of utter insecurity associated with the 
former principle. For instead of experiencing his true nature as a whole 
(4.13), he will view himself as an incomplete and deficient being constantly 
seeking in the future the happiness which can only be found in the present 
(see for example, I.5.2). Due to his ignorance of the true reality existing 
outside the film, this man will embark on an endless pursuit for lasting 
contentment in the film, but will always fail to find it since such lasting 
(eternal) contentment is attainable only by the turning of attention away 
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from the objects of experience and back to the subject of experience, the 
watcher of the film (see 12.4-12). In Plotinus’ philosophy, turning one’s 
attention back means to ‘escape to the upper world’ of the intelligible realm 
(III.4.2.12-15) and thus to avoid the never-ending pattern of incarnation on 
earth (VI.7.7.17-23). To the man watching the film, this means cultivating a 
state of detachment from the destiny of the plot and seeing through all 
events in the context of his own conscious awareness which remains 
untouched by such illusory circumstances. The recognition of immutable 
conscious awareness in relation to the film (insofar as it cannot be destroyed 
or threatened in any way by the events within it) is not merely an analogy 
for but is also a representation of eternity and man’s eternal state of being. 
For just as man is able to escape any illusion of being trapped in the timeline 
of the film through detached and desireless observation, so he is able to 
transcend the illusion of time itself and achieve eternity by adopting this 
desireless orientation in everyday life. The shift from a forgetful and 
transfixed state to his original detached state of observation therefore 
represents the same process in both the case of the film and everyday 
existence. For both in the cinema and in everyday life, the man who loses 
himself in the objects of experience will be enslaved to a timeline, whereas 
he who keeps his awareness double-pointed by experiencing objects in the 
knowledge of his transcendent nature will rise above his timeline and 
therefore exist in a state of timeless presence (either in a relative sense in 
relation to the particular timeline of the film, or in an absolute sense in 
everyday existence).  
Following the logic of our analogy, it is apparent that whereas time is 
produced by the ignoring or concealing of man’s original nature and the 
shift in his awareness from the ever-present seat of experience to a narrative 
with a before and an after, eternity is revealed to (rather than produced by) 
man when he is able to identify with his desireless state of being. In fact, 
eternity is not only revealed to man through this state of being as something 
external to him; rather it is revealed as his true nature, or as the ‘eternal in 
(him)self’: a mode of being which ‘dwells with it(self), fascinated by its 
nature and able to do so by a natural power that never tires’ (5.7-12). This 
act of subjectivity turning back to itself is what Plotinus means by eternity 
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‘bring(ing) itself into unity with relation to itself’: for man may first see the 
unchanging screen as something separate to himself (an attitude reflected in 
chapters 1-4 of III.7), but he will soon realise that it is in fact inseparable 
from his own nature (an attitude reflected in chapters 5, 11 and 12) and thus 
the paradoxical concealment of Being to itself (or to the higher part of the 
human soul) is eventually unveiled so that there is nothing left except for 
pure presence. Furthermore, man will realise that the desireless state of 
being through which he was able to access eternity is not merely a state of 
being but is rather true Being, or Being in itself. For as soon as man stops 
identifying with an incomplete and desiring consciousness (the lower part of 
the soul), his nature as eternity is revealed to him as ‘true Being (which) is 
never not being or being otherwise, and (which) is always identical, and 
(which) is Being without difference’ (6.12-14). We have therefore clarified 
Plotinus’ claim that time is generated by the form of life of the soul and 
have also attempted to show that a person can never actually become 
estranged from eternity when he enters time, just as the man in the cinema is 
always detached from the circumstances of the film however much he 
becomes involved in its plot and characters. The only thing that can ever 
happen is for eternity to be concealed from man through his desire for 
exciting prospects in the future and for physical experience. This means that 
eternity is never absent from man’s nature and is beyond generation or 
destruction, whereas time is the reversible product of man’s estrangement 
from his own nature through desire. The former is the mode of dwelling 
with Being (5.7-18) whereas the latter, as the image of eternity (see 1.18-20, 
11.46-47 and Ti. 37D5), is the mode of desire for Being (see 4.28-31) by 
means of the ‘before’ and ‘after’ (Ibid.). 
It would therefore appear that man’s desiring consciousness is a necessary 
but not a sufficient condition of possibility for the experience of the images 
of a film or of the sensory existence associated with Soul. For while this 
desiring consciousness sets the timeline of the film, and time itself in 
motion, the basic fact of awareness, which in itself is free from any 
identification, is a further condition for man’s experience of the film and 
physical experience. For without it, there would be nothing in which man 
could experience anything. We can therefore say that this eternal state 
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(existing outside of the timeline of the film) remains intact as a condition of 
possibility both in the case of the man watching the film in a desireless and 
detached state and for the man who has forgotten his eternal nature and who 
has become identified with the characters and events within the film. For in 
both cases, man’s conscious awareness remains aloof and untouched by the 
projections appearing in front of him, and is a necessary key to his 
experience. The only difference therefore between the enlightened and 
unenlightened man is that the former realises that his conscious awareness 
transcends time, whereas the latter does not. Ontologically however, the two 
men are identical in kind. For this reason we can say that the two men are 
always in eternity and that the latter is only apparently in time, since his 
conscious awareness is always there, and it is only his desire which blinds 
him to this fact. Thus, while time only comes into being with the ‘unquiet 
power’ of man (11.21), eternity is the ever-present reality which must be 
recognised through the extinction of the desire for a temporal life (12.4-12). 
Whether this occurs or not, however, eternity is the innermost condition of 
possibility for subjective experience since it signifies the conscious 
awareness which transcends all timelines. We have therefore discovered that 
on the one hand, man’s desiring consciousness is required for his experience 
of time and its associated sensory objects but that this experience itself 
occurs in his own original eternal nature (eternity itself) which provides the 
unchanging context in which all changing phenomena appear. In order to 
understand more fully man’s journey into ignorance and his return to the 
recognition of his original nature, we must complete our matching up of 
elements of Plotinus’ philosophical architecture with the elements in the 
cinema, so that we will be able to paint a picture of man’s journey of 
liberation from start to finish. So far, we have described the subjective 
conditions of possibility for man’s experience of the film: namely, man’s 
desiring consciousness (producing a timeline) and man’s original ever- 
present awareness (which is eternity). We must now turn to the objective 
conditions of possibility (or those realities which contribute to the 
production of experience independently of man’s modes of consciousness): 
the third, fourth and fifth conditions of possibility, represented in our 
analogy by the film, the filmmaker and the screen.  
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The third condition of possibility, the film itself, can be described as the 
conceptual unity of the characters and events appearing in the cinema. In 
everyday life, it would be the conceptual unity of the sensible realities 
appearing in man’s awareness. In Plotinus’ philosophy, the conceptual unity 
of the physical, sensible realities is Soul (see for example 11.27-35; 
VI.6.7.4-7 and VI.7.42). Like Intellect, Soul can be described as a set, but 
this time of physical things since ‘it was necessary that all the very same 
kinds of living things which were in the intelligible world should also exist 
in the world perceived by the senses’ (IV.8.1.49-51). As a metaphysical set, 
Soul also receives its identity from the parts existing within it, which are set 
in their appropriate place since sensible realities must exist in Soul just as 
the intelligible realities must exist in Intellect. Furthermore, Soul imitates 
Intellect by existing not only as the unity of the sensible realities but also as 
their cause (see again 11.27-35 and II.9.8.8-16). This means that, according 
to our analogy, Soul is both the film and the filmmaker and is therefore both 
the third and fourth condition of possibility for experience, since like a film, 
it stands for the conceptual unity of a certain series of events conveyed 
through images and like the filmmaker, it is the cause of particular objects 
of man’s experience which cannot themselves be explained by man’s desire. 
Indeed, Plotinus suggests that unlike time which is the result of human 
desire (12.19-22), the creation of the physical world is the consequence of a 
parallel journey of Soul wishing to depart from the realm of Intellect, which 
therefore made ‘all of it exist in time ... encasing all its means of escape in 
time’ (11.31-33). Thus, just as the particularities of a film are dictated by the 
filmmaker and are outside of the control of the viewer of the film, so too are 
the multitudinous sensible realities created by Soul without input from the 
human soul. We are therefore presented with an image of the human soul 
producing time and Soul generating the physical universe in conformity 
with time. Since time is produced by the human soul and corresponds to its 
desiring mode of consciousness, we may call time a mode of the esoteric 
(the third after the first mode of the One and the second mode of eternity). 
Since Soul produces sensible objects independently of man, we can call 
Soul a level of the exoteric (the third after the first level of the One and the 
second level of Intellect). Furthermore, the physical universe can also be 
140 
 
conceived as exoteric since it is created by (the exoteric principle of) Soul 
on the blueprint of (the exoteric principle of) Intellect. This is why the 
physical universe, unlike time, appears externally to man: for it arises from a 
source external to himself and therefore must appear as an object of 
experience rather than remain concealed as a subjective mode or condition 
of possibility for experience.  
While we have thus far observed an opposition in III.7 between time as a 
subjective mode pertaining to human consciousness (or the third mode of 
the esoteric) and Soul as an exoteric hypostasis relating to how things are 
independently of man, Plotinus seems to threaten the legitimacy of this 
distinction in 11.29-30 when he claims that Soul made ‘time as opposed to 
eternity’ by intending to be an image of Intellect. For in this passage, 
Plotinus suggests that Soul co-creates time with the human soul with the 
implication that time, or at least an aspect of it, is on the side of objective 
features of reality existing independently of man’s mode of consciousness, 
rather than existing as a mode. How then can we square the supposition that 
time is a mode (corresponding to its intimate connection with human 
intentionality) with Plotinus’ claim that it is also produced externally to man 
by Soul? We must do this by observing the distinction between two types of 
time in Plotinus’ thought: which we will call psychological time and 
mechanical time. In our analogy, this distinction may be illustrated by 
differentiating between man’s absorption in the time of the film 
(psychological time) and the timeline of the film itself (mechanical time) 
with its ‘before’ and ‘after’; and beginning, middle and end. The causes of 
psychological time have nothing to do with the filmmaker or the film itself, 
but can only be attributed to man’s desire to lose himself in the plot of an 
exciting narrative. Indeed, man must wish to go to the cinema to watch a 
film in order to give the filmmaker the incentive to create the film which 
will be shown there. This original desire to watch a film corresponds to 
man’s fall from Intellect, since it is his desire for the ‘next’ and the ‘after’ 
which sets into motion the productive power of Soul (the filmmaker) which 
then creates the physical universe (represented by the film) (11.27-33). The 
second cause of psychological time is man’s inability to remember his true 
nature as he watches the film and becomes invested in its plot, characters 
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and eventual conclusion. This corresponds to man’s identification with his 
physical body in the temporal universe of Soul, to the exclusion of his 
acknowledgment and remembrance of his true nature as an eternal and 
intelligible being. Psychological time therefore has both an original and a 
continuous cause corresponding first to man’s initial desire for physical 
experience and second to his ongoing absorption with such experience 
which leads him to forget his original nature.  
While psychological time is man’s absorption in the ‘before’ and ‘after’ and 
corresponding forgetfulness of his true nature, mechanical time is simply the 
‘before’ and ‘after’ itself, which bears a different relationship to man’s 
desiring consciousness than psychological time. At the beginning of the 
creation of the universe, mechanical time is just as dependent upon man’s 
desire as psychological time is. For without man’s desire to move beyond 
his timeless existence in the intelligible realm, Soul would not create a 
sensory realm subject to the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of time in which man could 
experience physical existence and the extended narrative that this entails. 
Since mechanical time is simply this ‘before’ and ‘after’, and this ‘before’ 
and ‘after’ cannot be created without man’s desire, we can conclude that 
mechanical time is caused by man’s desire. However, according to Plotinus, 
this mechanical time, or sequence of the ‘before’ and ‘after’, is also created 
by the hypostasis of Soul which generates time along with the physical 
universe, and ensures that the physical universe exists within time (11.27-
33). This means that the creation of mechanical time, once desired, is out of 
man’s hands since it falls under the domain of Soul to bring it into being. 
This is why Plotinus claims both that man ‘produced time as an image of 
eternity’ (11.19-20) and that Soul ‘made (time) instead of eternity’ (Ibid.): 
for on the one hand man is responsible for the creation of mechanical time 
by desiring it, while on the other Soul is responsible for the creation of 
mechanical time by actually generating it along with the physical universe 
‘in imitation of that intelligible world’ (Ibid.). Since the actual generation of 
mechanical time is outside of man’s control, man cannot immediately erase 
the past and future by recognising his true intelligible nature. Rather, once 
he remembers himself, man is immediately liberated from psychological 
time since he is no longer so absorbed in sensory experience that he believes 
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he is a physical being who was born and will eventually die. However, he 
will still perceive mechanical time, since he will still perceive a sensory 
world through a physical body created in accordance with his previous 
desire for a journey beyond timeless presence. Since the sensory world and 
physical body were subjected to mechanical time by Soul at their inception, 
man will still perceive mechanical time but will no longer feel himself to be 
part of it. And thus, the end of psychological time does not entail the 
immediate end of mechanical time. This is why Plotinus claims that the 
future or ‘one thing after another’ means nothing after man remembers 
eternity (see 12.12-13), rather than stating that the future immediately 
disappears: for man’s ‘return’ to eternity entails only the immediate escape 
from psychological time. For while there is a contradiction in remembering 
eternity and remaining in psychological time, there is no contradiction in 
man’s recognition of his eternal state and his perception of mechanical time 
through the physical body. This is why Plotinus claims that the abolition of 
psychological time and return to eternity only begins the destruction of 
mechanical time for that person (see my comments on 12.4-22): for once 
psychological time has ended, man destroys the cause of his embodiment 
and seduction by the ‘before’ and ‘after’ but still has to endure the rest of 
the timeline produced by his previous desire for physical experience. Once 
he has undergone this, however, he will no longer need to come back to 
earth in another body, since he will rest content in his own nature as an 
intelligible being (and perhaps in the end as the One beyond Being).  
Let us now clarify the difference between psychological time and 
mechanical time by returning to our analogy of the film and the filmmaker. 
In the beginning, man desires to depart from his present state and become 
lost in the timeline and narrative of a film. This original desire both sets up 
the possibility for man to become lost in an imitative world (psychological 
time) and incentivises the filmmaker (representing Soul) to produce a film 
(standing for the physical universe) with its own timeline (mechanical time). 
The two conditions of possibility for the timeline of the film are firstly the 
desiring consciousness of the man wishing to become involved in a 
narrative and secondly the creation of the film and its corresponding 
timeline by the filmmaker. Once the timeline is in place, man goes to watch 
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the film and becomes heavily invested in the plot and identifies with the 
main character to such an extent that he forgets that he is watching a film 
and feels that he himself exists within its timeline and shares the destiny of 
the main character (psychological time). However, at some stage, the man’s 
friend points out to him that he is only watching a film and reminds him that 
there is no need to be concerned, since nothing that happened in the film 
could affect his own life, which exists beyond the confines of its plot and 
narrative. At this stage, the man comes to his senses and neither identifies 
himself with the main character nor believes that he exists within the 
confines of the timeline of the film (representing the end of psychological 
time). The man is therefore, contextually speaking, in an enlightened state of 
detachment from the film since he no longer shares the fears or desires of 
the character(s) within it. However, while the negative psychological effects 
of watching the film due to total absorption in it have ended, the man still 
finds himself observing a film with a corresponding timeline (mechanical 
time) which does not immediately end once he comes to his senses but 
continues according to the plan of the filmmaker (Soul) who created the film 
in accordance with the original desire of the man to become lost in a 
narrative. However, having come to his senses and having realised that he 
does not need the excitement of a film to experience well-being, man 
watches the rest of the film in acknowledgment of his nature beyond the 
film (representing man’s eternal nature beyond time) until the timeline of 
the film comes to an end (representing physical death and the end of 
mechanical time). Since the man’s recognition that he no longer needs to 
watch films to experience well-being remains once the film is over, he no 
longer searches for other films with other timelines (representing other 
incarnations and physical bodies) and therefore rests contented in his present 
state (eternity) beyond the projected images of the film (beyond Soul and 
the physical universe).  
The fifth and final condition of possibility for man’s experience of the film 
is a world in which this experience can take place, representing Intellect and 
the intelligible realities. In our analogy, this world is simply the world of 
real things (in this context) outside the projected images of the film. Thus, 
the world would include the people watching the film, the cinema, and 
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everything outside the cinema. Just as the world in which the man lives 
exists before the film starts, while it is playing and after it is over, so 
Intellect exists at each stage of man’s journey: beginning with his desire for 
physical experience and the generation of the physical universe; during his 
experience of the physical universe and mechanical time; and after the 
dissolution of these things at the point of physical death (since Intellect is 
eternal: see for example 5.18-19; IV.7.10.32-37 and VI.6.18.35-39). 
Furthermore, just as the film comprises a series of projected images of the 
real world, so the physical universe and matter represent a ghostly image or 
imitation of the intelligible world of perfect forms (see V.1.6.41-48 and 
III.6.7.7-17 respectively). Therefore, not only is the product of Soul 
expressed within the unchanging context of Intellect (see also IV.4.2.15-18) 
but it also derives its nature from Intellect (see for example 11.27-30; 
IV.4.13.17-22 and IV.8.1.46-50), similar to the way that the images of a 
film are derived from physical things existing in a world outside it. From an 
experiential standpoint, awakening to one’s own eternal nature is 
synonymous with entering into the intelligible realm and vice versa. For as 
the man watching the film becomes aware that he is not in the film but 
merely observing it, so does he automatically come to his senses and 
recognise that he stands aloof from the narrative and destiny of the film as 
soon as he is made aware of the world outside the film. This serves as an 
illustration of the interchangeability of realisation of eternity and Intellect: 
for as soon as man recognises his own eternal nature, he immediately 
recognises all the intelligible forms which surround him, such as Beauty, 
Love and Truth, since it exists ‘with the primaries and among them’ (4.6-8). 
Finally, just as the man watching the film remembers that he exists beyond 
the timeline of the film as a part of the (more) real world, so does the man 
who remembers that he exists beyond time recognise himself as an 
intelligible being and as a part of Intellect (see once more IV.7.10.30-40).  
Of the conditions of possibility for experience of reality which we 
enumerated, two were exoteric and the others were esoteric. The exoteric 
conditions of possibility were Soul, represented by the film and filmmaker; 
and Intellect, represented by the world outside the film. These hypostases 
are exoteric by virtue of being external causes and unifying concepts of 
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man’s experience of reality, which is comprised of sensible realities on the 
level of Soul and intelligible realities on the level of Intellect. We also found 
that mechanical time was an exoteric product of Soul which generated the 
‘before’ and ‘after’ in accordance with man’s desire to journey beyond the 
timeless presence of Intellect, and which therefore, like the physical 
universe, could continue to exist even after man’s realisation of his own true 
nature. On the other hand, we also found that there were two esoteric 
principles for man’s subjective experience of reality. The first of these is 
eternity. As an esoteric principle, eternity differs from Intellect since as we 
have seen, it is not an objective reality by which a given set of realities is 
caused, but is instead a subjective mode in which these realities can be 
experienced. Eternity is therefore the internal and subjective cause of man’s 
ability to experience the intelligible realities, whereas Intellect is the 
external and objective cause of the intelligible realities themselves, and 
therefore the external cause of man’s ability to experience such realities. For 
just as man’s conscious awareness provides one condition of possibility for 
him to experience the intelligible world around him, this intelligible world 
must at the same time exist for him to have this experience. As we saw in 
the example of the film, man’s conscious awareness (eternity) gives him 
unconditional access to the intelligible realm (the world around him) but it is 
only because this realm is obscured to man through his desiring 
consciousness and subsequent departure into psychological time and the 
realm of Soul that he doesn’t see that this is the case. Furthermore, we can 
now see why Plotinus says that eternity is a whole which ‘does not arise 
from the gathering of its parts’ (4.8-11; see also 3.19): for man’s conscious 
awareness presents a unified intuition of the intelligible realities, similar to 
the way in which he perceives a face in one act of perception, rather than its 
separate features part by part (see IV.139). For this reason, as soon as man 
has entered into the intelligible realm, he perceives all the forms such as 
Beauty, Truth and Love all together (see I.1.8.1-8). On the other hand, in 
many passages, Plotinus claims that Intellect is made up of parts (see for 
example II.4.4.11-20; II.4.5.4-6; III.7.2.17-19; III.9.1.29-34; IV.3.4.9-12 
and VI.6.15.13-15) and this is because Intellect is the exoteric and objective 
reality within which the distinct intelligible realities belong rather than being 
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the esoteric mode in which the intelligible realities are encountered in 
simultaneity, like eternity is. And thus, as a set of objects, the logical 
distinction between forms must be made in the case of Intellect, in a way 
which goes against the unified experience in eternal awareness. As we will 
see, eternity and Intellect always co-exist, so that eternity ‘is comprised of a 
multiplicity’ (5.22-23) even though it is not comprised of parts in the way 
that Intellect is.  
So far, we have seen that eternity is an esoteric mode of experience, whereas 
Intellect is an exoteric cause of phenomena. The second difference between 
eternity and Intellect is that eternity conforms both to pure and impure 
objects alike, whereas Intellect is, properly speaking, the set only of pure 
objects. As we saw in the analogy of the film, man’s conscious awareness 
was always present as he was watching the film just as it was present when 
he was reminded of the real world by his friend. Eternal awareness therefore 
does not discriminate between the pure objects of Intellect and the impure 
objects of Soul but is equally present to all objects. The only catch is that 
man will not realise that he is in eternity if he is in a state of psychological 
time. By contrast, although Intellect is also present at all times as well, just 
as the real world is always present even when the film is playing, there is a 
sense in which the physical universe is not in Intellect even though it is 
contained by it. Indeed, if someone asked the man, once he had awoken 
from psychological time, if the film he was watching was part of the real 
world, he may well say that it is not, and would be justified in doing so 
because the images of the film do not exist on the same ontological level of 
the people in the cinema. On the other hand, he could also say that the film 
is part of the real world, for the film (as long as it seen as a film and nothing 
more), is indeed part of the real world, as a projection of it existing within it. 
This is the way that Soul and the physical universe exist in relation to 
Intellect- as an image of Intellect which therefore both is and is not part of 
the intelligible world. Therefore, while Intellect, properly speaking, is the 
set of pure objects alone, eternity is not a set of a given set of realities which 
are distinguished from their illusory imitations, but is instead the mode of 
comportment to all realities which can then be concealed to man through his 
desire and ignorance. One could argue that eternity most naturally comports 
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itself to the intelligible realities rather than the sensible ones, in the same 
way that man’s natural state is to perceive the (more) real world around him 
rather than images on a screen. However, even this is a push, since there 
would be no contradiction contained in the notion of man spending his 
whole life in the illusory sensory world, just as there is no contradiction in a 
man spending his life watching films rather than interacting with other 
people. We may therefore claim that while Intellect is the realm of the pure 
alone, eternity conforms both to the pure and impure, and therefore mirrors 
the One in which there are no differentiations (VI.2.9.13-14).  
As we have already seen, Intellect can be described as a metaphysical set 
whose nature is apparent in all the intelligible realities, just as the nature of 
the set of even numbers is apparent in the numbers two, four and six and so 
on. This is why we can say that Intellect is an exoteric principle which 
mirrors the exoteric nature of the One, since it stands as an objective reality 
which can be affirmed through its parts. On the other hand, if in attempting 
to define eternity, we pointed to the form of Beauty, Truth or Love, we 
would be missing the mark, since eternity is not any object, even though its 
existence can be realised through the recognition of intelligible objects. 
Indeed, although man may automatically awaken to his own eternal nature 
when he makes contact with the intelligible realm and sees through the 
illusion of Soul and the physical universe, this does not mean that eternity is 
itself the objects in that realm, but only that intelligible objects serve as a 
fool-proof way for man to recognise the natural state of subjectivity when it 
is able to remain in a state of rest orientated towards itself (12.4-12). In 
order to know eternity, man must recognise himself as the timeless presence 
through which all objects, both intelligible and sensible, are perceived and 
distinguish this consciousness from the privileged objects (such as the forms 
and great kinds) that he is able to perceive once he has become enlightened 
to his true nature. Just like the esoteric aspect of the One, which can only be 
known through encounter and not by pointing to sensible or intelligible 
objects, so too can eternity only be known by undergoing a subjective 
process of coming to one’s senses, which in itself is separate from all 
objects of perception and understanding. We are therefore able to sum up 
the difference between eternity and Intellect by claiming that eternity is the 
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esoteric mode and subjective condition of possibility for experience which 
stands as a partless principle of negation, whereas Intellect is the exoteric, 
objective condition of possibility for experience which stands in relation to 
its parts as a principle of affirmation.  
We are now able to see why both eternity and Intellect are aspects of Being. 
On the one hand, Intellect is the objective aspect of ‘what is’, since it 
comprises all the intelligible realities which can be perceived by man as 
existing outside himself. On the other hand, eternity is the subjective aspect 
of ‘what is’ since it is that through which all realities (including the 
intelligibles) are experienced by man. Without eternity, Intellect is merely a 
collection of objects without the spark of life which subjectivity brings. This 
is why Plotinus calls eternity ‘life’ (see 3.14-15; 6.8; 6.20; 11.1-4; 11.43-45 
and 12.19-22) and the life associated with Being (3.36-38): for eternity is 
the subjective force which animates the forms and great kinds, without 
which the intelligible realities would be merely theoretical concepts bearing 
no relation to consciousness or its journey to self-knowledge. On the other 
hand, without Intellect, eternity would exist as a life with nothing to enliven. 
For it would be an entirely empty form of subjectivity, since there would be 
nothing objective to which it could conform as a mode of experience. This 
modeless subjectivity does not exist on the level of Being, of which eternity 
is an aspect, because Being always stands in relation to beings, which is 
why Plotinus claims that eternity ‘is a god which shows itself and manifests 
itself as what is ... arising from a multiplicity’ (5.19-23). And thus eternity is 
the second and not the first mode of the esoteric, since only in the first mode 
can man experience the One in a state of formless self-awareness and 
transcendence (see VI.9.11.38-45). We may therefore conclude that since 
eternity conforms to the intelligible realities, it is not the One but is instead 
‘directed towards the One and in it’ (6.9-12) as a pure desireless mode of 
awareness which transcends psychological time but which stands below the 
One, since the One both transcends Intellect and rests only in itself (see for 
example III.8.10.1-12). We can now see that whereas the One represents 
both the first mode of the esoteric and the first level of the exoteric, Being 
represents the second mode of the esoteric and the second level of the 
exoteric, with eternity and Intellect fulfilling these respective roles. As we 
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have seen, whereas eternity imitates the One by existing as an esoteric mode 
of subjectivity, Intellect imitates the One by existing as an exoteric principle 
of objective reality.  
Now that we have distinguished eternity and Intellect, we will now 
endeavour to further clarify the relationship between eternity and time by 
showing why time can be thought of as the third mode of the esoteric which 
at the same time has an exoteric aspect. We will also see why Plotinus is 
critical of accounts of time which precede him: for these accounts describe 
time only as an exoteric and mechanical phenomenon, and therefore fail to 
capture the cause of such temporality which, according to Plotinus, exists as 
a restless disposition within the human soul (11.15). 
 
III: THE THIRD MODE OF THE ESOTERIC 
In the last chapter, we discovered that time had two aspects: an esoteric 
aspect which we called psychological time, and an exoteric aspect which we 
called mechanical time. The esoteric aspect is the essence of time, since it is 
the original form of desiring consciousness which sets into motion the 
production of its exoteric counterpart with the help of Soul. This exoteric 
aspect then represents the ‘restlessly active nature’ of psychological time 
through the ‘before’ and ‘after’ which accompanies discursive reasoning 
and the perception of sensible realities. The before and after of mechanical 
time existing in the realm of Soul can therefore be conceived as the image of 
the desiring consciousness of the human soul wishing to depart from its 
natural and formless state in Intellect since its sequential nature mirrors the 
movement of the human soul as it directs its attention away from eternity 
and Intellect. We also discovered that the essence of time, or psychological 
time, is not a hypostasis existing independently of subjectivity, but is rather 
a mode of subjectivity which makes the experience of the hypostasis of Soul 
possible. This essence of time is therefore a mode of the esoteric since it 
unlocks a certain range of experience (the hypostasis of Soul) and can be 
called the third mode since the level of reality it unlocks access to is more 
limited than that of the second mode, eternity (which gives access to both 
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Soul and Intellect), and the first mode, the One, which allows man to 
encounter an ineffable state beyond both intelligible and sensible objects. 
However, since time has an exoteric aspect, it does not only stand as a key 
for unlocking human experience of Soul (embodied by its esoteric aspect) 
but is also a product of Soul, alongside human desiring consciousness, in the 
manifest form of the ‘before’ and ‘after’. Since time has both an esoteric and 
exoteric aspect, Plotinus is sceptical of arguments which presuppose that 
time is only exoteric. Indeed, in chapters 8-10, Plotinus presents several 
objections to Stoic, Aristotelian and Epicurean definitions and explications 
of the nature of time, which, we will argue, all attempt to externalise time at 
the expense of its essence as a subjective mode. In this final chapter, we 
therefore aim to show that Plotinus’ criticisms of his ancient counterparts in 
chapters 8-10 pave the way for chapters 11-13, in which Plotinus presents 
time in its totality as both an esoteric and exoteric phenomenon, as the life 
of Soul. We will do this by showing that each of the conclusions reached by 
the ancients come close to Plotinus’ definition of time but miss the mark by 
failing to see that the nature of time is embedded into human subjectivity, 
rather than simply being observed or measured by it. In all, there are five 
conclusions which we will consider: the first is the belief that time is motion 
itself, which according to Aetius I.22.7; Dox. Gr. 318 = SVF 2:514 was the 
view of the ‘majority of Stoics’, and which is examined by Plotinus in 
chapter 8. 
The first ancient definition of time which Plotinus considers is a view 
attributed to the Stoics, namely that time is ‘most usually supposed to be 
motion and a kind of change’ (from Aristotle Ph. IV 10, 218b9-18). In 
chapter 8, Plotinus argues that time can neither be orderly movement alone 
(in response to Plutarch, who in Quaest. Plat. VIII 4, 1007c-d claims that 
time is ‘motion in an orderly fashion that involves measure and limits and 
revolutions’), nor movement taken as a whole (including orderly and 
disorderly movement) by considering two possibilities. Firstly, if movement 
is in time, this would mean that it is contained in or measured by time, and it 
is impossible for something to be contained in or measured by itself. 
Secondly, if someone were to say that movement was not in time, he could 
theoretically posit the identity of movement and time, but he would be at a 
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loss to describe what movement is contained within, which is clearly 
something different from this movement. This something, for Plotinus, must 
be time. For the purposes of this argument, it does not matter whether one 
considers orderly movement alone or all movement in general: for all 
motion, whether taken separately or together takes place, in Plotinus’ view, 
within time. Plotinus further supports his view by claiming that whereas 
movements of all kinds may be interrupted or come to an end, time never 
stops, since time contains and measures not only movement but that which 
is motionless. While Plotinus discards this (possibly) Stoic conclusion about 
the identity of time and movement, we already know that in chapter 11, 
Plotinus identifies time with a kind of movement (namely the movement of 
the human soul) when he claims that ‘time is the life of the soul in a 
movement that changes from one way of life to another’ (11.43-45). We 
may therefore argue that the Stoic definition of time as sensible motion 
arises from an incorrect interpretation: for the Stoics identify time with 
sensible motion in Soul, rather than with intelligible motion in the human 
soul as it attempts to depart from eternity and Intellect. This 
misinterpretation represents a category error for two reasons. Firstly, time 
possesses a higher ontological status than sensible realities and sensible 
motion and therefore cannot be reduced to these phenomena. Secondly, time 
is an internal feature of man’s soul in a desiring state and therefore should 
not be identified as something external to man like sensible motion in the 
physical universe (relative to the embodied human being). We can therefore 
see that the Stoic interpretation of their own definition of time betrays a 
fundamental misidentification of the esoteric (subjective nature of time) 
with the exoteric (conceived as external to man) but that their definition of 
time itself, when interpreted in the correct way, is compatible with Plotinus’ 
conception. For Plotinus may well assent to the Stoic definition of time as 
‘motion and a kind of change’, since he posits that time is the primordial 
motion associated with the specific change of orientation of the human soul 
as it redirects its attention from its own resting place (namely, eternity and 
Intellect) towards the ‘next’ and ‘after’. 
The second conclusion which Plotinus considers is the idea that time is the 
‘movement of the whole’: a view which, according to Simplicius In Ph. 
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700.17-21, was ascribed to Plato by commentators such as Theophrastus, 
Eudemus and Alexander of Aphrodisias (cf.op.cit.705.5-7). Plotinus accepts 
the idea that the movement of the universe is cyclical (see V.7.1.23-25) and 
therefore interprets ‘movement of the whole’ firstly as one complete 
revolution of the universe and secondly as the speed at which the heavenly 
bodies complete this revolution. Plotinus first rejects the claim that time is 
one complete revolution of the universe on the basis that the universe could 
accomplish such a revolution in different timeframes according to its speed, 
so that it could theoretically have achieved the revolution it ends up 
completing in half the time or double the time than it actually takes. Since it 
is possible for the universe to take more or less time to complete a 
revolution, and time is identical to itself, time cannot be a revolution of the 
universe because then it could be half or double itself (or both) and therefore 
not identical to itself. Plotinus therefore rejects the first interpretation of 
time being movement of the whole on the basis that such a movement must 
take place within time rather than being identical to it. Plotinus then rejects 
the second interpretation according to which time is identified with the 
speed of the heavenly bodies on the basis that once again, time would not be 
identical to itself because certain heavenly bodies move faster than the rest 
(cf. Alex. Aphrod. In Metaph 39.22-40.09 = Arist. De Pyth. Fr. 203), so that 
if time were all of the heavenly bodies it would not be uniform. 
Furthermore, time could not be the speed of any of the heavenly bodies 
because time is that by which the speeds of the different heavenly bodies are 
measured and not any individual speed itself. For example, we only know 
that the speed of the outermost sphere is quicker than the other heavenly 
bodies because it traverses a greater distance than the others in the same 
timeframe (here Plotinus confuses matters by saying ‘a greater distance in 
less time’) where time is the constant by which speed can be measured 
relative to distance. 
Once again, it is the interpretation from which the definition arises which 
Plotinus objects to rather than the definition itself. For as long as ‘whole’ is 
interpreted as the physical universe, Plotinus denies that time could possibly 
be identified as its movement since ‘the heavenly sphere…exists and moves 
within time’ (12.15-17) and is not time itself. However, Plotinus may well 
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assent to this present definition of time as ‘the movement of the whole’ as 
long as the ‘whole’ is associated with Soul rather than the physical universe 
itself. For Plotinus states in 11.27-33 that Soul ‘temporalised itself’ by 
moving ‘with a motion not belonging to that intelligible world’ (namely 
intelligible motion: see for example, V.8.3-4 and VI.7.13 where Plotinus 
associates motion with the life and thought of Intellect) and that time is the 
‘life of the soul (in) ... movement’ (11.43-45) in contrast to the intelligible 
motion associated with eternity and Intellect. We therefore see once again 
that the possibly Platonic definition of time as movement of the whole, if 
directed to the cause of the physical cosmos rather than the physical cosmos 
itself, is compatible with Plotinus’ understanding. The difference in this case 
(just as in the case of the Stoics) is that Plotinus does not associate time with 
motion of any sensible reality, or with observable motion in the sensory 
world, but rather with the primordial motion of the human soul and the 
hypostasis of Soul as they journey away from Intellect and eternity. This 
motion, and therefore time in itself, has a greater ontological status than 
either observable motion or the physical universe itself and therefore exists 
on a par with Soul in an intermediary position between Intellect and the 
physical universe since it is neither, properly speaking, an intelligible nor a 
sensible reality. Therefore, Plotinus neither identifies time with motion in 
general; nor with the motion of the physical universe; nor with the physical 
universe itself (a conclusion which, according to Plotinus, requires no 
separate arguments to disprove because the physical universe can only be 
identified as time on account of its motion) since he believes not only that 
all the arguments to support these claims are internally flawed, but also that 
they ascribe to time too low an ontological status by identifying it with 
sensible (rather than a unique kind of intelligible) motion. 
The third definition of time which Plotinus considers is that of Zeno the 
Stoic who claimed that time is the ‘interval of motion’ (see SVF 1:93; 2:510 
and 2515), as well as its modified form which became Platonic doctrine, that 
time is ‘the interval of the motion of the universe’. Once again, we can see 
that these definitions appear to be compatible with Plotinus’ conception of 
time when applied to the human soul (the same can also be said of 
Chrysippus’ definition of time as "the interval concomitant with the motion 
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of the universe" in SVF 2:509, which we further examine in the 
commentary). For in chapter 12, Plotinus claims that time is abolished when 
the human soul redirects its attention to eternity (12.15-22) and stops the 
activity which he describes in chapter 11 as a ‘restless nature, which ... 
chose to seek more than the present’ (11.15-16). This activity has a 
beginning and an end for each human being who has first descended into the 
realm of Soul through desire, and who is then able to redirect his attention to 
eternity and Intellect. Since this desiring activity is the essence of 
(psychological) time itself, and this activity is limited by the arising and 
disappearance of the desiring state of the human soul, it follows that time 
itself is limited by these factors. For time is limited on the one hand by 
having a beginning at the inception of human desire and the corresponding 
motion of the soul away from eternity, and an end at the point at which the 
desire of the soul ends and redirects its attention to eternity. Since time 
represents the motion of the human soul taken as a whole, rather than being 
restricted to any one part of its motion, one could very well argue that time, 
according to Plotinus, is the interval of the motion of the soul away from 
eternity; an interval which is surrounded on all sides by eternity, Intellect 
and Being. This does not mean that time is exoteric, or independent of 
human consciousness in any way, but only that man’s desiring mode of 
consciousness is a temporary state, so that we can observe its beginning and 
end and see it as a hiatus or interval interrupting man’s recognition of and 
allegiance to his own eternal nature. We therefore see that the definition 
presented by Zeno the Stoic of time as an interval of motion, when applied 
to the human soul, is consistent with Plotinus’ understanding of time both as 
an esoteric mode and as an embodiment of a limited range of motion 
representing man’s temporary estrangement from the intelligible realm.  
However, just like the previous two arguments, Zeno the Stoic defined time 
in relation to sensible, rather than a unique kind of intelligible, motion. 
Plotinus does not think that time could be the interval of (sensible) 
movement in general because there are many kinds of movement, each with 
their own duration. An infinite number of movements would therefore 
correspond to an infinite number of ‘times’, which would then once again 
mean that time wasn’t identical to itself, entailing a contradiction. Neither 
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does Plotinus think it feasible to identify time with the interval of the motion 
of the universe (according to the possibly Platonic modification of Zeno’s 
claim). For if the interval is the duration of the movement itself then time is 
identical to movement in general once again: a claim which Plotinus 
believes himself to have already refuted. If the interval is the length covered 
by the universe, then this is space and not time. If the interval of motion is 
the quantity of motion of the universe as it moves, with the implication that 
time increases as the quantity of motion of the universe increases, then this 
once again a reduction of time to space for Plotinus, since it is only possible 
to make sense of the quantity of movement in spatial terms (for example an 
object has achieved a greater quantity of movement than another object if it 
has gone twice the distance in a given time). Furthermore, if the interval of 
the motion of the universe is some kind of extension, then either this 
extension is distance or quantity, which Plotinus has already attempted to 
show cannot be synonymous with time; or time is not spatial but temporal 
extension, in which case we are no closer to finding out what time actually 
is as we are using time to define itself. Finally, Plotinus believes that time 
should not only be connected to motion, since it is not only things in motion 
but also things at rest which exist within it. One could argue that in this case 
Plotinus doesn’t take into account that since there is no contradiction in 
objects being motionless within the universe itself in perpetual motion, there 
is also no contradiction in time existing as the motion of the universe and 
containing objects at rest. Having said this, it still stands that there is no 
contradiction in positing a point at which the universe as a whole stops 
expanding (in our worldview) or pauses in its revolution (in the ancient 
worldview) within time. Since this does not entail a contradiction, time 
cannot be identical to the movement of the universe, and therefore it is 
possible to support Plotinus in his claim that time cannot be the movement 
of the universe. Either way, it is clear that Plotinus believes that the claim of 
the identity of time with the motion of the universe does nothing to 
illuminate the essential nature of time.  
We now turn to the fourth and fifth definitions of time which Plotinus 
considers: namely, the definition of time given by Aristotle as ‘the number 
of motion in respect of the before and after’ (Ph. IV II. 219b1-2 and Cael. I. 
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9. 275a14-15) and the modified form of this definition given by Simplicius 
In Ph. 736.23-35: namely the conception of time as the measure of motion 
as a whole. This latter definition is modified according to the critique of 
Strato in fr 75, who states that time cannot be the number of motion, ‘since a 
number is a discontinuous quantity, while motion and time are continuous, 
and the continuous is not numerable.’ Plotinus reiterates this line of 
argument in 9.1-2 and therefore rejects the idea that time could be a purely 
mathematical number (see also 9.14-17). Furthermore, as Plotinus claims in 
9.35-50, if time is a number, then it has been quantitatively determined, but 
it is not clear what external measure could determine such quantification. If 
that which is measuring time is a temporal unit, then time is measuring 
itself, which does not help us in our investigation since a measure is meant 
to be an external standard by which something else is quantified. 
Furthermore, a temporal unit is a length of time, and not time in itself, since 
any length is a concrete quantification, whereas time theoretically embodies 
all possible temporal quantifications and therefore cannot be reduced to any 
single one. Indeed, Plotinus warns us not to confuse the temporal 
embodiment of time with time itself, for since time is infinite (as Aristotle 
claims in Ph. VIII 1, 251b19-26) and each number is finite and determinate 
(see VI. 6.2.1-10 and 17.3), time cannot be number. Thus, only the temporal 
can be quantified, and time is that by which we quantify rather than that 
which is itself quantifiable (pace Aristotle in Ph. IV II, 219b7-8 and 220b8). 
As for the fifth definition of time as the measure of motion as a whole, 
Plotinus objects to this conception of time on the grounds that however 
‘measure’ is interpreted, no cogent argument can lead to its identification 
with time. For if ‘measure’ is understood as movement that is measured, this 
itself cannot be time since as Plotinus has already explained, motion can be 
interrupted but time cannot. Furthermore, motion, like motionlessness, 
occurs within time and therefore cannot be time itself, since that which is 
contained by something is necessarily non-identical with that in which it is 
contained. Secondly, if ‘measure’ is understood as that which measures 
rather than the movement measured, then time could never itself be 
measured, since it is itself the measure. But time is measured in every 
instance of temporal quantification (such as ‘three hours’) and therefore 
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time cannot simply be a measure. Plotinus therefore also rejects the 
definition of time as a measure of sensible motion, whether ‘measure’ is 
understood to be the motion that is measured or that which measures 
motion.  
We have now seen why Plotinus rejects the Aristotelian and Aristotelian 
commentators’ definitions of time as number of motion and measure of 
motion. However, once again, motion in both cases is understood as sensible 
motion. We will now, once again, investigate whether these definitions are 
compatible with Plotinus’ understanding of time when ‘motion’ is viewed in 
relation to the human soul. We will therefore consider whether Plotinus 
understands time either as the number of motion of the human soul, or as the 
measure of motion of the human soul. Let us begin with the conception of 
time as the number of motion of the human soul. As we see in chapter 12, 
Plotinus sets out the requirements for any individual soul to achieve 
liberation from time and the realm of Soul, claiming that we must make the 
restlessly active power of our souls towards the ‘next’ and ‘after’ (as 
described in chapter 11.17-18) turn back again towards eternity. He then 
claims in 12.15-20 that having done this, the heavenly sphere will disappear 
(which we interpret to mean man’s identification with the physical body and 
the realm of Soul: see comments on 12.4-22). The time it takes for each 
individual soul to return to its identification with eternity signifies the 
strength of the original desiring activity of this human soul: if the desire was 
weak then its identification with Soul and entrapment in time will be shorter 
lived than it will for he whose desire was strong. This is why Plotinus 
claims that we can ‘measure the duration of its stop (namely the stopping of 
the identification with the physical universe- my brackets) ... by the activity 
of soul’: for the activity of soul has a certain strength which determines the 
duration of man’s enslavement in the realm of Soul. This means that the 
motion of the soul (which Plotinus identifies as time in 11.43-45) is greater 
and lesser according to each individual. That being said, it would be 
possible to argue that time, for each individual, represents a certain number 
of motion, as Aristotle put it. This number cannot be stated, as the motion of 
the human soul is intelligible and not sensible, and therefore cannot be 
quantified in the way that the duration of movement of a physical body 
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could be. Seen in this light, the number of motion of the soul would 
therefore have to be a purely abstract number which could not be known 
discursively. However, one could come to some understanding of the 
number if one knew how many years or lifetimes it took for a man, having 
descended into the physical universe, to rid himself of identification with the 
physical universe and the desiring mode of consciousness which produces 
time. We would know for example that the number of motion of the soul for 
a man who took forty years to remember his true nature and return to 
eternity would be lower than the number of motion of the soul of a man who 
took eighty years to return to eternity and retain his identification with the 
intelligible realm. For we see from Plotinus’ description of the activity of 
soul in 12.15-20 that his conception of time does not only contain the 
concept of the motion of the soul itself, but also the idea of a primordial 
quantity of each soul representing an interval between his descent and 
subsequent escape from psychological time. We can therefore see that 
Aristotle’s definition, when applied to the human soul, is compatible with 
Plotinus’ conception of time. 
Finally, the idea that time is the measure of motion could be compatible 
with Plotinus’ conception of time when applied to the human soul. For when 
we take the interpretation of ‘measure’ as that which has been measured 
rather than that doing the measuring, we see that time is the measure of the 
motion of the soul, for it represents the totality of its motion from its 
inception in Intellect when it desires for more than its present state, to its 
return to Intellect when it extinguishes this desire and returns to its natural 
state. Therefore, just as one could say that the ‘measure of increase in 
expenses is large’ (see Kalligas 2014, 618 on 13.13-18) where the word 
‘measure’ refers to the totality of that which is measured, namely the 
increase in expenses; so we may also say that the ‘measure of the motion of 
the soul is time’, where ‘measure’ refers once again to that which has been 
measured: in this case, the completion of the motion of the soul away from 
Intellect, which may then be defined as time. For since Plotinus claims that 
time is the ‘life of soul in a movement of passage from one way of life to 
another’, and this movement is, as a whole, limited to the period in which 
man desires Intellect and eternity (between his original state of 
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desirelessness in Intellect and the moment at which he extinguishes this 
desire in his embodied state), we may claim that time represents the finite 
phenomenon of man’s movement away from eternity, and is thus the 
measure of this unique form of motion. Furthermore, we may also say that 
time is the ‘measure’ of man’s embodied state. For the duration of man’s 
existence within the physical universe affords us an indication or ‘measure’ 
of the activity or motion of his soul away from Intellect and eternity, which 
we have defined as both the essence of time and psychological time. Time 
may therefore be said to be the measure of each man’s visit to the physical 
realm, insofar as it represents the totality of their experience of this form of 
life. Similarly, time is also that which measures the duration of man’s 
embodiment. For, if we know the exact strength of the activity of a 
particular soul, we will also be able to predict how long it will be embodied. 
Indeed, as Plotinus claims, if physical existence and the physical universe 
itself ‘becomes still, we will measure the extent of its rest according to the 
activity of the soul, so long as soul is outside eternity’ (12.15-19). 
Therefore, as well as being that which is measured by the duration of each 
soul’s embodiment, time could also be that which measures this duration if 
man had the means to know and translate into temporal terms the strength of 
this activity as it moved towards the physical universe.  
We have now surveyed the main definitions of time which Plotinus 
investigates and attempts to refute in chapters 8 and 9 of III.7. The same 
logic applies to his more generalised definition of time as ‘an 
accompaniment of movement’ in chapter 10. For while Plotinus is content to 
call time an accompaniment of the original movement of soul as it moves 
towards the physical universe (see 11.15-20), he does not believe it makes 
sense to call time an accompaniment of sensible movement when this 
movement must itself be in time (see my comments on 10.1-8 on p88). We 
have therefore seen that Plotinus believes that the definitions of time, 
whether as motion itself; the motion of the universe; the interval of motion; 
the number of motion in accordance with the ‘before’ and ‘after’; or as the 
measure of motion, are all arrived at through shaky reasoning which he 
attempts to expose. However, we have also seen that, according to Plotinus’ 
definitions of time in chapters 11 and 12 as ‘the life of the soul in a 
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movement that changes from one way of life to another’ (11.43-45) and as 
the life which has continuous activity (12.1-4) which ‘chose to seek more 
than the present ... always moving to the next and to the ‘after’ (11.15-18), 
the concept of motion is integral to Plotinus’ conception of time. We found 
that the definitions which Plotinus argues against, when understood in the 
context of the intelligible motion of the soul rather than the sensible motion 
of the physical universe, presented different ways of understanding Plotinus’ 
own view of time. For Plotinus defines time as an activity and motion of the 
soul, and also describes how this motion begins and ends, so that we are 
justified in positing time as a finite phenomenon, which can be expressed as 
an interval, number or measure determining and knowable by the duration 
of physical existence of man as he lives through the consequences of his 
desire to seek an exciting narrative outside eternity and Intellect. We may 
therefore claim that the common presupposition underlying all the other 
definitions which Plotinus examines is that time is understood to stand in 
direct relationship with sensible motion, either by being identical with it, or 
by representing its quantity in the form of number, measure or interval. By 
contrast, Plotinus wishes to show us that time stands in direct relationship 
not with sensible motion but rather with the primordial motion of the human 
soul and the hypostasis of Soul as they journey away from Intellect. 
Therefore, it is only because time is synonymous with the motion of the soul 
that it stands in relation to sensible motion, which exists as a result of this 
original motion. For this reason, identifying time too closely with sensible 
motion is to make a category error, since time’s ontological status 
transcends that of the physical universe and sensible motion, and stands in 
relation to them by existing as the archetypal form of motion upon which 
sensible motion and the existence of the physical universe is made possible 
(see 11.15-30). One must therefore, according to Plotinus, conceive of time 
as an esoteric phenomenon (pertaining to the mode of the human soul) 
existing beyond the hypostasis of Soul, rather than as an exoteric 
phenomenon existing within Soul. 
Plotinus’ view that time has an indirect relationship with sensible motion is 
cemented in 12.40-43 when he claims that time measures motion 
incidentally and not directly. For time is first made manifest and measured 
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by regular motion (specifically the motion of the heavens), which we 
acknowledge by giving such motion temporal units (for example, the regular 
motion of the earth around the sun translates to one year) which can only 
then be used to measure the duration of other forms of movement. This 
means that time can be said to measure movement incidentally, since its 
measurement provides the condition of possibility for all other forms of 
temporal measurement, without itself being a physical reference standard by 
which other forms of motion are measured (like the heavenly bodies). The 
fact that time measures motion incidentally rather than directly in the way 
that Plotinus sets out lends further support to the idea that time exists on a 
different ontological level to both the physical universe and sensible motion: 
for it is because time is neither divisible or graspable in any way (see 12.28-
33) that it cannot be the direct measure or reference standard according to 
which any particular form of motion can be compared. As well as holding 
greater ontological status than things in the physical universe such as 
sensible objects, time is also indivisible and ungraspable because it exists as 
an internal mode of subjectivity in which all objects appear rather than an 
object itself. Thus, whereas one might say that Soul is manifest at all times 
by existing as the sum total of all sensible realities, time is not manifest, 
since it does not depend upon the sensible realities for its existence, but is 
solely the internal form of motion which enables these realities to come into 
being. One might therefore argue that time has an indirect relationship with 
the physical universe and sensible motion in two senses: first by being 
ontologically unlike these phenomena; and secondly by being the esoteric 
condition of possibility for their existence, which is why its innermost 
nature can only be glimpsed through the observation of the heavenly bodies.  
It would therefore seem that Plotinus approaches the nature of time from 
three directions. Firstly, he defines time in relation to the desiring state of 
the human soul, which enables us to see that by extinguishing such desire, 
we may enter into a state of timelessness and eternity. This essential nature 
of time we labelled the esoteric essence of time and psychological time. 
Secondly, he defines time in relation to the hypostasis of Soul which 
enslaves all physical objects in temporal succession (see for example 11.35-
36) as a direct result of the desire of the human soul to experience an 
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exciting narrative. This definition of time we labelled the exoteric aspect of 
time, or mechanical time, which is also synonymous with temporality. 
Thirdly, Plotinus defines time as that which can be measured and made 
manifest by the regular motion of the heavenly bodies. As well as giving his 
own arguments, Plotinus also attempted to refute earlier definitions of time 
by exposing the (possible) flaws in each argument. However, we have 
argued that Plotinus did not only disagree with the reasoning behind such 
arguments but also with the presupposition behind them, that time was an 
exoteric rather than an esoteric phenomenon, pertaining to something 
outside of man like heavenly bodies, rather than to the state of his own 
internal life and the activity of his own soul. By investigating Plotinus’ 
definition of time as that which is measured by regular motion, and by 
examining his arguments against other ancient philosophers, we have 
attempted to further illuminate Plotinus’ conception of time as an esoteric 
mode. For time cannot be identified with anything in the physical universe 
but only glimpsed through signs, just as the desiring consciousness of a man 
watching a film cannot be found on the screen but only inferred through the 
exciting narrative. Once time’s esoteric and finite nature is revealed, we are 
then able to map a route to eternity by extinguishing the desire for physical 
existence, which will in turn allow us to approach the One through an act of 
absolute negation.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ANCIENT AUTHORS 
 
   Albinus 
    Is. = Isagoge  
  "Alcinous"  
    Didasc. = Didascalicus 
   Alex. Aphrod. =Alexander of Aphrodisias 
    De temp. =De tempore 
    In Metaph. =In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria 
   Mund. =De mundo 
  Anon. = Anonymous Authors 
   In Tht = Commentarium in Platonis 
   Theaetetum   
  Apul. = Apuleius 
   De Plat. =De Platone et eius dogmate 
   Met. =Metamorphoses 
  [Archyt.] = pseudo-Archytas  
   Cat. = Categoriae 
   Arist. = Aristotle  
   Cael. =De caelo 
   De an. =De anima 
   De Pyth. =De Pythagoriis, fragmenta 
   Eth. Nic. =Ethica Nicomachea 
   Metaph. =Metaphysica 
   Ph. = Physica 
  Aug. = Augustine  
   Conf.= Confessiones 
  Boeth. = Boethius   
   De consol. philos. =De consolatione philosophiae 
  De trin. =De trinitate 
  Boethus of Sidon  
Schol. in Arist. Organon = In Categorias apud T. Waitz, 
Scholia in Aristotelis Organon 
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  Cic. = Cicero 
   Tusc. = Tusculanae disputations 
 
  Diog. Laert. = Diogenes Laertius 
   Vitae = The Lives of Eminent Philosophers 
  Epicurus 
   Ep. Her. = Epistula ad Herodotum 
  Heraclit. = Heraclitus of Ephesus 
  Homer 
   Il. = Iliad 
  Iambl. = Iamblichus 
   In Nicom Ar. = In Nicomachi arithmeticam introductionem 
  Lucr. = Lucretius 
   De rerum natura 
  Max. Tyr. = Maximus Tyrius 
   Or. = Orationes 
  Nicom. = Nicomachus of Gerasa  apud Phot. Bibl cod.  
Ar. = Introductio arithmetica 
 Num. = Numenius  
  Parm. = Parmenides 
  Philo = Philo Judaeus 
   Deus= Quod Deus sit immutabilis  
   Mut. =De mutatione nominum 
   Opif. =De opificio mundi 
  Philop.= Johannes Philoponus 
   In De an.= In Aristotelis de anima libros commentaria 
   In Ph. =In Physica 
  Pl. =Plato  
   Cra. = Cratylus 
   Leg. = Leges =Laws 
   Phd = Phaedo 
   Phlb. = Philebus 
   Resp. = Respublica =Republic 
   Soph. = Sophista =Sophist 
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   Tht. = Theaetetus 
   Ti. = Timaeus 
  [Pl.] = pseudo-Plato 
   Epin. =Epinomis 
   Plut. = Plutarch  
   De E ap. Delph. =De E apud Delphos  
   De Is. et Os. =De Iside et Osiride 
   Quaest. conu. = Quaestionum convivialium libri 
   Quaest. Plat. = Quaestiones Platonicae 
  Porph. = Porphyry 
   Sent. = Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes  
   VP = Vita Plotini 
  Procl. = Proclus 
In Eucl. =In primum Euclidis Elementorum librum 
commentarii 
  Sen.= Seneca (the Younger) 
   Ep. = Ad Lucilium epistulae morales 
  Sext. Emp. = Sextus Empiricus 
   Math. = Adversus Mathematicos 
  Simpl. = Simplicius  
   In Ph. = In Aristotelis physicorum libros commentaria  
   In Ti. = In Platonis Timaeum commentarii 
  Themist. = Themistius 
   In Ph. =In Aristotelis physica paraphrasis 
   
MODERN TEXT COLLECTIONS AND REFERENCE WORKS 
  
              Dox.Gr. = Diels, Hermann. 1965. 
 Doxographi Graeci. 4th ed. Berolini: apud Walter de 
Gruyter et socios. Orig. publ. 1879, Berolini: apud G. 
Reimerum. 
             
DK= Diels, Hermann, and Walther Kranz. 1951-2. 
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 Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. 6th ed. Berlin: 
Weidmann. 
LSJ = Liddell, Henry George, Robert Scott, and Henry Stuart  
Jones. 1940.  
A Greek-English Lexicon. 9th ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.    
SVF= von Arnim, Hans Friedrich August.ed. 1903-24. 
Stoicorum veterum fragmenta. 4 vols. Lipsiae et Stutgardiae: 
in aedibus B.G. Teubneri.Repr.1964, Stuttgart: B.G. Teubner.  
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This thesis follows the text of Henry, P. and H.-R. Schwyzer 1964-
1982. Plotini opera. (Editio minor.) Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
PRINCIPAL TRANSLATIONS 
 
 
In this thesis, all translations of Ennead III.7 are my own. Translations of 
passages from the other treatises in the Enneads are those of Armstrong 
1966-88. 
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